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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM:

THE SEARCH FOR

RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES
David L. Dillman, B.S., Abilene Christian University
M.A., University of Houston

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Lewis C. Mainzer

This dissertation is concerned with the problem of

securing and maintaining a responsible public administration.
Its focus is civil service reform, particularly reform

directed at the top levels, which is a primary expression of
changes in the notion of administrative responsibility.
Civil service reform is viewed as fundamentally a political

debate between individuals and groups holding alternative
notions of the nature of responsible government.
It is argued that civil service reforms in democratic

polities are complex webs of responses to social and

economic forces, reactions to changing political values and
intellectual trends, and initiatives by interested groups.
v

Reform represents a temporary political consensus.

To

illustrate this thesis an examination is made of
the political dynamics of reform in Great Britain and the
United

States.

A brief discussion of the Northcote-Trevelyan

Report and Pendleton Act is followed by

a more detailed

examination of the reform efforts associated with the Fulton
Committee, Second Hoover Commission, and Civil Service

Reform Act of 1978,
Although important differences may be noted between
British and American reform proposals, the similarities of
the reform processes are more striking.

efforts studied is characterized by

interest group politics.

a

Each of the reform

high degree of

Each reform has attempted to make

the higher civil service more representative of the outlook

of the reform leaders.

In the twentieth century reformers,

concerned with the growth of bureaucratic power, have
emphasized the need for responsiveness to political leadership.

Reform proposals have placed stress on managerial

competence and market incentives.
The Fulton and Carter reforms made important contri-

butions to problems specific to each civil service, yet both

wandered off the track to

a

responsible administration.

By

stressing political responsiveness, the independence and
initiative of the senior civil service may have been compromised.

More importantly, their emphases on external

controls and economic incentives may have
VI

a

negative impact

both performance and public service attitude

vii
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INTRODUCTION
In the process of researching and
writing a disserta-

tion, inquiries are made frequently
by well-meaning friends

and acquaintances about the topic that
has distracted one
from normal social intercourse. The very
mention of the
topic

here— civil service reform—usually evokes

yawn or a glassy stare.

a cavernous

Yet in the political arena, an

institution so seemingly dull— the civil service—
generates
a surprising amount of interest and even
passion.

It is

perpetually being condemned, reformed, and condemned.
successive round of condemnation typically points out

Each
a

vice

contrary to that earlier alleged and the later reform
response is likely in a direction contrary to or at least
distinctly different from that earlier essayed.

Why so much

attention to this supposedly anonymous, routine, deadly
boring institution?
In short,

fundamentally

a

the answer is that civil service reform is

political debate between individuals and

groups holding alternative notions of the nature of responsible government.

The outcomes of these debates are of

crucial significance for establishing a civil service which
is politically neutral and yet responsive to executive

leadership, accountable and yet capable of initiative, pro-

fessionally competent and yet representative and sensitive
to public ethics.

The outcomes of these debates are
1

significant for deciding who rules and to
what effect.
As the British civil service enters
the

1980s it finds

itself in the midst of such a political
debate.

Much of the

condemnation flows from Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher's
war on waste and inefficiency led by the Prime
Minister's
adviser on government management. Sir Derek Rayner,
the
joint managing director of a chain of large
department

stores.

Thatcher and Sir Derek want to cut almost 100, 000
jobs by
1984 and streamline the service by abolishing the rank
of

under-secretary and "hiving-off" functions currently performed by the public sector to the private sector to realize
huge savings in expenditures on the civil service.

Yet at

the same time, it is not so clear to many observers that the

civil service deserves to be attacked nor is there full

agreement that economy and efficiency are the proper criteria
to apply to it.

The 1980s, of course, is not the first attempt to

reform the British civil service.

In the mid-nineteenth

century a concern for civil service reform became

a passion

for a small number of public officials and informed citizens

and progressively grew to become an item on the political

agenda.

Yet by almost all accounts. Great Britain by the

1850s had developed a civil service that was loyal to the
Crown, a career service, and in some departments reasonably

competent.

It is also clear that the post-World War II

higher civil service in Britain could be characterized as

a

corps of well-educated, honest,
politically neutral car.reer
officials capable of being moved quite
freely throughout the
top jobs of the civil service. Why
then did Britain
experience criticism of the civil service,
beginning just
after the war and reaching its zenith in
the late 1960s?

And what were the new standards, criteria, or
values by
which the civil service of the 1960s was being
judged?

It is clearer why civil service reform was
placed on

the political agenda in the United States in the
late nine-

teenth century.

Yet it is not so clear why the American

civil service assumed the shape that it did nor why in the
1950s an attempt was made to change this shape to resemble
the image of the British civil service.

Indeed, why, in the

1970s, when the British have found the strengths of the

American higher civil service to lie in its professional competence, political responsiveness, and openness, did the

Carter Administration bring the efforts of past Democratic
and Republican Presidents to change the civil service to

fruition?

Who, besides the President, has found the civil

service wanting and how have they brought about reform?

And

further, what are the new criteria or values that underpin
the reforms of the 1970s?

The answers to these questions

form a complex web of pressures, interests, motivations, and

values that can be said to characterize the process of administrative reform.

.

ljie_ProbLem_of _the Higher CiviJ_ Servino

Why is civil service reform so often
the object of
attention? Why is reform of the
higher civil service

habitually a key target for those groups
advocating
responsible administration? According to

a more

Brian Smith,

"reform originates in a belief that

...

the adaptation of

existing structures, expressed in terms
of functions and
responsibilities, to new objectives, technology,

resources

and environmental factors" and, it might
be added, to new
concepts of responsible administration, "cannot
take place

given the existing methods of recruiting, training,

deploying and managing the organization's human resource.

"^

In other words, civil service reform is motivated
by the

belief that the type, quality, and structure of the organization's personnel does make a difference in achieving

organizational objectives and in establishing and
taining a responsible organization.

main-

Yet this does not answer

the question of why the focus of reform is so often on upper

levels of the civil service.

Undoubtedly, part of the answer

lies in the observation that higher civil servants have

three main functions which put them at the center of concern:
first to keep the machinery of administration in good
order so that it is readily useful for the political
leadership of the departmental systems; second to
operate the administrative machinery so as to accomplish
,

,

--Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971) 214-16
:

2,

.

^Sf -^^""^K^f

^^"^

political leadership, and third

to

In carrying out these functions,
the top administrator
is concerned with the traditional
"POSDCORB" activities of

planning, organizing, staffing,
directing, coordinating,
reporting, budgeting, and, it might be
added, evaluating.
In carrying out these tasks, the
administrator has a pivotal
role in translating political goals into
administrative

practice, a role which calls for technical-managerial
skills
In this pivotal capacity, "the importance
of the higher
civil service springs from the fact that collectively
the
upper ranks represent the bureaucracy's outlook for
most

purposes."

Top civil servants influence the attitudes and

work patterns and habits of those below them, and, "indeed,
the characteristics of the top group have generally formed
the model for the civil service at large.

"-^

Furthermore, in

the execution of these administrative functions the scope of

discretion is broad and the exercise of responsibility takes

^Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), footnote
p.

38

"^In "Why Does Public Administration Ignore Evaluation,"
Public Administration Review 31 (March/April 1971) 201-202
Orvile F. Poland suggests adding an "E" for evaluation, to
the traditional POSDCORB functions of the administrator.
:

Marx, The Administrative State, pp. 11, 46.

.

on real meaning.
1

Although it is not always clear
that
higher civil servants have more
discretion

in the implemen-

tation of policy than mid-level
and "street-level" bureaucrats, it is generally the case
that their use of discretion
has a wider impact— in terms of
the effect
on people,

finances, or area.

The potential for disaster or
for benefit

that comes through their use of discretion
and their
influence on the administrative machine
gives political
leaders and the public cause for concern
as to

the nature of

the higher civil service.

Being pivotal officials, the top permanent
bureaucrats
not only translate policy choices into
administrative

action,

but they also have

a

fourth function of making policy

choices through giving political and technical advice
and
initiating and formulating public programs.

Certainly the

top civil servant, if any public administrator, does not

work in a purely administrative environment.

On the con-

trary, he or she operates in the politicized atmosphere of

interest groups, political executives, congressional leaders,

opinion polls, political parties, and the press.

Thus,

in

addition to managerial skills, indeed, before managerial
^George A. Graham, "Essentials of Responsibility," in
Elements of Public Administration 2nd ed., ed Fritz
Morstein Marx (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
,

1959)

,

p.

474

.

skills, the top administrator
requires political sense. 1
As
the top civil servant performs
these political functions,
his personal and organizational
perspectives are brought to
bear on policy-making.

Carrying this notion of the higher
civil servant as
pivotal actor further, Hugh Heclo contends

a

that "the rela-

tionship between political and administrative
officials
persists as one of the linchpins of effective
government per
formance" and therefore "goes to the heart
of a modern
democratic government 2
Heclo 's view, democratic govern
ment depends not only on a supply of competent
politicians

and administrators, but more importantly on
developing and
maintaining a relationship between the two sets of actors
that facilitates political control of the bureaucrats
while
at the same time allowing them to exhibit individual initiative and positive performance.

To achieve this kind of

balance requires that political leaders and civil servants
be closely linked so that bureaucratic power can serve

political ends and be controlled by political leaders.
the same time,

At

the two groups must maintain a degree of

separation so that bureaucratic leadership will not become
Isee K. C. Wheare s discussion of the impact of party
politics on the British higher civil servant in The Civil
Service in the Constitution (London: The Athlone Press,
'

1954), p. 27ff.

^Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 3, 6.

8

ascendant over political life and
so that personal political
power will not become entrenched
in the machinery of government. ^ For Heclo, the search for
the proper balance raises
two questions:
"First, what sort of central
authority, if

any, should guide the civil service
system as a whole?
Second, how should responsibility for
protecting the civil

service from political partisanship be
organized? " 2 Thus,
for Heclo, achieving a responsible
administration requires

structural reforms of the higher civil service
which reflect
the constantly changing political balance
between executive
leadership, political responsiveness, and neutral
competence.
Similarly, Peter Self argues that it is the nature
of
the blend between the top political and administrative

elements of the public service which determines its effectiveness.^

management

Like Heclo, Self points to the structure of top

— the

dividing line between the political execu-

tives and career executives, its rigidity as well as the

sharpness and clarity with which these roles are differen-

tiated

— as

a key to securing a responsible administration.

For Self, the classic problem of responsible administration
in democratic societies is the tension between the
^Ibid., p. 8.
^ibid., p. 24.

Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, An
Enquiry into the Structure and Processes of Modern Govern ment 2nd ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1977),
,

pp. 162-63.

requirements for an administration
accountable to political
executives and an administration which
can take effective

act ion. 1

Part of the resolution of this
tension focuses on
the relations between top political
and bureaucratic
offi-

cials.

In Britain, the line between the
two sets of officials "is marked most clearly and rigidly,
and associated

with a definite and well understood
differentiation of roles.
Moreover, each of the groups principally
concerned is
highly

cohesive."

American government, on the other hand, "pro-

duces neither a clear differentiation of politics
and administration, nor a cohesive pair of political and
administra-

tive elites."

Each approach to defining the nature of the

higher civil service contains its own special problems since
that nature is a political accommodation over the rules of

access to the top positions, the kind of individuals in these
positions, the political values which are stressed, and the

higher civil servants' relationship to political executives.

Both Heclo and Self, then, correctly point out that the
nature of the higher civil service and the appropriate mechanisms for changing its nature are central concerns for the

reformer attempting to make administration more responsible.

^Ibid., pp. 277-78
^Ibid., p. 163.
^Ibid., p. 173.

.

The Problem of Power

Perhaps the crux of the problem of
the higher civil
service and responsible administration

is the issue of admin-

istrative power.

For example, in Great Britain
in the early
1960s, many members of the Labour Party
observed that administrators exerted an enormous amount
of power in
the

initiation and formulation of public
policy through their
continuity, expertise, and control of
information.

Many of

these Labourites believed that bureaucracy
should be held
responsible primarily through reducing the
preponderance of
Oxford and Cambridge graduates in the top
administrative

positions, politicizing top appointments, and
decreasing the
anonymity of administrative advice. Others in the
Labour

Party who perhaps shared the assessment of the source of
power but who disagreed on its extent, continued to hold to
the view that the bureaucracy's actions could be made respon-

sible by the strict anonymity of politically neutral,

competent (Oxbridge) civil servants.

More recently, the

concern for the civil servants' alleged power to thwart the
goals of Conservative Party manifestos is behind the Thatcher

Government's attempt to cut and reorganize British central
administration.

Thus it is that differing explanations of

the source or amount of bureaucratic power give partial

impetus and content to the reform debate.
The theme of administrative power is ubiquitous.

For

instance, common to the elite perspective of C. Wright Mills

.

who argues that power resides in
the very few interlocking
corporate, military, and state leaders; ^
the ruling class

perspective of James Burnham who claims
that modern managers
control access to the instruments of
production and therefor
form a ruling class; 2 and the pluralist
perspective of
J. Leiper Freeman who contends that
bureaucrats
share power

with interest group leaders, congressional
leaders, and
political executives, 3 is a concern for the
problem

of power

But to ask, "do bureaucrats really have
power?," and "what
is the nature of the power they possess?,"
involves
an

investigation into philosophical and theoretical
issues of
real complexity. For example, emerging from the despair

of

Robert Michels, who concludes that bureaucracy is inevitably

undemocratic,^ and F. A. Hayek who believes that public

bureaucracy necessarily restricts liberty;

^

the ambiguity of

Max Weber who, on the one hand, claims that bureaucracy is
-^C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1956).

2

James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (London:
Putnam Publishers, 1942)
Also see Milovan Djilas, The New
Class (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1957) for
this ruling class perspective.
.

3

J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process:
Executive
Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations (New York: Random

House,

1965)

.

^Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New
York: The Free Press, 1962)
F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1944).

a

.

.

tool subservient to its
owners, but, on the other
hand,
believes it is indispensable and
thus omnipotent; ^

and the

optimism Of Alvin Gouldner who
posits that bureaucracy is
not
inevitable, 2 is a hint of the
complexity that surrounds discussions of bureaucratic power.
Complexity arises from the
writer's own ideology as well as
the historical, economic,

and social context of the
bureaucracy under consideration.
In his review of the fundamental
approaches
to

achieving administrative responsibility.
Arch Dotson shows
the complexity of bureaucratic power
through

assessing the

sources, nature, and extent of that
power.

He argues that

administrative officials have "an extensive and
vast political power" which is derived from five
major areas:
1)

origination of legislation,

2)

the collaboration with legis-

lators and legislative committees,

3)

the collaboration with

pressure groups and special clienteles,

4)

the chief executive and his assistants, and

tation of law.

the

the influence upon
5)

the interpre-

Beyond this, the nature of bureaucratic power

is that it is conferred,

"not merely in a formal, but in a

substantive sense, [by] the representative assembly, the
chief executive, the courts, and other parts of the political
-"See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed.. From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd.
1948)
,

2

Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy
(New York: The Free Press, 1954) and his "Metaphysical
Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," American Political
Science Review 49 (1955) 496-507
:

3

13

system" due to the "role ux
of tne
the state
^t^t^ -in economic and
social
affairs" and "the inadequacy
or unsuitability of the rest
of
the political system to that role."l
Thus the source of
bureaucratic power may be located more
precisely

m

in the

bureaucrats' specialized knowledge
or expertise. 2 Dotson
concludes that given the nature of
bureaucratic power,
attempting to control it and attain
administrative responsibility is a problem for the entire
political system.
In a rare instance of bureaucratic
candor. Lord William

Armstrong, after his retirement as Head of
the British Civil
Service Department, gave credence to Dotson
's conclusions.

Lord Armstrong confessed.
Obviously, I had a great deal of influence. The
biggest
and most pervasive influence is in setting the
framework
within which the questions of policy are raised.
We set the questions which we asked ministers to
decide
arising out of that framework and it would have been
enormously difficult for my minister to change the framework so to that extent we had great power.

But not only does the ability to set the framework

provide administrators with power, power is also claimed by
the default of legislators and executive leaders.

Lord

Armstrong went on.
We were very ready to explain it to anybody who was
interested, but most ministers were not interested.
'-Arch Dotson, "Fundamental Approaches to Administrative
Responsibility," Western Political Quarterly 10 (September

1957) :720-21.
2

See Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and
Public Policy 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1976) for a discussion of bureaucratic expertise.
,

^The Times

(London), November 15, 1976.

.

14

prepared to take the questions as
we offered
came out of that framework without
goinq
back into the preconceptions of them.l
^

^
^Zl
t
them, which

^

Finally, Armstrong suggests that
expertise and continuity are sources of bureaucratic power.
in choosing top
civil servants, "I wouldn't say to the
Prime Minister 'there
is A, B, C, D and it's up to you to
choose' because

I

think

knew them better than he did and so in
that area I reckon
I had greater power in that sense. "2
Lord Armstrong
naturally assumes a well-intentioned, reasonable
I

use of the

power that fell to the civil service.

Other observers are

not so charitable.

Tony Benn, Labour M.P. and former minister, confidently

asserts "that the power, role, influence and authority of
the senior levels of the civil service in Britain

grown to such an extent as to create the embryo of
porate state."
II

3

.

.

.

have

a cor-

This power is seized by bureaucrats through

intentionally misleading ministers, maintaining

a veil of

secrecy, withholding information, delaying decisions, and so

on to maintain their own elite positions.

Benn's critique

receives support not only from the political left but from
the right as well, and juxtaposed to Lord Armstrong's more

Ijbid.

^ibid.

^Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Civil
Service," lecture given by Tony Benn to the Royal Institute
of Public Administration (Nottingham Institute for Workers'
Control, 1980)
p. 1
,

.

pluralist view exemplifies the
widely varying views with
respect to administrative power.
Frederick Mosher's premises, as
outlined in De^ocracx
and the Public,^ervice, provide
working assumptions regarding
administrative power.

governmental decisions and behavior have
1.
tremendous
influence upon the nature and development
of
oSr
society,
sSc?etv
our economy, and our policy;
the great bulk of decisions and
actions taken by
governments are determined or heavily
influenced bv
officials, most of whom are appointed,
2.

not'el'ectedr^

the kinds of decisions and actions these
3.
officials
take depend upo.n their capabilities, their
orientations,
and their values; and
'

these attributes depend heavily upon their back4.
grounds, their training and education, and their
current
associations
Thus, the existence of administrative power in contem-

porary democracy may properly be taken as a given without
specifying the precise extent and nature of that power.

Yet

its very existence suggests that with few exceptions "the

most important social question we face today is that of the

conditions of bureaucratic responsibility."^
It is clear then that one's perception of the power of

the higher civil service is closely interwoven with one's

assessment of the direction reform should take.

Those who

'Frederick Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 1.
2

J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
(Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), pp. 263-64.

believe that civil service power
should be reduced may
question the predominance of higher

civil servants with an

education in the classics, for example.
In political disputes over civil service reform,
the view of administrative
power that each group holds is part
of
the background that

shapes that particular group's
orientation with respect to
securing a responsible administration.

Civil Service Reform and the Nature
of Responsible Administration

Responsible administration is

widely shared in democratic society.

a

political concept

And yet it is

a con-

cept often at the center of political disputes
because it
is shared imperfectly.
Among its varied meanings

particular

political participants in particular disputes may find
just
that connotation which best serves their purposes.

Thus,

it

may be that when "responsible administration" is invoked

differing connotations and values are being expressed.
For example, in both the United States and Great
Britain, differing notions of responsible administration have

been alternatively stressed according to the social and
political context.

Herbert Kaufman has shown the cyclical

nature in the United States of three administrative values-

representativeness, politically neutral competence, and

executive leadership."^

He argues that while one value is

See Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization
and Political Power," Public Administration Review 29
(January/February 1969) 3-15, and "Emerging Conflicts in the
:

.

.

being stressed, political
discontent associated with the
neglected values grows until
enough political pressure has
been generated to support a
change in institutional

fo.
)rms

NO political value is totally
achieved and no value i:.s
totally neglected.
this way, a constant movement
in
political values and institutional
reform is taking place.
Frederick Mosher has identified the
evolutionary
character of the American governmental
administration.
Dividing American administrative history

m

into six periods-

government by gentlemen, government by the
common man, government by the good, government by the efficient,

and in the

post-World War II period, government by administrators
and
government by prof essionals— he has shown how each
turn of

the evolutionary cycle emphasized different values
of respon

sible public administration.

Mosher has also pointed out

that in European countries, since World War II, reform

efforts have emphasized three values:

first, representative

ness, through democratizing "their higher civil service by

opening its gates of entry to larger segments of the population"; second, competence, through strengthening "their

capacities to deal effectively with the social, economic,
political, and technical problems in

a

period of acceleratin

change" through professionalizing the civil services; and
third, executive leadership, through enlarging "their

Doctrines of Public Administration," American Political
Science Review 50 (December 1956 ): 1057-1073

.
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capabilities in the areas of
administration, management, and
broadly, politics. "1 The point
that both

Mosher and Kaufman

make is that administrative values
are shaped by changing
societal, intellectual, and political
trends.

Similarly, James Q. Wilson identifies
five goals or
values which characterize a responsible
government.
First, there is the problem of
accountability or control-getting the bureaucracy to serve
national goals. Second is the problem agreed-on
of equitygetting bureaucrats to treat like cases
basis of clear rules, known in advance. alike and on the
Third is the
problem of efficiency— maximizing output for
a
expenditure, or minimizing expenditures for a given
given output.
Fourth is the problem of responsiveness— inducing
bureaucrats to meet, with alacrity and compassion,
those
cases which can never be brought under a single
national
rule and which, by common human standards of justice
or
benevolence, seem to require that an exception be made
or a rule stretched. Fifth, is the problem of fiscal
integrity properly spending and accounting for public
^

money

—

It is clear that the values Wilson mentions may contradict

each other.

For example, the goal of responsiveness or

making compassionate exceptions may conflict with the desire
for equity or treating everyone the same.

Likewise, the

problem of efficiency may contradict efforts to pursue
national goals.

Because the various values which fall under

the rubric of responsibility may work against each other,

political debates about the meaning of responsible administration are complicated and ambiguous.
•^-Democracy and the Public Service,

p.

37.

James Q. Wilson, "The Bureaucracy Problem," The
Public Interest 6 (Winter 1967) :4.

If the values that
embody "administrative
responsibility" are political, it is
also the case that the
administra-

tive reforms that institutionalize
these values are
political.
indeed, Dwight Waldo
persuasively argues that
"administrative devices are relative
to the economic and
social composition and ideological
complexion of the
societies in which they exist.
And the British student of
public administration, c. H.
sisson, asserts that administrative techniques and procedures
"are essentially not solutions
to administrative problems-if
indeed such things as purely
administrative problems may be said to
exist at

ail-but

responses, more or less slow, coming
from sources more or
less deep in the histories of the
countries
concerned, to

particular political problems of

a

more or less enduring

sort. "2

Likewise, his British colleague, Brian Smith,
argues
that "reform aims to make administrative
structures
and

practices compatible with broader political goals.
Institutional reform of public bureaucracy, therefore,
is a response to changing political values and goals.

It

should be added, however, that to view reform as the well

coordinated pursuit of agreed-on goals would be too
^Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic
Administration," Ameri can Political Science Review 46 (March
^

1952) :91.
2

C. H. Sisson, The Spirit of British Administration
(London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1959), p. 147.

^Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," p. 217.

.
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simplistic.

Civil service reform "is not
necessarily
developmental one towards a clearly
defined

a

goal known in

advance, but a complex matter of
acceding to pressures, communicating and discussing ideas,
stimulating comments from
groups with potential interests, and
making judgments within
the administrative system about
tactics and timing for the
introduction of particular changes.
Reform,
then, is a

complex web of reactions to changing
political values and
responses to political pressures from groups
outside and

inside bureaucracy as well as initiatives
by interested
groups.

It is only by identifying these deeper
pressures

and values that one can explain the moral fervor
and political turbulence which often surrounds civil service
reform

movements
Looking Ahead
The chapters which follow will examine several signif-

icant reforms of the British and American civil services

beginning with the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and Pendleton
Act.

Particular emphasis will be placed on the post-World

War II reform periods associated with the Fulton Committee,
the Second Hoover Commission, and the Carter Presidency.

An

attempt will be made to identify and describe the assortment
of factors contributing to a reform environment, the
'"Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p. 183.

interests that participate in reform,
the recoi^endations of
the reforming bodies and the
problems of implementing those
recommendations, and the political, economic,
and social
values that characterize the reform
period.

in essence,

then, an attempt will be made to
identify and describe the

political dynamics of administrative reform
and the problem
of securing and maintaining a responsible

public administra-

tion in two contemporary democracies.

Chapter

I

will examine the creation of career civil

service systems in both Great Britain and the
United States.
The focus will be on the political, economic, and
social

dynamics of the reform process which resulted in the

Northcote-Trevelyan reforms and the Pendleton Act.
Chapters II and III will investigate the great post-

World War II American reforms.

The creation and recommenda-

tions of the Second Hoover Commission and its implications
for a responsible civil service will be the focus of Chapter
II.

Chapter III brings the presidential fascination with

higher civil service reform up to date.

This chapter is a

case study of the Carter Administration civil service reform

and asks why this presidential fascination continues, what

forces or pressures have stimulated and shaped the reform

process and proposals, and how the Carter reforms have

affected the nature of the higher civil service.
Similarly, Chapters IV and V will examine the post-war

British civil service, with

a

primary focus on the work of
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the Fulton Committee.

Specifically, Chapter IV will
discuss
the political, social, and
economic dynamics that played
a
role in the creation of the Fulton
Committee, chapter V
will discuss the work of the
Fulton Committee, its recommendations, the response of the
government,
the civil

service, and the press and the impact
of the Fulton reforms
on the higher civil service.

Chapter VI pulls together the threads
running through
the various reform efforts in the hope
that
such an assess-

ment may contribute to

a

better understanding of the nature

of reform in democratic polities.

Finally, it asks whether

the reforms that are investigated here are
on the right

track to a more responsible civil service in the
belief that

thinking about such a question may provide insight into
the
nature of a truly responsible public administration in

contemporary democracy.

CHAPTER

I

CREATING THE CIVIL SERVICE IN
GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES

The reform movements in Great
Britain and the United
States which resulted in the
creation of unified, career
civil service systems were marked
more by their similarities
than by their differences. For
although the pressures which
stimulated the reforms and the
practices which characterized
the civil service in each country
can be in some ways sharply
distinguished, nonetheless both reform
efforts were fathered
by a concern for politically neutral
competence and mothered
by a concern for responsible civil service
subject to democratic control. It is also true that
administrative practices in both the United States and Great
Britain were
shaped by external social, economic, and political
pressures
as well as by internal administrative pressures
and initiatives.

Immediate causes of reform may differ, but the

similarities lie in the fact that in both countries civil
service reform processes and the consequent administrative
structures are responses to these pressures.

This chapter

will trace the pressures leading to the creation of civil

service systems in the mid-nineteenth century in Great

Britain and the United States and discuss the implications
for administrative responsibility.

23
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Pressures fqr_ch ange in Brit ain

unlike the Genesis account of
creation,
Civil service based on career
employment

a unified Ho.e

was neither created

ex nihilo nor was it the work
of one creator.

Northcote-Trevelyan Report of November

23,

For while the

1853, stands as a

Significant landmark, its historical
antecedents along with
the social, political, and
administrative
post-Northcote-

Trevelyan developments form a continuous
web of creative
activity
As England entered the 19th century its
civil service
was neither unified, permanent, nor much of
a service.
At
best there existed a departmental service,
not a unified
public service. 1

"Each public office carried on its business

in its own way, using whatever methods of
organization its

traditions or its necessities dictated and the public
tolerated." 2

Thus, each office determined its own criteria

for selection and tenure.

There was not a clear distinction

between the civil service and the political service to the
Crown; even low-level officials had political tasks to perform.

Nor was the civil service permanent in the sense

^Henry Parris, "The Origins of the Permanent Civil
Service, 1780-1830," Public Administration 46 (Summer 1968):
143.
Also see J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
(Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), chapter 1,
for description of the British civil service in the early
19th century.
•^Emmelme W. Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil
Service, 1780-1939 (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1965),
p.

33.

that officials enjoyed tenure
for good behavior.
The result of this state of
administrative affairs was
that attempts to provide services
were not coordinated, and
there was no "supervision of
public offices, and therefore
no means of ensuring that the
public business was performed
at as low a cost as possible. "1
There were no examinations
or other "objective" selection
standards; positions were
secured through patronage, either
political or
personal, and

positions often degenerated into sinecures.

Patronage was

largely in the hands of Parliament, although
the Treasury
was exercising more and more control over
the appointment
and promotion of patrons.
One late 19th century American student of British
government, Dorman Eaton, was led to conclude that it
was

inevitable that "grave abuses" existed.

Patronage "caused a

vicious activity and rewarded demoralizing intrigues in

Parliamentary and even municipal elections.

.

.

.

The prac-

tice was also fatal to economy and disastrous to the character and efficiency of the public service."^

Misappropriation

of public funds for private use was prevalent and bribery

was common.

Yet, by the 1830s an administration had devel-

oped that was to a great extent distinct from Parliament and
'Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service

...

2

,

p.

33.

Dorman B. Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, A
History of Abuses and Reforms and their Bearing Upon
American Politics (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1880)

,

p.

145.
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the crown.

..And,

at the sa.e ti™e,

it had, by the force
of

public opinion, without any law
on the subject, co.e to
be
the rule, almost universally
acted upon,
that those in the

civil service below cabinet
ministers and a few political
assistants should not be removed
except for causes other
than political opinions...!
Whether due solely to the foi
)rce
of public opinion or to some
help from top administrator,

who found a spoils system a hindrance
to their attempts to
provide services, it is the case that
a spoils system, on
the American model, had vanished from
British administration

early on.

Permanent tenure of officials during good
behavior
became the normal practice, although this did
not preclude
the use of political and party considerations
to fill

vacan-

cies.

In addition, reformers, motivated largely by
a desire

to introduce probity and economy into
government finances,

and department heads, looking to make their own job easier,

had secured an end to the practice of sinecures.

For the

same reasons, opportunities for embezzlement and conflicts-

of-interest had been closed through establishing new auditing
and accounting procedures in the Treasury and subordinate

offices.

Following these developments which were aimed at preventing corruption and waste, pressures continued to grow
-^Ibid.,
2

p.

146.

Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service, p. 69.

during the 1830s and 1840s, slowly,
but steadily, against
the use of political patronage
as the sole vehicle for
access to the civil service.
The new focus on
political

patronage signaled a change in the
reformers' perspective of
a responsible civil service.
By mid-century, many
reformers

were confident of the civil servant's
character or at least
convinced that checks had been instituted
to protect the

public purse against officials of weak
morals.

And although

economy continued to be the focus of many
members of Parliament, the emphasis of some reformers was
shifting to
a

con-

cern for administrative efficiency through
improving the
quality of the personnel selected. Requiring a
candidate

to

demonstrate fitness for public service through
competitive

examinations was emphasized as the best approach to securing

competent officials.

Eaton points out that the demand for

examinations as a condition for admission to the service was
so great during the Melbourne administration (1834-1841),

from both higher officials and thoughtful public opinion,
that Lord Melbourne "yielded so far as to allow pass exami-

nations to be instituted in some of the larger offices.""^
The number of departments requiring some type of examination
"'"Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain
In the
p. 157.
pass examination system each candidate is examined against
some prescribed standard and does not actually compete with
anyone.
The candidate merely has to meet a standard which,
incidentally, can be manipulated to select the desired
appointee or lowered to a point that no barrier really
exists.
The pass examinations instituted by the Treasury in
1836 tested the candidate's ability to read, write and do
simple arithmetic.
,

to be taken or standard
to be ™et increased
steadily up to
1853.

Thus by 1853 the character
of British administration
was such that:

e^'^'^l^^^t^?-^^

for. Of

piac°s"L^ro%f:er:;":L-:r!o^nra%^^lf?cSriu?^-^^"'
K:-:iL?ca1°co:d^Itio°n?"^

was^roscribed Vre^L^^of

^eveLV^Jnr^f a^L^-e^":S:

H

T^^t^^^^^^

departments also)
the higher places were ^xxxea
fili;d bv
promotions from the lower.
,

h^.^^^.^^Y °f Q^^^^ Anne, which prohibits post office

influence elections, and the laws
Geora^^T?T
George
III, ^^i^^"""
which prevented them and nearly all others of
service from voting, were still in force,
^nd
and ^Lf'-'^iJ
they effectively protected the freedom of
elections
from invasion by executive officers.

There were pass examinations ... and very
5.
generally, a six-months probation.
In addition, competitive
examinations were being enforced (in mere selfprotection) by the heads of some of the offices..

Personal corruption in office had, for a consider6.
able period, been of very rare occurrence.-^
It should be pointed out that Eaton's generous
assessment

was from the perspective of an American reformer seeking a

model for reform of the United States public service.
Yet, even by Eaton's admission, all was not well.

The

growing use of pass examinations did not prevent positions
being awarded on the basis of the needs of the incumbent
Ibid., pp. 182-83.

political party or an individual
member of Parliament or
the
political opinions or family name
of the candidate for
government service. Since the Reform
Act of
1867, which

extended the electoral franchise,
had not yet appeared, it
is clear that for the Prime
Minister and Parliamentary
leaders patronage still played a part
in controlling the
House of Commons and holding electorates ^
.

Patronage was

the single, most important "defect"
that reformers of the

mid-nineteenth century were out to remedy.

For in the

estimation of reformers, patronage allowed
position in the
civil service to be filled by the unambitious,

the indolent,

and the incapable, rather than those with
superior qualifications. As a consequence, the efficiency of the
public

service suffered; there were "complaints of official
delays,

official evasions of difficulty, and official indisposition
to improvement. "2

That such complaints were not unanimous

throughout the civil service was an indication that some

departments were reasonably competent.

Thus,

unifying the civil service departments under
also lay before the reformers.

the task of
a single system

For not only were some

departments setting quite high examination standards while
^K. C. Wheare, The Civil Service in the Constituti on
(London: The Athlone Press, 1954), p. 15.
'^Great Britain,

Report on the Organization of the Per
manent Civil Service C. 1713 (1854)
Reprinted in Great
Britain, Committee on the Civil Service, The Civil Service
Cmnd. 3638 (June 1968), Vol. 1, "Report of the Committee
1966-1968," Appendix B. Hereinafter cited as N-T Report.
,

.

y
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others were

adminic;tp>r-T
nrr
uministering

,,^-,1

weak pass exams or none at
all,
there was also a diversity
of pay scales in the
different
departments and differing age
limits for entering and

retiring from the service.
^

For example, examination
prac-

tices ranged from none in the
Home, Colonial, and Foreign
offices to simple arithmetic
examinations to a real quali-

fying examination in the Admiralty.
2

m

most departments,

promotion was based on seniority or
political criteria.
Whether or not it was entirely

justified, the charge of

administrative inefficiency, in the form
of patronage,
departmental fragmentation, and incompetent

officials, was

the rallying cry of the reformers.

The Northcote-Trevelyan Report
It should be noted again that the reforms
of the mid-

nineteenth century, and indeed reforms at the
beginning of
that century and those to come later, were initiated

by exec-

utive officials, primarily from the Treasury, rather than

members of Parliament.

For while the department leaders had

much to gain in terms of facilitating their day-to-day jobs,
if the patronage system were dismantled, the elected politi-

cians, until after later electoral reforms, had much to lose
'Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service pp.
Also see Robert Moses, The Civil Service of Great
Britain Vol. LVII, No. 1, Studies in History, Economics
and Public Law, Columbia University (New York: Longmans,
Green and Co., Agents, 1914), pp. 24-33 for a discussion of
the condition of the British Civil Service in 1853.
,

93-95.

,

^Moses, The Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 72.

in terms of political power
to reward supporters.
However,
if Members of Parliament
were not interested in securing

efficiencies through abolishing
patronage, they were interested in securing economies in
public expenditure. Thus it
was that "frequent Parliamentary
expressions of dissatisfaction with the rising cost of
administration led in 1848
to the appointment of a Select
Committee on Miscellaneous

Expenditure to seek economies."^

In April 1853, W. E. Glad-

stone, Chancellor of the Exchequer in
the Aberdeen Administration, appointed Sir Charles Trevelyan,
assistant secretary
to the Treasury, and Sir Stafford
Northcote, Secretary at
the Board of Trade, to prepare a report on
the organization

of the permanent civil service to present
to the Select

Committee.

The report appeared on November 23, 1853.

Where the Select Committee sought to reduce the cost
of the civil service through lowering salaries and
reducing
the number of positions, the Northcote-Trevelyan report,

citing a, by now, familiar litany of defects and abuses,
argued that patronage was the root cause of inefficiency and
waste.

To remedy the defects of the service, Northcote and

Trevelyan advocated the general principle,
that the public service should be carried on by the
admission into its lower ranks of a carefully selected
body of young men, who should be employed from the first
upon work suited to their capacities and their education,
and should be made constantly to feel that their promotion and future prospects depend entirely on the

^Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971): 217.

"hich they discharge their
dutie^''^h^f
auties, that with averaqe abilihip<3
an^
J?
applicpation they ™ay IoIk
^o^^rd
certain provision for their lives 'onmently"?o I
that w?;;
powers they may rationally
hope to attain
a^tlin to the highest
prizes in the Service ,.,>,( i„ -«
•

This guiding principle of the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report is
often termed a radical departure
from the past; more accu-

rately it appears to be a rather long
step in
the civil service was already moving.

a

direction

To implement its general principle
the report called
for six innovations:
1) a system of open competitive
exami-

nations before appointment.

The key to eliminating patron-

age was to make the examinations competitive.

Those finally

selected must score higher than their competitors,
not simply
pass a minimal educational standard. At the same
time
the

examinations were "to be open to all persons, of
subject only

...

a given age,

to the necessity of their giving satis-

factory references to persons able to speak of their moral

conduct and character, and of producing medical certificates." 2
2)

There was to be no test of political loyalty.

Academic examinations.

The examinations themselves were

designed to "test the intelligence, as well as the mere
attainments, of the candidates."^

••-N-T

Report, p. 111.

^Ibid., p. 113.

Although the subject

matter of the examinations was to
be as numerous as possible
to secure a varied amount of
talent for
the service, it was

also recommended that the examination
ought to include some
problems directly related to the official's
work.

Yet the

emphasis was on recruiting officials of
university age with
general ability who could be trained. For
the "superior

situations" or higher positions in the service,
the examinations were to be on a level equivalent to
the highest levels
of education in the country.
3) Division

of the service into

higher and lower divisions.

To insure that only men of the

highest quality reached the top positions, the Report
recommended "establishing a proper distinction between
intellec-

tual and mechanical labour.

Not only would this type of

distinction prevent the unqualified from reaching the top
but it would encourage those below to do their best to reach
the top levels.

4)

Promotion by merit.

In order to

encourage initiative and ambition, Northcote-Trevelyan advocated the use of merit as

a

criterion for promotion from

class to class rather than seniority or favoritism.
5)

Probation.

Although the use of a probationary period was

already common, the Report reiterated the need to take pro-

bation seriously if
6)

a

competent service was to be achieved.

Creation of a central examination board.

To provide

unity to the fragmented nature of departmental examinations,

Northcote-Trevelyan recommended an independent, central
^Ibid., p. 115.
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board to develop and conduct
examinations and to certify
those candidates having passed.

Though it has been emphasized
that these remedies were
recommended in the pursuit of
efficiency, it would be wrong
to suggest that the reformers'
concern was merely
technical.

Eaton makes it clear that the
question of civil service
reform in 1853 "was not regarded as
a mere question of admin
istrative details or as having its
greater interest
in its

probable effects upon a general election,
but as a vital
issue of principle and national policy,
of which the influence would be felt to the very foundation
of government and
of social order. "1 Northcote and Trevelyan
were

products of

a nineteenth century liberal philosophy
that prescribed not

only limited government activity but government
that is
capable of attaining a high degree of internal efficiency
through reason and one that thrives on competition.
tainly there is much of this flavor in the Report.

Cer-

Beyond

this there is also in the Report a notion of responsible

administration that reflects the liberal political ideals of
the late 1800s,

"namely the political supremacy of the House

of Commons, ministerial responsibility to Parliament, and

electoral politics determined by issues rather than vested
interest." 2

•'-Eaton,
2

Civil Service in Great Britain

,

p.

175.

Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p 16
.

.

A factor of equal magnitude in
shaping the reform
environment of the 19th century

was the displacement of
the

old landed aristocracy by the
middle and commercial classes
as the predominant political
force.
in Kingsley's interpretation, the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report was but one in a
series of measures which "destroyed
the aristocratic
monopoly and cut away the roots of
aristocratic power. "1
in particular, the Report's
emphasis on open competition
reflected the desire of the growing
middle class for entry
into the civil service. Given the
influence of

these forces,

one aim of Northcote and Trevelyan "was
the purification of
political life, in particular the heightening

of the tone of

Parliament and the conduct of elections, and
the furthering
of meritocratic as opposed to hereditary
values. "^
In its opening paragraphs, the Report asserts
that

"the Government of the country could not be carried
on with-

out the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers,

occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the
Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to
Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist,

and to some extent, influence, those who are from time to
time set over them."^
-'-Kingsley,
2

Reform

,

Thus for Northcote and Trevelyan, a

Representative Bureaucracy

,

p.

48.

Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative
p

.

16

.

^N-T Report, p. 108.

responsible civil service was one
that is efficient or in
some sense technically competent,
politically neutral though
representative of emerging middle-class
values, and account-

able to Parliament through the
Ministers.

Yet at the same

time, the authors saw a policy
role for administrators

through influencing Ministers.

Responsible administration,

then, to some extent, must be able
to take initiative and

provide leadership.

it was in this notion, if in no
other,

that the Report was far ahead of its time.^

The Report

embodies a notion of responsible government
that both
reflects its authors' particular historical
circumstance and,
at the same time, envisions enough of the future
to make the

Report a significant document.
Reaction and Change

Reaction to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was predictable; early support from Parliament and London society was

almost nonexistent.

Naturally members of Parliament were

reluctant to give up their prerogatives of filling vacancies
in the civil service.

Furthermore, "the House of Commons

could find little enthusiasm for measures which promised no
savings at once, were of doubtful value in producing large

economies later, and might give rise to chaos in Government

-^See Wheare, The Civil Service in the Constitution
16-19 for a discussion of the significance of the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report along these lines.

pp.

,

offices during the interim
period of reorganisation.
in Parliament, those who
benefited

"1

Thus

by patronage or who saw

change as an attack on privilege
were united against the
Report.
In the Cabinet, support was
scarcely higher,

chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone,
although sponsor of the
Report, believed that the importance
of patronage had been
exaggerated. 2 gome Cabinet members were
concerned
about a

radical republicanism that a board of
examiners would
exchange for the Crown, believing that a
board would substitute talented, but discontented, middle-class
bureaucrats
for officials with character and loyalty
to
the aristocracy.

Others feared that the examination system would
result in
more and more recruitment from the middle classes

and make

the civil service unattractive to the higher
classes.

Simi-

larly, the Queen was concerned about the "Victorian
respect-

ability of appointees."^

However, due to Gladstone's persis-

tence the Cabinet acquiesced to the Report, without any

immediate result.
Copies of the Report were widely disseminated.

Much

of the public comment that was generated was opposed or only

grudgingly supportive of the Northcote-Trevelyan version of
^G. A. Campbell, The Civil Service in Britain 2nd ed.
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 42.
,

2

Moses, The Civil Service in Great Britain

^Ibid., p. 85.

,

p.

84.

reform.

The_^Spectator labeled the Report
Utopian,

The_Westnar^^

,3,,,,^

^

while

^^^^^^^

lished an unenthusiastic artiole.
in which it was pointed
out that, although competitive
examinations were preferable
to patronage,

they might be expected to fill
the civil Service with conservatively minded
men, clever rather than
able. "2 Many observers believed
that securing first-class
officials for the higher levels through
open competition
would bestow upon the service too much
power and threaten
constitutional democracy, other critics held
the Cabinet's
view that open examinations would result
in men
from the

lower social classes holding civil service
jobs, while others
criticized the Report on the grounds that academic
examina-

tions would give preference to aristocratic
education.

Others merely doubted that competition would attract
firstclass minds.

Many civil service officials, too, withheld their sup-

port for one reason or another.

Many officials refuted the

charges of inefficiency made against the service, others

merely claimed the charges were exaggerated.

Civil servants

also questioned the efficacy of examinations for securing
the best officials or emphasized the uselessness of highly

educated men for routine work.

Finally, the notion of pro-

mo tion by merit was attacked on the basis of its conflict
^Ibid., p. 74.
2

Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service, p.

109.
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with the principle of seniority.
Even Trevelyan recognized the
unpopularity of his
recommendations. For as he wrote
in a letter to Eaton,
the
"early supporters of it
might_be^ounte^^^
and if the matter had been put
to the vote in London
society
or the clubs, or even in Parliament
itself by_secret_vo^
the new system would have been
rejected by
majority."! Given such firm opposition,
the Aberdeen Govern-

ment was reluctant to push

a bill embodying the reforms in

the House of Commons; for the moment
the Northcote-Trevelyan

Report lay severely wounded.

Implementation of the proposed

organizational changes did not follow automatically
from the
logic or persuasiveness of the Report itself.
But the political, social and economic environment
out-

side the immediate debate over the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report

was changing rapidly, with important consequences for civil
service reform.

Giving unexpected aid to the supporters of

reform was the outbreak of the Crimean War toward the end of
1853.
W. H.

Uncensored reports from The Times correspondent,
Russell, told of mismanagement, confusion, and gross

inefficiencies in the administration of the war effort.
'Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain appendix p.
Indeed, unqualified supporters were few. As Moses points
out. The Times alone was a supporter of reform from the
beginning. On the other hand, support for the Report was
qualitative with J. G. Shaw Lefevre, Rowland Hill, J. S.
Mill, and Edwin Chadwick "unstinted in their praise."
E. N. Gladden, "An administrative century; 1853-1953,"
Parliamentary Affairs 6, No. 4 (1953) :320.
,

4 30.

Readers were also shocked
by accounts fro. Plorence
Nightingale of the inadequacies of
the Government s
provision for
the troops. 1 The ir^ediate
effect of the war was the
fall
Of the Aberdeen Ministry in
February of 1855 to a new
Govern
ment under Lord Palmerston
and the creation on
•

May

5,

1855

of the Administrative Reform
Association. The avowed
purpose of the Administrative
Reform Association was to
expose the incompetence brought
on by patronage and demand
civil service reform on the
Northcote-Trevelyan
model.

Other societal changes during the
middle years of the
century also helped create a climate
for civil service

reform.

Among other activities was "the
establishment of
factory inspection by the government,
the establishment

of

an education office and grants and
inspectors, the establishment of the metropolitan police force in

1829, of the

municipal police forces in 1835, and the county
police
forces in 1856, the establishment of the poor
law

commis-

sions, local boards of health, and other reforms
of local

government, partly depending upon grants in aid."^

These

reforms were placing indirect pressure on leaders to make

changes in the civil service.

But two reforms which had a

"'See Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service
110; and Enid Russell-Smith, Modern Bureaucracy: The"~Home
Civil Service (London: Longman Group Limited, 1974), pp. 1415 for interesting accounts of the effects of the war on
civil service reform.
,

p.

^Herman Finer, "Better Government Personnel,"
Political Science Quarterly 51 (December 1936) :574-75.

direct impact on the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report were
those
concerned with the administration
of India and university

education.
Thomas Macaulay, later Lord
Macaulay, had taken a long
time interest in creating a
unified civil service
in India

based on the principle of
competitive examinations over
the
subjects that composed the liberal
education at

Oxford and
Cambridge; his report to Parliament
recommending such a
scheme appeared in November,
1854. Macaulay's plan had had
a major impact on the thinking
of Trevelyan, who had spent
fourteen years in India and was married
to Macaulay's

sister

At the same time changes were taking
place at Oxford and
Cambridge in the dispensing of university

fellowships and

awards.

Under the influence of Benjamin Jowett, a
famous

Balliol Master, competitive examinations were
introduced to
make awards on the basis of merit rather than
patronage.

This scheme was not without its influence on
Northcote, him-

self a product of Balliol.

Given the momentum of these reforms, the growing

criticism from the Administrative Reform Association and
general public opinion concerning the mal-administration of
the Crimean War, and the continued interest and discussion
of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report among civil servants, Lord

Palmerston, knowing the strength of the opposition to civil

service reform in Parliament, issued an executive Order in

Council on May 21, 1855.

Palmerston 's action began the

implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan
proposals.
Through the Order in Council a Civil
Service

Commission was

established to administer

a

system of limited competition.

That is, the Commissioners' responsibility
was to certify
that candidates satisfied the minimal
requirements of being
within the age limits set by the department,
of adequate
health, and of possessing basic knowledge
to do
the job.

The authority of nominating and appointing
remained with the
department heads. In effect, then, appointment
remained a

political gift.

Yet, at the same time,

the Commissioners

"were able to introduce a more uniform standard
and a cer-

tain degree of co-ordination into the tests

...

to survey

all those nominated to the Service" and to issue "an
annual

report which contained detailed analysis of the results of
their

work."-""

it was through this report that the Commis-

sion and civil service itself could keep pressure on the

Government to continue the movement toward a real competitive system.
Indeed, within a year. Parliament had perceived so

much favorable support for the new method that it resolved
by a vote of 108-87 that limited competition did eliminate
the serious defects and recommended to the Queen that open

competition be made

a

condition of entrance to the service.

^Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service
111-12.
pp.
^Eaton, Civil Service in Breat Britain, p. 211.

,

2

The vote was symptomatic of
a changing attitude
in Parliament, the public, and the
press.
It is to some extent
possible to hold the power of
ideas responsible for these
changes in attitudes. Jeremy
Bentham, Thomas Carlyle, and
J. S. Mill were leading
advocates of reform ideas and
their
advocacy was undoubtedly influential
among the political
cognoscenti, if not the middle class.
The popular fiction
of Charles Dickens, Anthony
Trollope, and others telling
stories of bureaucratic red tape and
incompetence found wide
audience among the middle class. In
addition, Trevelyan,
Jowett, Gladstone, and Robert Lowe,
Chancellor of the

Exchequer under Gladstone, campaigned tirelessly
for reform
seeking support from every important segment
of the commu-

nity.

By 1860 support for reform had grown to such
an extent
in Parliament that a select Committee on Civil
Service

appointments was established to enquire into the possibility
of expanding selection of lower positions by competition.

After the Select Committee's recommendation for

a qualified,

but significant, extension of the competitive system. Lord
Palmerston approved the Select Committee's report.

Thus,

between 1855 and 1870 opinions regarding open, competitive
exams were almost reversed from widespread opposition to

widespread support.
See Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Meri t
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1979),
pp. 68-88.
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Th^re are a number of factors
contributing to this
perceptible change in opinion in
addition

to those already

mentioned.

Pirst, the decade of the
1860s saw the electoral
changes of 1832 extended in the
Reform Act of 1867 with
working and middle class
enfranchisement. Not only did
the
1867 Act make patronage less important
as a tool for controlling Parliament and the electorate,
but the Act also made it
possible for upper-middle class
families without political
influence to support electorally
members of Parliament who

advocated competitive examinations as
the route to the civil
service for their well-educated sons.^
Yet this point must

not be overdrawn, for it is true that
the competitive examinations for higher civil service positions
were designed for
the products of Oxbridge. At the same time,
the newly

enfranchised middle class was unified with their
more fortunate neighbors in believing in the virtues of
free
competi-

tion and progress— commercial, scientific, and
administrative.

2

Undoubtedly, the Reform Act of 1867 had an impact of

such force that patronage was a victim of its wake.
Second, it is Herman Finer 's

contention that the civil

service reforms of this period came into existence due to
-'R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, From
1870 to the Present Day (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd., 1955), p. 3. Also see Kingsley, Representative
Bureaucracy pp. 60-61.
,

2

Herman Finer makes this point in both his "Better Government Personnel," p. 575, and The British Civil Service
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937), p. 37.
^In "Better Government Personnel," pp. 573-74.
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the need to be economical.

There was economic pressure

because the aristocratic
statesmen of the period
believed
that a Government's expenditures
should be measured like
the
expenditures in their banks and
factories.

m

addition,

"there was economic pressure,
because England was not a
rich
country compared with the exacting
and passionate demands of
social reformers." Hence, not
only a laissez-faire philosophy but the objective economic
condition of society as well
provided pressure for civil service
reform.
Third, Leonard White suggests that
it was the structure of the political system which
facilitated the change in
public opinion. For example, during
this period in British
history there was "no strongly organized
political party
with local branches scattered over the
country and maintained
in order and discipline by the expectation
of mass distribution of patronage." Thus not only were the
number of people

affected by the change from patronage not large,
but, at the
same time, the changes primarily affected leaders
of
two

centralized parties who could tacitly agree that the reforms
were desirable.^

This centralization of leadership favored

acceptance of reform.
Finally, it is necessary to point to the interaction
of educational and societal changes as a contributor to the

^Leonard D. White, "The British Civil Service," Civil
Service Abroad, Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935), p. 6.
,
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acceptance of reform.

Many proponents of the Report,

including Gladstone, advocated
open competition and the
separation of routine work from
higher levels as a way to
secure top administrative
positions for the upper classes.
In a letter to Lord Russell,
Gladstone wrote
that these

reforms would "open to the highly
educated classes a career,
and give them command over all
the higher parts of the civil
service, which up to this time they
have never enjoyed."^
Thus, it is interesting to note that
although the Report
itself spoke in tones of a meritocracy
and presented the

hope of upward social mobility to the
middle-class, some of
those responsible for implementing the Report
held a different concept of responsibility on this issue.
In
the late

1800s when university education was to a large
degree a

guarantee of social status, it was possible for aristocrats
to support reforms of the civil service which made
university

education a prerequisite for higher positions.

Proponents

of Northcote-Trevelyan had a ready response for those who

feared that competition would be a leveling force in society;

competitive examinations were heavily based on the classical
subjects taught at the elite universities, particularly

Oxford and Cambridge.

At the same time,

one must not over-

look the strong argument set forth by Kingsley that reform

'Quoted from E. Strauss, The Ruling Servants, Bureauc racy in Russia, France and Britain? (London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 241-42. H. Finer in The British
Civil Service p. 45, also makes this point.

—

,

of the civil service was part
of a middle-class bid for
power that "aimed essentially
to bring about a harmony
of
outlook between the permanent
officials and the new governing
...l
class. . .
From such disparate factors,
it is necessary
to conclude that reform was
the result of the interaction
of

complex forces and motives.
The culmination of this period of
reform occurred in
1870, during Gladstone's first administration,
with an Order
in Council issued on the fourth of
June.
It will be remembered that Gladstone had, as Chancellor of
the
Exchequer,

commissioned the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.

As Prime

Minister he was able to secure the support of
his Cabinet
for an Order "which directed that for the
future

all vacan-

cies in a given list of offices should be filled
by open

competitive examination.

"

^

rphe

Order was followed by

Treasury regulations which provided for a higher and lower

division in the civil service, with candidates for the
higher division to be tested by examinations of a university
standard.

Thus it was some seventeen years after the issu-

ance of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, that its recommen-

dations were accepted substantially intact,

a

result of

growing political pressure, changing social conditions, and

strategically located reformers.

^Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
2

,

p.

188.

Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service,
121-22.
pp.
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Lesso ns From the Creation

That the order in Council of
1870 was not implemented
fully and immediately is not of
crucial importance. Its
importance lies in the fact that, in
principle, the notion
of open competitive examination
and of a distinctive higher
division for the civil service had been
accepted and made
authoritative by the Government of the day.
Full
implemen-

tation and consolidation of the reforms
awaited a series of
committees and commissions— the Playfair
Committee of 1874,
the Ridley Commission of 1886-1890, the
MacDonnell Royal

Commission of 1912-1914, the 1918 Gladstone
Committee, the
Tomlin Commission of 1929-1931, the Assheton
Committee of

1944, and the Priestly Royal Commission of
1953-1955— each a

response to its own set of political and social pressures
and administrative needs.
Herein, of course, lies the significance of the period
of reform from 1853 to 1870--that the British Civil Service

was not pulled from the proverbial magician's hat, but was
the product of a complex assortment of factors that merged

into a consensus for reform.

It is clear that the reformers

were not unified in their purposes or approaches, but that
the reform process incorporated a number of different
-^For a history of these reform bodies as well as
earlier reforms, see Moses, The Civil Service of Great Brit ain Cohen, The Growth of the Civil Service 178 0-1939;
G. A. Campbell, The Civil Service in Britain Kingsley, Rep resentative Bureaucracy and Great Britain, Committee on the
Civil Service, The Civil Service Cmnd. 3638 (June 1968),
Vol. 3, "Survey and Investigations," chapter 10.
;

,

;

;

,

.
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perspectives of what the purposes
of reform should be and
what a reformed civil service
should look like.

The

Northcote-Trevelyan Report itself grew
out of a concern for
economy but its authors craftily
adapted it to their concern
for more efficient administration
through neutral, competent
officials. Theirs was a political
intent to purify a "cor-

rupt" society and further "meritocracy
at the expense of
vested interests" in politics and education. ^
Some of those
who had a hand in implementing the
Report, notably Gladstone,
were less concerned about economy and
efficiency
than in

using administrative reform to achieve
political advantage
by bringing together the interests of the
aristocracy and
the middle class.

^

The emerging middle class saw in the

reforms an opportunity for increased access to
government
and more jobs.

Others, like department heads, were more

narrowly concerned with the administrative convenience that
reform would offer.

Each of these perspectives of reform

was woven into a fabric richly embroidered by nineteenth

century liberal, laissez-faire ideology and ongoing social
and economic changes.
The Northcote-Trevelyan period left a deep impression

on the character of public administration in Britain.

The

Report's emphasis on politically neutral civil servants of

Reform

•^Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative
51
p
,
.

^Ibid.

.

.

50

high intellectual and social
calibre, who had studied
classics at the traditional
universities of Oxford and
Cambridge,
and its role in creating higher
and lower classes of the
civil service are felt over
one-hundred years
later.

because the reform process is

a

But

continuous bolt of cloth,

these same emphases were the objects
of attack when new
political and social pressures arrived
on the
scene.

in

large measure, then, the creative
act in Great Britain was a
political attempt to make responsible a
public service that
was perceived by political and opinion
leaders to be irre-

sponsible.

To what extent this was the case in
the creation

of the American civil service is the subject
to which we now
turn

The Seedbed for U.
By the early 1870

's

S.

Reform

the United States had already

passed through, what Frederick Mosher terms, "government by
gentlemen" and was experiencing reaction to "government by
the common man" in anticipation of "government by the good."-^
The public service during the Federalist period had been

characterized by its honesty,^ competence, and permanent
^Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)
p. 54ff
,

2

Carl Russell Fish in The Civil Service and the Patron age (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 26 notes
that "the best proof of the general integrity of the service
is that [Secretary of State] Gallatin, when directed by
Jefferson to conduct a searching investigation of the
Federalist financial administration, was able to find no
evidence to its discredit."

SI

tenure.

Washington, Adams, and Jefferson
adhered to a rule
of "fitness" for office that
was defined as possessing
competence to perform one's duties
and the "correct" political
philosophy. Yet during this early
period civil servants
were spared the obligations to
political parties that were
soon to follow. The Federalist
service was staffed by
a

decidedly upper class aristocratic
caste many of whom held
high political and moral ideals
regarding public service.
Such was the character and reputation
of American administration during this period that it was
the envy of many

British observers."^
But by 1829, with the benefit of an enlarged
electorate, the balance of political power had
shifted from the

Federalists to the Jeffersonian Republicans and again
to the
Jacksonians. Accompanying this shift were changed
notions

regarding the preferred nature of the civil service.

Suscep-

tible to charges of being aristocratic, exclusive, and unre-

sponsive to the new political leaders, the Federalist service
•'-For detailed histories of American civil service from
which this chapter draws, see Fish, The Civil Service and the
Patronage Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States
Civil Service (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958)
Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1961) Leonard D. White, The
Jacksonians (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956); Leonard
D. White, The Republican Era: 1869-1901 (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1958) Frank Mann Stewart, The National
Civil Service Reform League (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1929)
For a more concise treatment of civil service
history, see Herbert Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal
Personnel System" in The Federal Government Service 2d ed.,
ed. Wallace S. Sayre (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
;

;

;

;

.

,

Inc.

,

1965)

,

pp.

7-69.

52

was attacked and reshaped to
reflect the Jacksonian
values
of equality of opportunity,
social mobility, individual
freedom, and popular government.
^
Nowhere were these values
more clearly seen than in the
practice of spoils.

Rooted in democratic theory as
expounded by the
Jacksonians,2 ^poUs politics was based
on the proposition
that long tenure in office resulted in
indifference
to the

public and the promotion of individual
interests; that any
person of average intelligence could
perform the duties of
public office; and that government office
was not a right of
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service

,

p.

55.

2

Jackson's famous defense of rotation in his first
annual message to Congress in part read:
"The duties of all public offices are, or at least
admit
of being made, so plain and simple that men of
intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by
the long continuance of men in office than is generally
to be gained by their experience.
I submit, therefore,
to your consideration whether the efficiency of the
Government would not be promoted and official industry
and integrity better secured by a general extension of
the law which limits appointments to four years.
"In a country where offices are created solely for the
benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic
right to official station than another. ... No
individual wrong is, therefore done by removal, since
neither appointment to nor continuance in office is
matter of right.
The proposed limitation would
destroy the idea of property now so generally connected
with official station, and although individual distress
may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that
rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the
republican creed, give healthful action to the system."
.

.

.

Quoted from White, The Jacksonians, p. 318.
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any single person or group.

i„ practice, these spoils
concepts were institutionalized
by the systematic application
Of limited tenure, rotation
in office, and personnel
appointments and promotion based on
party or factional affiliation
and loyalty.

The period between 1845 and 1865
was the high-water
mark for the spoils system.
Officials often were placed on
the government "payroll because
they had influential political connections, or worked for a
partisan newspaper, or distinguished themselves in local politics. "1
Appointment of
illiterate clerks as a reward for party
service was common.
Rotation of offices became "ruthless partisan
removals"2
every few years when clerks, messengers,
customhouse weighers
and measurers were removed along with
department heads and
second level officials identified as policy
makers.
Rotation reached into the fringes of the absurd when
Democratic

President Buchanan replaced Democrats appointed under
Democrat Pierce whom he succeeded in 1857. Rotation and partisan appointment "imposed political obligations and duties

upon government employees, particularly obligations to pay

party assessments, to do party work at election time, and to
•vote

righf."^

From 18 29, federal employees increasingly

became dependent upon local political machines and
-'-White,

The Jacksonians

^ibid., p. 329.
^Ibid., p. 332.

,

p.

327.
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congressional patrons for their
survival.
The harmful consequences of the
spoils system for
administrative efficiency and the
prestige and morale of the
public service were manifest, with
removals ranging from
10% of the civil service during Jackson's
tenure to even
higher during Lincoln's, advantages of
administrative continuity and expertise were lost.^ At the
same time, incumbent
officials were filled with apprehension over
the next election and harassed and burdened financially
by demands to pay
political assessments. Undoubtedly, the service
lost
its

attractiveness for the individual who possessed
professional competence.

In addition,

a degree of

"the chief executive's

appointment and removal burden often reached intolerable
proportions, "2 creating personal and political anguish.
Finally, associated with the spoils system was a decline in

moral standards, as fraud, kickbacks, bribery and other forms
of corruption were widespread.

The deficiencies of spoils politics resulted in some
few attempts at reform before 1865.

The most significant

was the Classification Act of 1853 which established

a sys-

tem of pass examinations for departmental clerks, a scheme
-'-It was only after Lincoln's Presidency and certainly
during and after World War I when government functions
became more and more complex that continuity became a crucial
factor in administration. Thus, one must not overdo the
negative impact of high turnover during the late 1800s and
early 1900s.

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 50.

^
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to classify clerks according
to type of service
rendered,
and the equalization of
salaries in each of four
classes.

The rigor of the examinations
was dependent upon the discretion of the department head;
while a few departmental
examinations did establish minimum
competency criteria, most
were merely window-dressing.
one sense it is remarkabl e
that reform was attempted at all,
since before 1865

m

the re

existed little or no public pressure
for reform, the parties
were silent on the issue, and there had
been no particular
scandal to trigger legislative action. 2
What passage of the
1853 Act does show is that reform was demanded
by the

bureaucracy itself; administrative action required

a minimal

level of competence and systematization.
Indeed, a balanced assessment of the pre-reformed

civil service must show that the service was never
as incom-

petent as the critics claimed.

"The burden of administrative

work was carried on by a nucleus of permanent clerks who

knew what had to be done"^ and who were relied upon by

department heads.

Neither was the unreformed service as

ineffective as critics claimed.

First, it is "extremely

probable" that public services were adequately supplied

because "the party leaders were only too glad to multiply
-'A. Bower Sageser, The First Two Decades of the
Pendleton Act, A Study of Civil Service Reform (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska, 1935), p. 12.

^White, The Jacksonians
^Ibid., p. 329.

,

p.

374.

2
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offices. "1

second, the spoils system
was effective in
accomplishing the social purposes
of the Jacksonian era.

Spoils politics successfully
made the public service
of the
late 1800s more representative
of the Jacksonian
egalitarian
spirit.
Nonetheless, as the United States
entered the reconstruction period after the Civil

War, the civil service sys-

tem as a whole was in a primitive
state.

There was no uni-

formity in personnel policy;
appointment of clerks, assignment to duties, conduct in office
(e.g.,

hours of work),

transfers, promotions, pay, discipline,
removals were
entirely at the department head's discretion.
The Classification Act of 1853 provided a skeletal
structure
for

classification, pay, promotion, and selection but
was largely
a farce.

Training was unknown, efficiency ratings were
in
an experimental state, and retirement policies
were nonexistent.

In personnel matters presidents had very little

actual influence.

For although in theory they had authority

to advise and direct heads of departments,

evidence that they did

"there is scanty

so."-^

Indeed, the civil service reform movement in the late

nineteenth century must be seen against a backdrop of

""Fish,

The Civil Service and the Patronage

,

p.

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
White, The Republican Era

,

p.

347.

,

a

151.
p.

535.
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congressional-presidential power struggle. ^
The Civil War
had increased the power of
the President and heightened
the
distrust Of the Congress. With
Lincoln's death the Radical
Republicans in the Senate acted
quickly to address the
imbalance by attempting to control
President Johnson's
patronage power through the Tenure of
Office Act. when
Johnson tested the Act by removing
Secretary of War Stanton
without Senate approval and survived
impeachment

by one vote,

the constitutional integrity of
the presidency was saved,
but it nevertheless limped along in a
subordinate position
to Congress until Theodore Roosevelt.
During this postCivil War period Congress participated directly
in the admin-

istrative process— attending to constituent problems
as well
as to the details of personnel administration.
With a

Congress that was looking to exercise its political
muscles
and a series of presidents unable and/or unwilling to
exer-

cise presidential prerogatives, personnel patronage became
the domain of Congress.

Control of patronage by the Congress

was perceived by party leaders as essential to the cohesion

of the party organization and ultimately to the survival of
the local party machines and their bosses.

The exercise of

presidential power, on the other hand, depended to some
extent upon "wresting control of appointments from Senators,

-^See Ibid., pp. 17-45, and Fish, The Civil Service and
the Patronage , pp. 186-99, for a detailed discussion of this
power struggle.
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congressmen, and local machines.

civil service reform,

therefore, because it had to a large
extent the effect of
redistributing appointment power from
the local machine and
a decentralized Congress to
central leadership, became an
integral part of the struggle between
the post-Civil War
Congress and President,^
In addition to the congressional-presidential
power
struggle, there were social forces that
shaped the civil ser-

vice reform of 1883.

Post-Civil War America was a society,

like nineteenth century Britain, that
held dear the doctrines
of laissez-faire economics, individualism,
and political

liberty.

It was a society congenial to the growth
and pros-

perity of business, particularly big business.

In a society

growing more complex and pursuing the prosperity of
the

American industrial revolution, business methods (which,
ironically, were more primitive than government personnel

and budgeting methods) were seen as solutions to problems in

public administration.

Yet the post-Civil War era was also

characterized by widespread agrarian unrest under the Granger

movement and the Farmer's Alliances, recurrent economic
depressions, hostile labor-management relations, and popular

distrust of powerful railroads and big business, all of

which provided counter-points to the predominant laissezllbid., p. 278.
'^See E. E. Schattschneider
Party Government (New
York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1942)
pp. 137-40 for a
discussion of this point.
,

,
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faire philosophy.
The postwar period was steeped in
the old Puritan
ideals of morality, yet it was a
period that was rocked by
one scandal after another. it was
a time when many Americans
were turning from a divil conflict to
look at the
world.

And many of these observers saw what
they perceived to be
the efficient public services of Europe.
Indeed,
when

Senator Charles Sumner, a student of the
British civil service and in correspondence with English
friends,

introduced

his civil service reform bill in 1864 it bore
very close
resemblance to the British model. America of

the 1860s to

1880s was an age in which intellectual and social
forces

were conducive to

reform."'"

O vercoming Inertia, A False Start
and Building Support

,

Although the seeds of reform had been sown and were
fertile, the spoils system in 1865 remained the dominant factor in American public administrative life.

Not only did

spoilsmen see any effort to reduce spoils as un-American, but
most Americans saw spoils as necessary and proper.^

The

task that lay before the reformers was monumental; the years
•^Indeed, the 1880s were years of ballot reform, regulatory reform of business, and municipal reform as well as
civil service reform.

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service p. 62,
and White, The Republican Era p. 291. Stewart, in The
National Civil Service Reform League p. 7, points out that
the "public conscience seemed dulled to the enormous abuses
of patronage."
,

,

,
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between 1865 and 1871 were spent
in overcoming the
intertia
created by a system grown conservative.

The Sumner bill had

hardly caused a stir, but the effort
to control patronage
was continued by Republican
Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes
of
Rhode Island who introduced reform
bills in
1865 and every

year from 1867 to 1871.

Jenckes, the archetypical civil

service reformer of the period, a man
of wealth, a lawyer,
from a prominent New England family,
brought leadership to
the nascent reform movement.

Like many other reformers,

Jenckes was a student of civil service systems
in other
countries. Particularly impressed by the
British

approach,

he carried on correspondence with Northcote,
Trevelyan, and
other British figures and regularly received British
news-

papers. ^

Not surprisingly, his bills, patterned on the Brit-

ish approach, called for open competitive examinations
at
the entry level, upper level vacancies to be filled by
pro-

motion based on merit, and

a

board of commissioners to

administer exams and formulate rules.
Jenckes' legislative efforts were never successful,

but his agitation eventually forced a discussion in Congress
and stimulated public attention.

By the late 1860s, Jenckes

and other reform leaders, including Julius Bing, Carl Schurz,

Dorman Eaton, George W. Curtis, Everett

P. Wheeler,

and

Charles J. Bonaparte were receiving broad public support
'Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit, pp.
194

.

192-
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from newspapers such as the
Chicago Tribune, the Bostor^Post,
and the Newjrork_E^^
magazines such as ^JT^I^'
the NorU^Ainerica^^
Putnam^^jlag^ businessmen
such as the National Manufacturer's
Association
and the

Boston Board of Trade; federal civil
servants; and civicminded citizens. 1 From 1867 until 1883

editorial and public

support for reform increased dramatically.
Jenckes' proposals received some support.

Even in Congress,
However, at this

early date, there was no organized,
concentrated, persistent
pressure on Congress to effect passage of reform
legislation.
Yet, in an amazing turn of events,

"on the last day of

the last session of the 41st Congress,"^ in
1871 Congress

passed a civil service reform bill which authorized
the
President to make rules and regulations for admitting

people

into the civil service and to appoint people to administer
the rules.

The bill came in the form of a rider to a civil

appropriations bill.

It was briefly but hotly debated, with

the reform supporters able to come together long enough to
pass the appropriations bill with its rider.

Thus, unable

to agree on a legislative mechanism to control patronage.

Congress grudgingly allowed the President to proceed.

Such

a concession was less an acknowledgment of Grant's leader-

ship than an indication of the impact of outside pressure

Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
The Republican Era p. 270; and Hoogenboom,
p.
Outlawing the Spoils pp. 41-45.
'-See

,

66; White,

,

,

^White, The Republican Era, p. 281.

and Jenckes- and the other reformers'
agitation. 1 Undoubtedly, the widespread belief that
Grant would not pick up the
gauntlet helped ease the bill's passage.

But

the surprise of many. Grant did
appoint an
advisory board, later to become a Civil
Service Commission,
and named George W. Curtis, a leading
reform spokesman, as
its chairman.
Perhaps "part of Grant's surprising
personal
interest in civil service reform stemmed from
the fact that
he, too, was feeling the pressure of
patronage.
curtis
was quick to issue a set of rules and establish
the machiner;
to.

to administer them.

The rules, which applied to Washington

departments and federal offices in New York, provided
for
competitive examinations,

a

probationary period, and the

prohibition of political assessments.

It was Curtis' view,

as well as that of most reformers during this period,
that

patronage could be controlled by requiring competitive exams

with the ability to fill vacancies by patronage eliminated,
the regulation of tenure would not be necessary.
ers' approach,

The reform

then, was to close the front door to public

service appointments, but to leave the back door open.
The Grant Civil Service Commission soon found itself
in trouble.

Grant found it impossible to live by the stan-

dards set by the Commission and Curtis resigned when Grant

made an offensive appointment.
'Ibid., p. 282

Passage of the reform bill

.

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service^ p. 69.
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appeared to be a moment of temporary
insanity for the Congress as during the next session
in 1872 opposition to reform
and the Commission was as hostile
as ever.
Making matters
worse was a lack of unity among reformers
on a
number of

issues peripheral to civil service
reform,

eager to dismantle Grant

•

s

with opponents

Civil Service Commission and pro-

ponents less than unified. Congress withheld
funding for the
Commission in 1874. Grant, unwilling and
unable to fight
Congress, withdrew his support for the
Commission.

The

examining boards were abolished in 1875.
Despite this false start toward reform, the establish-

ment and operation of the Grant Commission was
important for
future reform efforts. It provided evidence that
the

reform-

ers' concepts were practicable and it gave reformers
experi-

ence in fighting later legislative battles.
For nearly a decade after the defeat of the first

Civil Service Commission, the reform forces and their

opponents were at a stalemate, nevertheless it was an active
stalemate.

In 1876 both Republican and Democratic Party

platforms called for civil service reform.

President Hayes

brought a favorable attitude toward reform to the White
House in 1876 and showed reformers his good faith by applying

merit principles to the New York Customs House and the New
York Post Office and appointing Carl Schurz as Secretary of
Interior.

He also commissioned Dorman Eaton to write a

history of the British civil service reform movement which

^
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was submitted to Congress in
1879.

Published as a book the

next year,l Eaton's report had
a favorable influence on
public opinion. Yet Hayes' administration
ended in disappointment for reformers as nothing was
accomplished in the way of
legislative action.

Nonetheless, opinion was continually
stirred by the
relatively small, but well-educated and
committed, contingent
of reformers. Working at both the municipal
and national

levels to secure new laws and administrative
reorganization,
the New York Civil Service Reform Association
was formed in

May 1877, followed in 1881 by the National Civil
Service
Reform League with Curtis as president. Using their

state

societies in large cities across the country, these two

associations were extremely effective in educating the public through every available form of propaganda

.

3

The reform-

ers repertoire was fundamentally the delivery of speeches to

professional or business clubs, editorials, and pamphlets in

which spoilsmen and the evil consequences of spoils politics
-'-Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, A History of
Abuses and Reforms and their Bearing Upon American Politics
(New York: Harper and Brother, Publishers, 1880).
For a
detailed discussion of the Eaton Report and the influence of
his book, see Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit
,

pp. 248-56.
o

Martin J. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)
for a discussion of municipal civil service reform from 1880 to 1920.
'^See

,

3

Sageser, The First Two Decades pp. 34-35. See
Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League for a
history of the New York Association and of the National
Civil Service Reform League in particular.
,

were denounced.

The reformers, by and large,
products of a

New England Protestant background,
college educated, club
men, entrenched in late nineteenth
^
century
society,

empha-

sized what they perceived to be the
moral bankruptcy of
public life and party politics brought
on
by spoils.

In this approach they were greatly
aided by the exposure of the political scandals of the
Grant and later

administrations.

The Credit Mobilier scandal, the Whiskey

Ring fraud, the Indian Ring and Belknap
frauds, the Tweed
Ring, and the Star Route frauds were laid
before a shocked
public.

"Each scandal was eagerly caught up by the
reform-

ers and published in detail, always with the moral
that such
fraud could never occur under a reformed civil service."^
The reforms that were to emerge in 188 3 cannot be

attributed entirely to the work of the Batons and the
Curtises.

The reform process is too complex for that simple

analysis.

Other groups in society had a stake in a reformed

civil service.

For example,

"as agriculture,

labor, com-

merce, and industry came more and more under the regulation
of the federal government, these great pressure groups became

increasingly insistent upon regulation by competent personnel
divorced from the worst ravages of partisan politics.""^

In

Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils pp. 191-96. See
Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League pp. 10-18
for brief biographies of reform leaders.
,

,

2

Sageser, The First Two Decades

,

p.

35.

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service,

p.

133.
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addition, public employees were
themselves interested in
reform-department heads who required competent
workers^ as
well as employees who were about
to be replaced
due to a

change in administration.

Finally, most presidents in that

period,

though constrained by party obligations,
desired
civil service reform and acted to see it
extended, if only
to be relieved of the pressures of
patronage.

Though the reformers had potent allies and
live ammunition with the scandals, the final assault on
spoils
required a spark.

It was provided by the assassination of

President Garfield on July

2,

1881 by Charles J. Guiteau, a

Chicago lawyer who had apparently haunted the capital for

weeks searching for a job.

Garfield alive had been

appointment to the reformers.

Though a supporter of reform,

his actions generally belied his support.

months later, dead, Garfield became
of reform.

a dis-

a

Wounded and, two

martyr for the cause

"Reformers quickly transformed their concept of

Garfield from a weak, spineless fool of [then Secretary of
State Jages G.] Blaine's to a fearless crusader for civil
service reform." 2

They immediately seized the opportunity

to extend their organization and poured forth the message

that spoils was responsible for murder.

Public indignation

'Hoogenboom, in Outlawing the Spoils p. 69, notes
that Secretary of the Treasury Boutwell, whom reformers
regarded as an enemy, was in 1870 the first official to
administer a competitive exam in the Treasury in order to
secure competent workers.
,

^Ibid., p. 212.

was raised by the assassination
and reformers across the
country became intent on channeling
that emotional outrage
to the reform cause.
If the final assault had begun,
Congress remained bar-

ricaded.

Democratic Senator George H. Pendleton,
had submitted a reform bill in December 1880.
Convinced
by Dorman

Eaton that his bill contained a number
of weaknesses,
Pendleton, with the consent of the Senate,

substituted a

bill drafted for the New York Civil Service
Reform Association by Eaton, John Jay, and William Curtis.
The

new bill

was modeled closely on British example.

It provided for a

commission to administer open competitive examinations
for
initial appointment and promotion to higher levels,

entry at

the lowest levels only, and political neutrality of
offices.

Resubmitted on January 10, 1881, before the attack on
Garfield, the bill predictably died.
his substitute bill on December

6,

Pendleton reintroduced

1881, four months after

Garfield's death, but this bill too was left to die at the
end of the session.

Throughout most of 1882 the spoilsmen

in Congress withstood the barrage of public pressure.

The barricades were finally brought down by the Novem-

ber elections in 1882, in which civil service reform had

been perceived as the key issue in

a

Republican majority, after suffering

number of states.

The

a loss of seats in

Congress and fearful of losing the Presidency in 1884, were
ready to approve civil service reform.

Republicans reasoned

^
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that support of refor. now
would salvage Republican
victories
in 1884; if Republicans lost
a majority in 1884 a
merit system would blanket-in many
Republican appointees at high
administrative levels. Democrats, on
the other hand, smelled
blood, but were put in a dilermna.
Support of reform perhaps
would help make them the majority
party, yet, at the
same
time, passage of the Pendleton bill
would remove a large
portion of patronage from their control.^
With the 1882

electoral results in mind the Congress
debated the Pendleton
bill in December 1882.
Congress the tenor of

m

debate

turned from the reformers' moral argument to
concerns for
partisan advantage and political expediency.
In the House, there was little debate at all;
the

Pendleton bill sailed through by a wide margin, undoubtedly
because the entire House was facing re-election in 1884.
In the Senate also, debate was relatively swift and
highly

partisan, but it did not overlook matters of less partisan

concern.

Perhaps the Congressional critics' most serious

concerns were that competitive examinations would result in
a civil service

composed of an aristocratic class and that

the merit system was not an American product.^ Supporters
•^Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
2

^Van Riper,

,

p.

237

.

"Adapting a British Political Invention to

American Needs," Public Administration 31 (Winter 1953): 318.
^See the remarks by Senator Woodbridge of Vermont
arguing that the merit system is aristocratic and Senator
Schenck of Ohio claiming that selection based on merit is
democratic, in Hoogenboom, ed.. Spoilsmen and Reformers
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 20-22.

.

argued,

to the contrary, that selection
based on competence

was democratic and demonstrated that
where competition had
been used as the basis for selection,

appointment of college

educated persons remained

a small

percent of the total.

The

competitive principle also came under fire
because many
critics believed that examinations were not

adequate as a

test of fitness for office.

In addition, with entrance

limited to the lowest positions, older men and
outsiders
could not afford to enter the service making
it

a closed

service.

While undoubtedly it is true as Hoogenboom
argues
that "members of each party sought partisan
advantage
through proposing a number of amendments that would
retain

or secure offices for its own partisan

use,""*-

it also

appears to be the case, and not inconsistently so, that many

members of Congress were concerned about broader political,
democratic consequences

But the focus of the debate appears to have been on
partisan matters.

At issue for many critics, particularly

Democrats, was the fear that "the in-coming party could

only secure the insignificant positions while members of
the out-going party would be promoted." 2

Appealing to his

fellow Democrats, Pendleton argued that Democrats ought to

support his bill because reform is what people want.
"'"Hoogenboom,

ed..

Spoilsmen and Reformers

2

,

p.

"I

37.

Sageser, The First Two Decades p. 48. Also see
Democratic Senator Brown's comments on this possibility in
Hoogenboom, ed.. Spoilsmen and Reformers, p. 38ff.
,

3
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believe," he said, "that the
adoption of this policy
will hasten the day of the victory
of our party and
fill many offices with Democrats."''"

.

.

.

Attempting to address both the political
and admi nistrative concerns, the British-modeled
Pendleton
bill was

adjusted to "American patterns of thought
and action.
example, while accepting the idea of
open

For

competitive exam-

inations for testing the fitness of
applicants, the American
examinations were to be "practical in their
character"

rather than academic as the British examination
tended to be
Rather than permitting entrance into the service
at the

lowest grades only, the Senate deleted this provision
from
the Pendleton bill, allowing lateral entry.

Congress

accepted the British notions of security of tenure and polit
ical neutrality.

At the same time, the Act left the

President in control of removals, subject to the provision
that failure to render political service or contribute to

political fund was not just cause for removal.

a

In the same

way, the issue of where to draw the line between politics

and administration was left to Presidential discretion.
-'-Hoogenboom,

S poilsmen and

ed..

Reformers

,

p.

37.

2

Van Riper, "Adapting a British Invention to American
Needs," p. 318.
See also Van Riper, History of the U.S
C ivil Service
pp. 98-110 for discussion of how Pendleton
Act was adapted from British system to fit the American
political and social climate.
.

,

^22 U.S. Statutes 403 (1883)
The First Two Decades, Appendix A.
,

.

Reprinted in Sageser,
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congress did not establish an
administrative class, but left
the President's appointees
unprotected.
Yet despite important differences
between the British
and American approaches, these
distinctions
can be over-

drawn. ^

The Pendleton Act provided for a
three member Commission, appointed by the President
with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to assist the
President in making
rules, supervising examinations, and
conducting investigations.
The British commission consisted of
three commissioners with similar duties and conditions
of office. The
rules prescribed by the Pendleton Act
included the fair

apportionment of Washington appointments among
the States;
establishment of health and age requirements; exclusion

of

drunkards from the Service; prohibition of political
assessments; and a probation period for new appointees.
Similarly,
the British Civil Service Commission monitored the distri-

bution of appointments between England, Scotland, and Ireland;
established rules denying employment to persons habitually
intoxicated, prohibiting political information to be used as
a basis for employment, and requiring health and age stan-

dards; and designated a period of probation for new employees.

Through the Pendleton Act only about ten percent of

civil service positions were placed in the classified service.

Significantly, the Act authorized the President to

'See Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit
314-18, for a more detailed discussion of similarities
between American and British reforms.
,

pp.
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include in the merit system previously
unclassified positions.
It has been through Executive
Order, therefore, that
the size of the classified service
has expanded and,

occasionally, declined and the line
between career and political appointees has been pushed
upward
and, occasionally,

downward.

Van Riper correctly notes that British
civil service development differed from American
development in
that

British growth occurred through Orders-in-Council
are in reality Cabinet or legislative
mandates.

,

which

Neverthe-

less, at least in early British development,
the initiative

for Orders-in-Council was taken by the Prime
Minister who is
head of the civil service. In other words, civil
service

extension in both countries appears to have been at the
initiative of the chief administrator.

Thus, as the Pendle-

ton bill was signed into law by President Arthur in January
1883, the strong influence of the British model is evident.

Reaction, Consequences, and the
Nature of Reform

Eighteen eighty-three marked the end of a political
skirmish for civil service reform, but not the end of the
battle.

For passage of the bill "betrayed a fundamental

opposition to the civil service reform movement

.

If

reform is a continuous web it is important briefly to examine
the reaction to the passage of the Pendleton bill.

From the

-^Ibid., p. 238.
See also, Stewart, The National Civil
Service Reform Leag ue, pp. 171-75, for an account of
opposition of spoilsmen.

reformers' perspective passage of
the Act had mixed consequences. On the one hand, the new
law applied only to

Washington and to custom houses and post
offices in the largest cities. On the other hand. President
Arthur appointed

Dorman Eaton as the new chairman of the
Civil Service Commission and two other members who had the
support of the

reformers.

In the 1884 Presidential election,
reformers

supported the winner, Grover Cleveland, but at
the same time.
Senator Pendleton was defeated for re-election
and in the

new Congress bills were introduced to repeal the
Pendleton
Act.

Although these bills were unsuccessful. Congressional

hostility to reform remained vigorous for years to come.
Consequently, expansion of the new merit system was left to
the initiative of Presidents, not Congress.

Arthur set the

pattern for the next few Presidents by adding positions to
the classified service at the end of his term.

From

a

longer term perspective, the Pendleton Act

planted the seed for future political concerns.

While most

observers agree that the introduction of competitive exams
led to a different type of individual entering the service,

there is disagreement over the nature of the new civil service.

White, for example, argues that examinations helped

replace political and personal favorites with citizens
capable of demonstrating their fitness and ability for

office

—a

thoroughly democratic principle."^

'White, The Republican Era, pp. 351-52.

Fish contends

.
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th^t examinations resulted in
replacing opportunities for
"clever, sometimes brilliant, men"
with a service which
attracted "the steady-going and unimaginative."!
Hoogenboom
stresses the view that competitive exams
resulted in
the

recruitment of persons of a higher social
status and were
thus, by implication, less democratic.^
At

the same time.

Van Riper claims that the reform, given
the political and
social conditions of the late nineteenth

century, made the
"

civil service more representative

.

^

whether less represen-

tative or more representative, less democratic or
more

democratic, the representative nature of the public
service
was changed in a way that left it open to future
political

questioning
The character of the civil service was affected in

another way.

As White notes, for decades the ideal of the

administrative system "had been a system political in character, serving the interests of party at an admitted cost in

competence and integrity.

.

.

.

This ideal was challenged

and gradually subdued to the ideal of a 'businesslike' gov-

ernment."^

A number of consequences ensued.

businessmen were brought into the government.
•'Fish,

For one, more
Secondly,

The Civil Service and the Patronage

,

p.

233.

^See, for example, Hoogenboom, "The Pendleton Act and
the C ivil Service," American Historical Review LXIV (19581959)

:

312.

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
538ff.
101-111,
pp.
^ The

Republican Er a, p. 387.

,

,

.
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business methods and the new
disciplines of economics and
statistics were introduced to
government activities.
Thirdly, with the prohibition of
assessments, politicians
turned for financial support to
businessmen who in turn
gained political power. ^ And fourthly,

civil service pro-

tection was pushed to higher and higher
levels in the
bureaucracy. Thus, while the civil service

perhaps became

more efficient, the seeds were sown for
later reformers to
ask whether it had grown politically
unresponsive.
But the web of reform is not only continuous,
it is
also woven out of a complex variety of motives
and

interests.

The predominant view among students of American
administra-

tive history is that reformers, motivated by moral
outrage,

were intent on purifying political life and public
administration.

Reformers, in the words of Schurz, were attempting

"to restore ability, high character, and true public spirit

once more to their legitimate spheres in our public life,
and to make active politics once more attractive to men of

self-respect and high patriotic aspirations."^
time,

At the same

Schiesl persuasively argues that reformers were

motivated by a commitment to administrative efficiency.
'-See Hoogenboom, "The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service," pp. 316-17, and Matthew Josephson, The Politicos
1865-1896 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938)
pp. 322-23 on this point.
,

2

Quoted in David Rosenbloom, "Public Personnel Policy
in a Political Environment, " Policy Studies Journal 9
(Winter 1980) :449-50
^Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency

,

passim.
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Stewart concludes that it was those
reformers who entered
the reform movement later, as it
began to be drained of its
leadership in the 1890s and early
1900s, who were "inclined
to stress reform as an instrument
to improve

the efficiency

of the administration as well as a
moral force for the purification of politics."^
If the reformers were concerned with
restoring morality

to politics, it was partially because
they were individuals

imbued with a sense of personal morality and
integrity, a
desire for liberty from the tyranny of political
parties,

and an impatience for democratic government
wherein "offices

must be open to all citizens according to their fitness
to
fill them."

2

Thus, one must question Hoogenboom's view that

the reformers were attempting to return government to pre-

Jacksonian attitudes and standards.

For,

"on the contrary,

civil service reformers accepted the principles of egalitar-

ianism and of equal opportunity in the public service."-^
The standard they were seeking to apply to the public ser-

vice was a mixture of "Federalist" competence and "Jacksonian" democracy.

Yet the reformers were political men

motivated by more than a moral crusade.
probably correct that Jenckes,

a

For example, it is

political foe of President

'Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League
p.

,

258.

^Carl Schurz, Civil-Service Reform and Democracy
(Washington, D.C.: Press of Good Government, 1893), p. 14.
^Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service

,

p.

64.

Johnson, first introduced his civil
service reform bill in
1865 in an attempt to weaken the powers
of the President.
Furthermore, Hoogenboom's class
interpretation
lays less

stress on the reformers' moral motivation
and more on the
view that the movement "had resulted
primarily

from loss of

political power. "1

He is undoubtedly correct that
seeing'

themselves and others like them gradually
overshadowed by
spoils politicians, the reformers attacked
the

politicians'

source of power.

One must remember, however, that the

reformers never sought to destroy the political
party, but
to regain their standing in them or to purify
them,

depending

on one's perspective

.

^

Whether the primary motive was

morality, efficiency, or power, the reform movement was
not

intended simply to make technical improvements, "rather it
sought fundamental political change."^

Congressional motives were perhaps as complex.
'Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils

,

p.

A few

67.

2

While it may be true, as Schiesl argues, that reformers sought the destruction of political parties at the local
level, there is no indication that this approach was taken
at the national level.
^Rosenbloom, "Public Personnel Policy in a Political
Environment," p. 4 50. Jay Shafritz's wisdom is worth noting
here.
"It is difficult if not impossible to separate the
moralistic from the political motivations of people. One
can never truly know where moral indignation over patronage
abuses ended and a not disinterested concern for denying a
power base to the incumbents began. It is a question that
lends itself to extensive and pointless philosophic debate."
Public Personnel Management, The Heritage of Civil Service
Reform (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 32.
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congressmen were perhaps concerned with
the moral argument,
a few were seeking revenge or
redress at being

overlooked in

the scramble for patronage.

Many, maybe most, were troubled

by their perceptions of the imminent
1884 election and
responded to their political instincts.
President Arthur's
support for reform apparently proceeded from
this
source as

well as a desire to rid himself of the nightmare
of dividing
the spoils, rather than from an interest in
strengthening

Presidential leadership.

it is clear that the Congress

neither expected nor wanted power to accrue to the
President.

Although department heads and appointing officers lost
their
discretionary appointment power, indications are that many
were willing to give it up in return for more competent
employees.

E.

L. Godkin,

a

leader in the civil service

reform movement, notes that reform was not "the result of
clear national policy."^

It was, one might add,

the result

of the coalescing of a number of external pressures, personal

and political motives, and administrative needs into a com-

promise that momentarily served

a

variety of purposes.

Britain and America
Summary and Conclusions
;

The creation of civil services in both Great Britain
and the United States was a response to multiple forces and
events:

political and social pressures, intellectual

trends, and events external to the immediate reform context.

'Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsmen and Reformers

,

p.

50

In each case the reform process
was characterized by interest

group pluralism.

That is, in both countries public
opinion,
interest groups, civil servants, reform
associations, political parties, legislatures, and
heads of government were
important actors in the creation. The
reformed civil services were the products of the application
of political
skills by intensely committed reformers in
specific social

and political contexts.

To a large degree the reform

processes resulted in civil service systems that
reflected a
consensus among the major actors and that remain
largely

intact.

In both countries representative bureaucracy
was a

central concern.

In Britain, advocates of reform hoped to

replace a hereditary aristocracy with

a

meritocratic elite,

which for many meant an increasingly powerful middle-class.
In the United States, Eaton, Schurz, and other reformers

sought to make public office more representative of middle-

class morality and business competence.

Reformers in each

country sought to purify government, to secure civil services which reflected their values and attitudes by changing
its representative character.

Both sets of reformers were

extremely successful.
The pursuit of efficiency by both British and American

reformers was related inextricably to the effort to make

administration more representative.

Northcote and Trevelyan

perhaps were more clearly concerned with increasing effi-

ciency than the American reformers but, nonetheless, both
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sets of reformers believed improved
government performance
delivered with more economy would
result when merit principles were applied to civil service
selection.

Thus in the latter part of the nineteenth
century both
Great Britain and the United States began
measuring their

civil services by new standards.

were attempting to assert

a

In both countries reformers

new democratic doctrine that

repudiated the practice of appointment to the
public service
based on political privilege. Both British and
American
reformers believed that their reform proposals would
enhance
democratic government.
Yet,

it is clear that the civil service structures and

procedures that were created in both countries were not
identical.

The foundation laid by the Northcote-Trevelyan

Report resulted in a higher civil service characterized by

a

relatively closed, elite corps of liberally educated generalists who were committed to deep-rooted principles of
anonymity, nonpartisanship, and public service.

The higher

civil service that emerged from the Pendleton Act was charac-

terized by its openness, professional-technical competence,
and commitment to particular policies and programs.

Yet

these differences only further suggest that civil service

reform in both countries went to the very heart of politics
and government.

.

CHAPTER

II

THE SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION:
REPUBLICANISM RENEWED

After its creation, the U.S. Civil
Service developed
through a series of incremental victories
and defeats.

By
the end of World War II the civil
service largely had met
its basic goal— selection by examination,
tenure for good
behavior, and political neutrality. It had
closed the front
door to the service; in its enthusiasm to
protect personnel
from political pressure and provide security it
also had

closed the back door, a move the creators of the merit
system
had not desired. By effectively restricting department
heads' discretion to fire, discipline, and manage, the
now

rule-bound system had become, many critics argued,

overly

centralized, burdened with complexity, and inflexible.

It

was criticized through the early 1950s for rigidity with

respect to position-classification, the lack of a systematic
wage policy, the absence of training programs particularly
for higher levels, and weaknesses in other "personnel man-

agement" areas such as promotion and transfer, separations
and removals, efficiency ratings, and appeals and grievances.
•'See, for example, Paul P. Van Riper, History of the
United States Civil Service (Evanston, Illinois: Row Peterson
and Company, 1958), especially pp. 425-40, 453-55, 528-31;
and Bernard L. Gladieux, "Civil Service Versus Merit,"
Public Administration Review 12, No. 3 (Summer 1952) 173-77
:
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In Short, most critics agreed that
the system which now over-

emphasized employee protection and administrative
continuity
was unable to adequately respond to the
stress of

depression,

war, and public pressure for increased
services.

From a managerial perspective, the reams of
personnel
regulations in place by the early 1950s were
contributing

to

many of the problems they were designed to prevent
or remedy.
Of particular concern was the shortage of qualified
individuals for top executive positions and the related problems
of

how to secure and retain competent persons in these key
positions and the low prestige of the civil service.

Even

before the second world war many of these problems had

received attention from official sources concerned with the
chief executive's inability to control and manage the government machinery.

The President's Committee on Administrative

Management reported in

1931-^ and the Ramspeck

Act was passed

in 1940 giving the President increased authority over person-

nel management.

The problems continued to receive attention

in the postwar period in numerous Congressional studies, the

1949 Classification Act, and from the Commission on Organi-

zation of the Executive Branch of the Government (First

Hoover Commission, 1946-1948).

That the energies of many

-'-President's Committee on Administrative Management,

Report With Special Studies (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1937)
.

^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Personnel Management (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1949), hereafter referred to as First Hoover

Commission

.
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academics, businessmen, and
professionals were attracted to
the stubborn problem of recruiting
and holding competent
higher civil servants is suggested
by the stream of studies
that emerged between 1935 and the
early 1960s. ^ Binding each
of these studies together had been
the common concern for

strengthening the managerial or leadership
capacity of the
President by giving him responsibility for
personnel management and increasing his control of top
executive
personnel.

Important as these administrative concerns
were and
are, they cannot be separated from the
social and

political

milieu that existed in the late 1940s and early
1950s.
was a time when a large segment of the public,

It

although just

experiencing the benefits of big, positive government,
was
reasserting the ingrained philosophy of laissez-faire.
Despite the fact that (or perhaps because) governmental

bureaucracy had come to play an increasingly important role
in society,

it was a period in which the dominant public

mood was conservative, wanting reduced public expenditures
for foreign aid but not to homeowners and veterans, less
-'-For example, Leonard White, Government Career Service
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935); William
Carpenter, The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform
(Princeton University Press, 1952); John J. Corson, Execu tives for the Federal Service (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1952); Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for
Government (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957); David
T. Stanley, The Higher Civil Service (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1964); American Assembly, Sixth, The Federal
Government Service: It's Character, Prestige, and Problems
(New York: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business,
1954)

.
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government regulation of business and
more of unions, and
increased attention to the threat of
communism abroad and at
home
Ignoring the successes of public
administration in the
depression and war years, many people in the
postwar population evidenced a renewed acceptance of the
goodness and

efficiency of business and scientific management.

Government

was denounced as wasteful and inefficient while
big business
was efficient and economy-minded. Public officials
were

denounced as lazy and timid and, at the same time,
intent on
securing power. Thus, unlike the Populist period of the
1880s, the public was not just anti-bureaucracy, it was

specifically anti-government bureaucracy.

The Whitten Amend-

ment of 1951 limiting the size of the career service exemplified the predominant legalistic, simplistic views of the
nature of the problems of the public service.^

The loyalty

and security programs gave clear evidence of the prevailing

mood of suspicion and distrust of public administrators.
The public service was under attack and for many of
the attackers the issue was the growth of administrative

power at the expense of other governmental bodies.
See Herbert. S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American
Crusades (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952) for
description of 1950s political environment.
o

See Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
pp. 464-66 for description of Whitten Amendment and pp. 468469 for other examples of the negative approaches taken to
,

control bureaucracy.

particularly Congress, business,
and the individual. The
mood of those persons moving
into positions of power after
the election of 1952, and of
much of

the public putting them

there, was caught by MacNeil and
Metz.

This vast and rapid [post-war]
expansion of Government
extravagance.
EspSaUy
it str^iLr^%'°
^"^"^ ^""^ expanded the executive branch of
the
Federal Government and weakened the
others
It
encouraged the trend toward collectivism
and it
went far to discourage and weaken the
free enterprise
system
It has greatly weakened the position
of the
individual
relation to his Government. Thus there
long has been a crying need for a group
of competent
public men to resurvey the Government's
activities for
the purpose of bringing them back into
conformity with
the principles of the American Constitution.!
'

.

.

.

m

The Second Hoover Commission was just that group
of public
men to renew what conservatives considered the lost
principles of the Republic, to make the now unresponsive
public

bureaucracy responsive—responsive to standards and philosophies enunciated by leaders in the Republican Party.

From a social perspective, then, the early postwar
years were troubled by tensions that reflected uncertainty

and disagreement over the proper role of government in
society.

Was government to be used as a positive force to

solve social problems or was it merely a mechanism for
social control?

The civil service took the main brunt of

the tension, uncertainty, and anger, becoming a victim to

the lack of consensus in the public policy debate.

Neil MacNeil and Harold W. Metz, The Hoover Report
1953-1955 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956), p. 7.

,

.
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" The^^oj^i

tics of Revenge "

The outcome of the Presidential election of
1952 was,
to some extent, a reflection of the concern
among

the public

for the growth of administrative power.

Eisenhower had cam-

paigned on promises to "clean up the mess in
Washington," to
reduce government spending and size, and to restore
honesty
to government.

Thus, a central political issue confronting

the new Eisenhower administration concerned its
relationship
to the bureaucracy.

Perhaps to

a

greater degree than in any

previous transition, the Republican Party in 1952 was faced
with this recurring question:

to what extent does an

incoming administration need to control higher and middle
level personnel who are largely protected by civil service

rules and procedures in order to effectively direct the

agencies that will carry out its policy?^
cinctly,

Stated more suc-

"What is the proper balance between change and

continuity in the context of our system?"-^

For partisan

Republicans, this question took on added significance due to

several interrelated developments.
-'-This phrase is taken from Van Riper, History of the
U.S. Civil Service p. 485, who credits it to Samuel Lubell's
chapter 3 in Revolt of the Moderate (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1956)
,

^Leonard D. White in The Republican Era: 1869-1961
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958), p. 317 posits the
question as one integral to the issue of extension of the
merit system by executive order.
^Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the
Change of Administration," American Political Science Review
See also Frederick C. Mosher,
48, No. 1 (March 1954) :137.
De mocracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968), p. 85 for the application of this question to
the Eisenhower election.
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Of both utmost joy and concern
for Republicans was the
fact that their capture of the
White House came after a
twenty-year absence. During this
time the Federal service
had increased in size from
583,196 to 2,603, 267 of which 85%
were under a merit system, a large
percentage of the

remaining employees, "although not under
civil service had
been given the protection accorded
classified employees" by

President Truman's Executive Order 9712 in 1947.^
provided that an employee in the merit

The order

system who left to

take an excepted position was still protected
from removal.
In addition, during the last years of the
Truman administration a large number of top positions had been
"blanketed-in"
the classified service.

Van Riper indicates that under

Truman patronage consisted of 50,000 plus Post Office
positions for attorneys, U.S. marshals, collectors of customs and internal revenue and another 5,000 to 25,000

positions at lower levels for approximately 70,000 positions
for patronage purposes.

Yet when Eisenhower came into

office in 1953 probably only 15,000 positions were immediately available, due to tenure restrictions, though another
50,000 could be anticipated when the incumbents died or

retired.

2

At the same time, the federal service was con-

tracting, and Republicans had contributed to the patronage

^Louis L. Friedland, "The Career System Revisited,"
Personnel Administration 18, No. 1 (January 1955) :19.
Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
490.

"^Van

pp. 443,

,
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squeeze by promising to reduce the
national government even
further.
TO make matters worse,

famine had created

the twenty-year Republican

situation where "few Republican
leaders
with any federal experience were available
and many
a

of those

who had worked with the Democrats were
suspect in the new
administration."^ Republicans it appears had

extraordinary

reasons to complain of a dearth of political
leadership.
Thus not only did Eisenhower and Congressional

Repub-

licans have relatively few patronage
appointments, but the
career civil service had been stocked over twenty
years with
New Deal-Fair Deal Democrats. Many of these
individuals
had

entered government service because of their commitment
to

particular policies or programs and, even after attaining
permanent status, had remained spokesmen for those programs.
Over twenty years close relationships had developed between
bureau chiefs, interest group leaders, and congressional

committee chairmen that gave bureau chiefs a degree of

policy-making autonomy from their department heads.

To the

incoming Republicans most of the top level civil servants

were policy-makers protected by civil service tenure; to
Republicans civil service rules had gone too far.
tion,

In addi-

new Republican political appointees found some hold-

over Democrats in the career service to be overtly partisan.
For example,

"many career people had attended the $100

^Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 85.
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Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners of the
Democratic Party.
Although the Hatch Act did not
specifically prohibit such
activity, it was certainly highly
questionable from a Republican perspective. it is not difficult
to understand, then,

that the Republican Administration
entered office carrying a
heavy load of suspicion and mistrust—
a "built-in bias"^
against top level bureaucrats in addition
to an ideological
mistrust of governmental bureaucracy
in general.
A Washing ton Post an d Times Herald article by
Walter Trohan
in

January 1953 expressed the widely held
perception,

A powerful fifth column of New Dealers
Dealers will operate in key posts under theand Fair
incoming
Republican Administration. ...
Republicans will take over the top departmental
jobs
as Cabinet officers, under-Cabinet officers,
agency
heads, and various chief deputies, but these
offices are
largely fronts and top-policy posts.

At the level where policy is carried out and information is supplied for policy making, the New Dealers
and Fair Dealers are wired in civil service. The vast
majority of these plan to remain under the Republicans
to work underground for the Democrats.^
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, Administration of the Civil Service System
85th Congress, 1st session. Committee Print No. 2, 1957,
Report of Special Consultant, James R. Watson, to the Committee, p. 39.
,

2

See Emmerich
What Next?", Public
1954): 3; and Martin
Research Reports 1,

and Lyle, "The Federal Career Service
Administration Review 14, No. 1 (Winter
Packman, "Government Jobs," Editorial
No. 19

(May 18,

1955) :363.

3

Congress, House, Sub-Committee on Manpower and
Civil Service, History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the
United States and Selected Foreign Countries Part I, by
Virginia A. McMurtry, Committee Print No. 94-29 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 268.
-^U.S.,

,

.
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Fearing that the "Democrats" in
the merit system would
delay,
if not sabotage, the
implementation of Republican policy,
the new Administration began
to search for
means to take^

control of the bureaucracy
It should be noted that the
distrust that was generated
was mutual. With the civil service
itself in a state of
turbulence due to the anti-bureaucratic
character of the
1952 campaign, the continued loyalty attacks,
reductions-inforce, almost continual Congressional
investigations into

the economy and efficiency of the service,
and lists of
career persons who had attended Democratic
fundraisers being

actively circulated as blacklists,

^

the morale of the

service reached a low point with the 1952 election
and the
succeeding few years.
The Eisenhower Administration entered office in 1953

with the largest popular majority up to that point in the
^Herbert Emmerich and G. Lyle Belsley in "The Federal
Career Service— What Next?," p. 2, add some perspective to
the Republican picture of the bureaucracy.
There are no factual bases for believing that there
was a preponderance of Democrats in the civil service in
the District of Columbia at the close of the Truman
Administration. On the contrary, there is strong reason
to believe that if one could determine how these civil
servants would have voted in the 1952 election, it would
be found that they did not vary greatly from the rest of
the population. It is significant that the two counties
in Virginia and the two in Maryland adjacent to the
District of Columbia which are populated by a heavy proportion of federal employees voted overwhelmingly for
Eisenhower in 1952.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office,
Administration of the Civil Service System p. 39.
,
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nation's history and with
House and Senate. 1

slim Republican majority in
the
Eisenhower, of course, "brought
a

to the

Presidency the conviction that the
country had had its full
measure of new programs during the past

twenty years and that

it wanted consolidation without
undermining past achievements." 2 His was a moderate view when
laid beside that of

many Congressional Republicans.

To win the campaign for

less government and for what Republicans
hoped would be more
competent, honest administration, Eisenhower
and his
sup-

porters directed much of their attention to the
higher civil
service. Believing that "administrative talent
would have

to be found in men with a different social orientation
than

that which presumably had dominated the executive
branch

during the previous two decades," the new administration set
off to replace the "planners," the "idea men," the "intel-

lectuals" with efficiency engineers, business management
experts, and pragmatic business executives.^

From the

Republican perspective, the civil service had become unrepresentative of the values of postwar America; only by an
infusion of carriers of the conservative creed could its

representative character be restored.
-^Eisenhower had a Republican Congress only in his
first two years of office (1953-1955)
In the 83rd Congress
Republicans held a one-vote majority in the Senate, and a
seven-vote majority in the House.
.

2

Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades

,

p.

359.

Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of
Administration," pp. 131, 146.
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The Administration also opened
with much uncertainty
about just how a more representative
bureaucracy could be
attained. Eisenhower himself was
repelled by partisan political fighting and showed himself
to be rather naive by
agreeing with his political rival.
Senator Taft, that he
would not discriminate against supporters
of Taft in the
making of high level appointments
In addition, Eisenhower
instructed his staff that friendship with
him was not a

qualification for office.

Thus "Eisenhower early put him-

self on record as willing to abstain from
using one of a
president's prime political weapons for the forging
of

party unity— namely

,

the manipulation of the patronage."^

Though it is clear that Eisenhower opposed manipulation
of
the merit system, it is apparent that he realized the
need
to control it through appointments.

His ambivalence left

the issue as to where to draw the line between the career

civil service and political administrators in a state of con-

fusion and the civil service, to a large extent, leaderless.
Three Administration actions contributed to the

blurred line between the permanent and political executive
positions.

In 1953 Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Ser-

vice Commission, was given the dual title of Presidential

Advisor on Personnel Management.
Chairman became

a

In this capacity, the

personnel advisor to the President in the

^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
2lbid.

,

p.

478.

.
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White House Office.

Although this was a move recommended
by
the First Hoover Commission, many
critics saw it as compro-

mising the oversight responsibilities
of the Commission.^
Confusion was further visited upon the
politics-

administration dichotomy by Eisenhower's
attempt to control
policy-making jobs by creating a new schedule

for positions

excepted from the merit system.

Executive Order 10,440 on March

Schedule
31,

C,

created by

1953, was to encompass

all positions of a confidential or policy
determining character and remove them from civil service protection.
At the
same time, the Executive Order partially reversed
President

Truman's 1947 Order which gave job security to
policy-makers
who, although no longer formally in the merit system,
had

been protected at one time by civil service tenure.
principle behind Schedule

C— that

The

policy-making positions

ought to be controlled by a new administration—was good.
However, as the Second Hoover Commission's Task Force on

Personnel and Civil Force found. Schedule C was based on an

oversimplified "policy-determining" criterion
"policy-determining"?

— just

what is

Because an answer to this question

lacked clear criteria, the use of Schedule C resulted in a

confusing scattering of political executives up and down the
hierarchy.

In addition. Schedule C resulted in the conver-

sion to political status of some positions held by career

-'-See

appointment

Ibid., pp. 495-98,

for a discussion of the Young
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officials at lower levels in the
hierarchy, many of them
"at
levels where expertness and
continuity
are essential."!

Indeed, the Task Force concluded
that Schedule c contributed
to "the most significant cut-back
of the competitive service
in its history."^

Democrats, of course, were quick to
charge the Republicans with undermining the merit
system, yet the quantitative importance of Schedule C was not
high.
For
example,

out of the total of 1098 positions placed
in Schedule C by
September 1954, 269 had been transferred from
the competi-

tive service,

559 from Schedule A,

only 268 were new positions.

^

2

from Schedule

B,

and

The Civil Service Commission

had turned down a large number of agency requests
for

Schedule C jobs.

Thus, most Schedule C jobs were filled by

transfer from within the service, perhaps a recognition of
the need for continuity or the result of a few qualified

U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force on Personnel and Civil
Service, Report on Personnel and Civil Service (Washington:
Government Printing Office, February, 1955), pp. 35, 37.
Hereafter cited as Second Hoover Commission Task Force,
Report
.

^Ibid., p. 192.
3

Schedule A includes a wide variety of miscellaneous
positions which have never been placed in the competitive
service or have been expected for various reasons, in particular, positions that were judged by the Civil Service
Commission to be not feasible for either competitive or noncompetitive examination. Schedule B includes a small number
of positions filled by noncompetitive examination, for
example, technical and professional positions.
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outsiders.^

Nevertheless, many Republican Congressmen
were
highly critical of the Civil Service
Commission and Chairman
Young.
Some even requested Young's resignation
on the
grounds that by rejecting such a large number
of Schedule C
requests "he was not supporting 'the
Administration
in

helping to remove those who would sabotage the
very Administration who gave you a job'."^ Republican
complaints

throughout 1953 and early 1954 that Democrats in
the executive branch continued to obstruct policy and leak

information

to the press led

to the issuance of the "Willis Directive"

in 1954.

The Willis plan, the third Administration action to

blur the relationship between political and administrative
executives, was an effort to subject all career appointments
and promotions at GS-14 levels and above to political clear-

ance through the Republican National Committee.

The plan,

otherwise knows as Operation People's Mandate, was the

product of Charles F. Willis, Jr., then assistant to Sherman
Adams, President Eisenhower's Chief of Staff.

According to

James R. Watson, Executive Director of the National Civil

Service League,
The new plan established a special assistant in each
department and agency for the purpose of maintaining
touch with appointments among the agency, the White
'•R. N. Spann, "The Eisenhower Civil Service and the
Reformers," Public Administration 34 (Summer 1956): 146.

^Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of
Administration," p. 14 3.

.
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House and the Republican National
t^-o
purpose was to control vacancies, Committee
not only in'the*Do?^
real offices, but also in career
posts in the top Irl^ll
of the career civil service.
It attempted to esLbUsh
clearing appointments.
''^'^L
pob
iob'^of'thf
of the special assistant was to
see that Republican^
were appointed to the upper five grades,
recognized career jobs, on an unmitigated including
partisan

Though the publication of the Willis Directive
was an embarrassment to the Eisenhower Administration, there
is no

indication that it was ever rescinded.

Republican partisans

were bent on revenge
The Creation and Work of the
Second Hoover Commission
•

It was out of this environment that the Second Hoover

Commission was born.

When the 83rd Congress convened early

in 1953, many Republican members were motivated by a

"politics of revenge" to create a Commission on the model of
the popular First Hoover Commission to help restore the

"American way of life."

At the same time, the impression

should not be left that there were no Republican members of

Congress who saw a Second Hoover Commission as the best

approach to solving serious problems.

Yet the evidence is

clear that partisan gain was an important motivation.
It is important to note that the idea for and the

force behind the Commission were Congressional in origin.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, Administration of the Civil Service System
For details and examples from the Willis plan
pp. 29, 31.
see the Appendix of the Committee print, pp. 83-144.
,

Shortly after his inauguration Eisenhower
had appointed a
President's Advisory Committee on Government
Organization
(PACGO) to provide him with "immediate
advice and

action on

reorganization during his first year in the
White House.
The Committee, composed of Nelson Rockefeller,
Arthur S.

Flemming, and Milton Eisenhower, and later
Don Price who
replaced Rockefeller, apparently operated quite
effectively
through both of Eisenhower's terms of office.
Beyond PACGO,

Eisenhower was backing a bill to establish a Commission
on
Intergovernmental Relations which he believed would overlap
with the work of the Second Hoover Commission.
Eisenhower was able to say in his diary,

Hence

"I personally doubt

the need for its [the Second Hoover Commission] organization

because of the simultaneous authorization of another commission which will have to do with the division of functions,
duties, and responsibilities between the federal government

and the several states."^

Despite his lack of enthusiasm

for another Hoover Commission, Congressional pressure forced

Eisenhower to give his support.

His diary continues, "Never

theless, and in spite of the fact that these views were

carefully explained to congressional leaders, two or three
individuals on the Hill were so determined to have

a

new

-'-Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administra
tive Management (University, Alabama: The University of
Alabama Press, 1971), p. 174.

^Robert H. Ferrell, ed.. The Eisenhower Diaries (New
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1981), p. 249.
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'Hoover' commission that

I

had to accept the Hoover Commis-

sion in order to achieve the other
one, from which I expect
much."
Indeed, Senator Homer Ferguson of
Michigan and Representative Clarence Brown of Ohio, seeing
an opportunity to
reduce the role of government, were the chief
sponsors of a
bill to create the Second Hoover Commission.
The Ferguson-Brown bill passed Congress on
July 10,
1953 with surprisingly little opposition or debate,

^

which

is rather remarkable in view of two major
provisions of the

bill.

The first noticeable provision, or lack thereof,
was

its failure to require an equal number of Democrats
and

Republicans as did the bill authorizing the First Hoover Com
mission.

This failure tended to confirm the partisan pur-

poses of the sponsors of the Commission.

Like the First

Hoover Commission, the bill did provide for twelve members,
four each, two from public life and two from private life,
to be chosen by the President, Vice-President, and the

Speaker of the House.

^

But because partisan equality was

llbid.
^67 U.S. Statutes 142 (1953), created the Commission
of Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
known as the Second Hoover Commission.
3

Members of the Second Hoover Commission were:
Eisenhower appointments: Attorney General (Rep) Herbert
Brownell, Jr.;
former Civil Service Commissioner (Rep)
Arthur S. Flemming; former President of the United States
(Rep) Herbert Hoover; former Postmaster General (Dem) James
Nixon appointments:
(Rep) Senator Homer
A. Farley.
Ferguson replaced by Republican Senator Syles Bridges;
(Dem) Senator John L. McClellan; Dean of the College of
Engineering at Cornell University (Rep) Solomon C. Hollister
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not required, the Commission was
composed of seven Republicans and five Democrats. Only after
the Commission reported
did Democrats raise much objection to
this arrangement.
For
example. Representative Holifield in a
dissent to the Final

Report to the Congre ss argued that the value
of the Commission was seriously nullified because it
lacked
a statutory

requirement for bipartisanship

.

However, as Hoover was

^

wont to declare, there was never

a

split among the committee

based on strictly party lines.
Going beyond the legislative requirements of the Com-

mission's membership, it is clear that as a group those
finally selected were most conservative, certainly more so
than the members of the First Commission.

There were five

returnees from the First Commission, none of whom were among
the more vocal dissenters on that First Committee.

More

telling is Eisenhower's testimony regarding Hoover's state
of mind:

"I was a bit nonplussed to find that the only

individuals he wanted on the commission were those whom he

knew to share his general convictions

— convictions

that many

of our people would consider a trifle on the motheaten

Dean of School of Law at Southern Methodist University (Dem)
Robert G. Storey. Speaker Martin:
(Rep) Representative
Clarence J. Brown; (Dem) Representative Chet Holifield;
Former Ambassador to Great Britain (Dem) Joseph P. Kennedy;
Business executive (Rep) Sidney A. Mitchell.
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Final Report to the Congress (Washington:
Government Printing Office, June 1955), p. 27. Hereafter
Second Hoover Commission, Final Report.
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side."^

The membership of the Commission
Task Forces was
heavily composed of representatives of
free enterprise and
the corporate sector-65 business
executives, 40 lawyers, 37

engineers,

8

bankers,

8

CPAs,

3

insurance executives, and

6

public administrators 2-many of whom had
been exempted from
conflict of interest laws by special legislation
requested

by Hoover.

Critics have little trouble supporting
their con-

tention that the Task Forces were padded to
provide the
recommendations that the Commission desired."^
The second aspect of the Ferguson-Brown bill which

later provided canon fodder for attacks on the Commission
was the explicit authority the Commission received to make

recommendations with broad policy implications.

Where the

First Hoover Commission, largely for political reasons, was
limited to examining approaches to reduce expenditure,

eliminate duplication and waste, consolidate services, and
ac hieve efficiency,"^ the Second Commission was charged to

^Ferrell, ed.. The Eisenhower Diaries
2

MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Report

,

,

p.

p.

247.
19.

3

Most observers, however, are more generous with the
Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service. Chaired by Harold
Dodds, President of Princeton University, it also included
such notables as Chester I. Barnard, author of Functions of
the Executive Leonard D. White, Professor of Public Administration at the University of Chicago, and Robert Ramspeck,
former Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, along
with six business executives. George A. Graham, Professor
of Political Science at Princeton, was its Staff Director.
,

^Emmerich persuasively and, I believe, correctly
argues in Organization and Administrative Management p. 105,
that the First Hoover Commission had the authority to examine
,

,
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eliminate "nonessential services,
functions, and activities
which are competitive with private
enterprise"

and to define

"responsibilities of officials."^

The latter two charges

made the intent of its sponsors clear.

The Commission was

not to limit itself to questions of
organizational arrangements and efficiency, but to broaden its
inquiry to what
government should and should not do ^ That
the
.

Second Com-

mission was given such a wide scope is clear
from the Senate
testimony of its authors. Ferguson pointed out
that the

terms of reference were

and make recommendation in substantive policy areas and was
prepared to do so at the time of its creation in 1947
However, with Truman's unexpected election in 1948, Chairman
Hoover restricted the scope of the inquiry to organizational
structure, efficiency, and economy questions. The scope was
limited to examining means to make government work better,
rather than questioning whether a particular government
function was needed. The Second Commission was under no
such political constraint to limit itself to questions of
structure. James W. Fesler in "Administrative Literature
and the Second Hoover Commission Reports, " American
Political Science Review 51, No. 1 (March 1957), p. 148,
also takes this position. The distinction between the scope
of the two commissions is instructive for what it reveals
about the climate of the Second Hoover Commission, yet the
dichotomy between structure/efficiency questions and policy
questions is a bit forced. That is, one may argue that the
study of efficiency and organizational structure is not
neutral with regard to policy as the Emmerich and Fesler
arguments imply. As Harold Seidman, in Politics, Position
and Power 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980)
p. 29, asserts, issues of organization and structure are
essentially questions of power who shall control and to
what ends?
.

,

,

—

'"Second Hoover Commission, Final Report, p. 1.

^See comments regarding this efficiency-policy
dichotomy in footnote 4, page 100.
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standpoint of polt^y"^?^ inq"re°°'""•Sht
fn"":"."'^
Should
the Government be performing
aoTiviti or
service, and if so, to what extent?! this ^^^ivity

That Ferguson's question was not
without bias is apparent as
he continues,.
the cost and the size of our Government
reduced by cutting down the things which can best be
Government
does.
The mere process of reorganization
cannot
reduce the size of Government or its burden
on the ?ax
percent. Reorganization can^
nnr^t^v'"°''!
not
strike at lu^""
the heart of the problem of big Govern^
.

.

.

ment.'^

The means to strike at the heart of the
problem lay in the
Commission's "power to recommend a complete elimination

or

abolition of an activity.

"3

m

his dissent in the Final

^Qpo^t Commissioner Holifield made the first of the Democrats' rather late responses by pointedly declaring that

such a sweeping mandate was an "unwise departure from repre-

sentative government" where the people's elected representatives determine policy.'^

Any doubt that the assumptions and purposes of the

Commission were grounded in a political philosophy of conservatism were dispelled by Hoover himself.

The Final

Report announces that "the primary purpose of the Commission
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Senate Report No. 216, 83rd Congress, 1st Session,
1953, Senate Reports 1, p. 4.

^Ibid.
'^Second Hoover Commission, Final Report,

p.

28.

2

.
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was to recommend methods by which
savings could be made in
the expenditures of the agencies
of the executive branch."^
"But more important than savings."
Hoover declared in a New
York_Times interview, "was the realization
that the whole
social and economic system is based on
private enterprise ."
The creation, organization, and operation
of the Hoover Commission of 1953-1955 was motivated by a desire
to return

government and its relationship to business to
pre-New Deal
days
Findings, Recommendations, Assumptions
It is possible that a small miracle could have trans-

formed the work of this ideologically committed, conserva-

tively-biased Commission and its Task Forces into
ful,

skeptical analysis.

In general,

a thought-

such was not the case.

The Commission's studies on public versus private production,

mortgage guarantees, agricultural credit, medical services
reflected the philosophical position from which it started.
However, by almost all accounts, the Commission's report on

Personnel and Civil Service ^ was competent and distinguished,
an outcome that must be accounted for by the strength of its
llbid., p. 19.
^

New York Times

,

26 June 1955,

Sec. 1, p. 63.

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Personnel and Civil Service, A Report to the
Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, February
1955)
Hereafter cited as Second Hoover Commission, Civil
Service Report.
.
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Task Force.

And yet, given the political
tenor of the
second Hoover Commission one
must ask, what purposes

and

assumptions lie behind the findings
and recoMnendations on
the civil service? is there
any reason to believe that
these purposes were out of
character relative to the overriding concerns of the Commission?
The centerpiece of the Commission's
(and its Task
Force's) report was an argument for
changing

the topmost

levels of the administration, by creating
a distinctive
career senior civil service sharply separated
from an
enlarged political executive corps. The
Commission found
that the greatest weakness in the area of
personnel and civil

service was in "expert managerial direction."

Indeed,

"increasing the supply of managerial talent available
within
the Government

problem today.

...
"^

is the heart of the Federal personnel

The source of this deficiency was to be

found, according to the Commission, in the high rate of
turn-

over for political or noncareer executives, the confusion of
functions among career administrators and political executives,

the lack of systematic recruitment and assignment

procedures, low salaries, political executives who are un-

prepared for their political tasks, conflict of interest
laws that discourage competent persons from entering government, and a system which emphasizes positions, not people,

at the higher levels.

^Second Hoover Commission Task Force, Report,

p. xxi.

—

^
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TO address these problems the
Commission made nineteen

wide-ranging recommendations, only

a few of

which need be

examined here.

As the Commission's report to
Congress
states, its primary purpose was
to reach a balance between
the need for competent, politically
responsive non-career
executives and the need for skilled,
non-partisan career
administrators.
in the Commission's view that
balance could
best be reached by increasing the number
of political appointees from 750 to 5,000,1 concentrating
these political executives at the department level, and clearly
separating their

responsibilities and duties from the career officials
below.
At the same time, officials with civil service
protection

were to be restricted to the bureau level and below
where
they would be relieved of all policy-political duties and
would carry out solely technical, administrative responsibilities.

The cornerstone of this new relationship was the

Commission's recommendation for

a

Senior Civil Service.

Reportedly the proposal nearest to Hoover's heart,
the Senior Civil Service was to be a corps of senior career

officials, 1500 to 3000 strong, who were to be nominated by

department heads and selected by a Senior Civil Service Board
^MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Commission p. 34. The
Hoover Commission Report leaves the amount of increase
indeterminate. MacNeil and Metz indicate the 5,000 figure
a seemingly fantastic increase from 750.
As the Report's
editor and Director of Research they obviously were privileged to some of the Commission's discussions.
,

^Ibid., p. 29.
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solely on the basis of competence.

its putative purpose was

"to have always at hand in the
Government a designated group

of highly qualified administrators
whose competence, integrity, and faithfulness have been
amply demonstrated" and "to
make the civil service more attractive
as a career."^ The
members of the new service would have their
status, rank,

and salary vested in them as individuals
rather than in their
job.
At the same time, they would be obligated
to serve

where needed most.

These features would provide the top

civil service with flexibility.

Senior civil servants would

be required to refrain from political activity,
making statements or speeches of a political nature, contributing
to

political campaigns, testifying before Congress on political
questions, or identifying publically with

a

political party.

Indeed, the political neutrality of the senior administrator

must be such that he avoids "emotional attachments to the
policies of any administration."^

His incentive would come

in the form of higher base salaries and pay increases for

satisfactory performance.

Though never used explicitly as

an example by the Task Force or Commission, undoubtedly the

Administrative Class of the British civil service had some
influence in the development of the Senior Civil Service

Second Hoover Commission, Civil Service Report
2lbid., p. 41.

,

p.

39.
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idea.l

The rank-in- the-man idea (as
opposed to the rank-inthe-job) also pointed to American
experience in the military
and foreign services, where a
"corps" model seemed to
exist.

Other recommendations of significance
include the proposal to allow managers greater
discretion
to select person-

nel at middle and upper levels
by adopting a "rule of five"
rather than the "rule of three."
addition, the Commission recommended opening the back door
to the service by

m

limiting appeals of dismissal to one appeal
to higher
authority within the agency and to tightening

the veteran's

special right of appeal.

Finally, the Commission recommended

replacing the then current performance appraisal
system with
a new system that would make the rating of
performance
an

aid to management rather than end in itself.

That the recommendations of the Commission reflected

a

particular political ideology can be seen at first instance
by noticing those few areas where the Commission disagreed

with its Task Force.

First, the Task Force proposed ending

veterans preference in reductions-in- force and as a factor
for appointment to positions above the GS-12 level.

The

-'Leonard White in "The Senior Civil Service," Public
Administration Review 15 (Autumn 1955) 237-43 briefly discusses the history of the senior civil service corps concept
in the U.S.
Suggested first in 1935 by the Commission of
Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, White himself provided
details in his Government Career Service (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935). The idea was revived in 1937
in a report to the President's Committee on Administrative
Management and recommended again by the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement (Reed Committee) just before
World War II.
:

,
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Conunission failed to support
either proposal, and reco^ended
a much less severe change
in veteran's preference.
Second,
the Task Force made a strong
statement rejecting all forms^

of political clearance for
appointments to the career service; the Commission made almost
no mention of this issue.
Third, the Task Force recommended an
official inquiry into
the Government's personnel security
programs while the Commission made no reference to the loyalty
issue and its negative effects on morale. Finally, the Task
Force was critical
of the dual position of the Chairman of the
Civil Service
Commission, but the Hoover Commission disagreed.
in each
case, the position taken by the Hoover Commission
appears to

have been in conformity with conservative thinking.

And what of the nature of political implications of
the recommendations themselves?

mendations were aimed at securing

Most decidedly, the recoma

greater degree of polit-

ical control of policy-making by the party in power.

Certainly this was the intent in proposing an increase in
the number of top political appointees.

By drawing a clear

line between nonpolitical and political officials and

rigidly separating their functions, the Commission hoped to
reduce the power of a bureaucracy which was perceived to be

under Democratic control.

Politically neutering the bureau

chief would leave the Congressional committee in firm control of the policy subsystem.

As David and Pollock point

out,l the commission's
analysis is based on a concept
of
responsible party government that
the party in power will
translate its platform into programs.
indeed, the Cormnis-

sion Report on personnel makes
very little reference to the
President and his needs to control,
apparently being more
concerned with strengthening the
Congressional party's

policy^role than the President's.

Increasing the number of

political appointees at the department
level rather than
just in the President's executive office
tends to confirm
this view.
In addition, MacNeil and Metz, the
Commission's
editor in chief and director of research,
note that
"as a

creature of the Congress, set up by it and
reporting to it
alone, the Hoover Commission in examining
every activity

of

the executive branch was conscious of the rights
of the

legislative branch and never ceased to protect them.

"2

in a

very real sense, the Second Hoover Commission, ingrained

with the traditional Republican distrust for executive
leadership, broke with the predominant administrative doc-

trine held by the President's Committee on Administrative

Management and the First Hoover Commission.

From the Com-

mission's perspective, responsible administrators would

reflect the views of the party in control of the Congress.
In terms of administrative doctrine, the Commission
'-David and Pollock,

Executives for Government

,

pp. 158-66.

^MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Commission, p. 302.

:
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made

number of controversial
assumptions. First, of
course, was the assumption
that politics and
administration
could be rigidly separated-a
major criticism made by
the
academics who by and large
labeled the notion as unrealistic.
Wallace Sayre argued that
"the political executive
who is
all policy and politics, the
career executive who is all
competence and neutrality, are not
portraits from real
life."
In particular, the Commission's
claim that the
senior civil Service would be a
politically
a

neutral corps,

devoid of all emotional attachments
was described by many
critics as nonsense. The Senior
Civil Service would make
career officials out to be "more neuter
than neutral, a

pallid creature resembling
and an elderly clerk. "^

a

hybrid of Little Lord Fauntleroy

if the Commission's concern was

bureaucratic inertia, Harlan Cleveland noted that
"it is not
neutrality but vigorous advocacy that overcomes
inertia in

our big government.

Too much emphasis on neutrality would

shift the whole government into neutral."^

In addition,

Somers pointed out that neutrality would likely result in
^^ New

York Times 3 March 1956, p. 36. Also see Stephen
"The President and His Political Executives," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 307 (September 1956):24-36; Harlan Cleveland, "The
Executive and the Public Interest," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science 307 (September 1956)
37-54; Everett Reimer, "The Case Against the Senior Civil
Service," Personnel Administration 19, No. 2 (March-April
1956):31-40.
K. Bailey,

^Ibid.

^Ibid.

,

government attracting fewer competent
administrators not
more.
"To identify -good management'
in the

civil service

with indifference to the objects
of management and unconcern
with the social consequences of
policies is to make of public
administration a barren, if not nihilistic,
affair which
seems unlikely to attract the kind of
imaginative

competence

which the Report hopes for."^

Thus,

in the eyes of these

academics a responsible public administrator
must have
qualities of leadership and political savvy.
He

or she is,

in Arnold Meltsner's terms,

2

an entrepreneur-an individual

who possesses both technical competence and
political skills.
If this is so then public administration is
characterized by

more bargaining, competition, and compromise in
policy-making
than a strict politics-administration dichotomy allows
for.

Separating political from administrative functions,
the Commission believed, and then increasing the number of

political executives, would result in

susceptible to change.
ordained.

a

bureaucracy more

Such a consequence is not fore-

As Heclo warns, simply adding more political

appointees in an effort to control the bureaucracy may "further bureaucratize the political layers and accentuate

Herman Somers, "Some Reservations About the Senior
Civil Service," Personnel Administration 19, No. 1 (JanuaryFebruary 1956) :11. Louis L. Friedland, "The Career System
Revisited," Personnel Administration 18, No. 1 (January
1955) :20, also makes this point.

m

Arnold Meltsner, Policy Analysts
the Bureaucracy
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1976)
.

.
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initial distrust and the mindless
compulsion to change personnel with each new administration,
as well as create more
nonelected entrepreneurs trying to
cut their own swath
through Washington. "1 Further,
Presidents, to their dismay,
have found their political
appointments often too willing to
take up life with the "natives."

The Senior Civil Service proposal also
assumes that
there are "broad areas of government
activity reaching into
and across a cluster of departments and
agencies within any
part of which a senior civil servant would feel
at home."^

Like the British Administrative Class, the Senior
Civil

Service is predicated on the notion that an administrative

generalist can be transferred from one post to another
without a loss in effectiveness.^ Yet this assumption
not only

overlooked the technical value of continuity and program
specialization, but the reality, in the American system,
that administrators

(with the support of their colleagues in

Congress and interest groups) become attached to particular
programs

(a

reality the Commission hoped to change)

Finally, many academics were critical of various

details of the Senior Civil Service, arguing that the career
^Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 243.
2

Leonard White, "The Case for the Senior Civil Service,
Personnel Administration 19, No. 1 (January-February
1956) :7.
"

•^Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service
cusses this doctrine.

,

p.

87,

dis-

2
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concept woul. clash with
othe. i.po.tant ,oals.
Po. example
It was Claimed that
the Senior civil Service
would li.it
lateral entry and thereby
create a closed,

elite service;
that a rank-in-man system
would create tensions when
placed
along side the ran.-in-job
system and, further, goes
against
the concept of social
egalitarianism; and that the
notion of
a generalist corps is
impractical in a system which
produces
and rewards specialists
But perhaps the more important
^
,

criticism of the Hoover Con^ission
was aimed at its assumption that a career service is
built on correct technical
arrangements and monetary incentives.
Van
Riper

observations regarding the First Hoover
Commission continued to
hold true for the Second;
's

the problem of our national public
service
can at
best be met only temporarily and
partiaUy
wi^h'recommendatrons which stress merely financial
Ld procedural
solutions to difficulties which are really
the reflection
of deep and underlying political
considerations
At the
personnel problem of the Federal Govern.^^^
^2n^T-°
1"'''''^ fundamental considerations of national
no ^^f-^.^i policy,
political
and it will take political as well as
administrative invention to solve them.
To attract and hold quality public
servants requires more

than just applying personnel techniques; rather
it is a matter of creative political leadership and
creating a consensus
on the purpose of administration.
'•See Stanley, The Higher Civil Service,
pp. 123-25 for
a discussion of the pros and cons for a career corps of
top

civil servants.
2

Paul P. Van Riper, "The Hoover Commission and Omission," Personnel Administration 14, No. 6 (November 1951) :38.
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While much Of the criticise
of the Cor^ission's
report
on personnel and civil
service focused on its
public administration doctrine and
administrative assumptions, the
future of its recommendations
rested on the responses of
those groups whose interests
would be affected by its
implementation, in short, the factor
determining the disposition
of Hoover's proposals was
power. For the supporters
of a

renewed Republicanism, the 1954
mid-term election came as a
blow.
The Republicans lost their
majority in the House and
the Democratic majority, reacting
partially to the earlier
Republican transgressions of "playing
partisan politics
with our civil service, "1 gave a
cold shoulder to the Hoover
Commission proposals when they were
reported in early
1955,

including those dealing with personnel
and civil service.
With the 1956 election just around
the corner, the Democrats
looked forward to using the big business
bias of the report
to campaign successfully again
against "Hooverism"
and hoped

to tie Eisenhower to the report by
pointing out that he had

appointed three Republicans that included Hoover
and only
one Democrat. 2 Eisenhower responded by trying

to distance

^Former President Truman quoted in Packman, "Government Jobs, " p. 360
.

2

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 13, No. 24
See also "The Second Hoover Commission Abandons Reform for Revolution," Democrati c D igest 3,
No. 2 (September 1955):25-31, for partisan Democratic statement accusing the Commission of "turning back the clock."
(June 17, 1955), p. 692.

.
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himself

the Co^ission, and many
Congressional Republicans indicated that they
also found some of the
reco^aendations "too hot to handle."
Even Republican Senator
Bridges, a Commission me^er,
suggested that the Congress
Should "not do a hurried
job in putting (the
recommendations)
into action.""^ AS
a*^ a
^ result
y-a.c,^,n- 4-u
the proposals fared badly
in
Congress
fror.

But beyond the strictly partisan
electoral interests
of Congress was an institutional
concern that cut across
party lines. The personnel
proposals of the Commission were
a two-edged sword.
On closer examination, some members
of

Congress saw in the proposals for

a

Senior Civil Service and

an increased number of political
appointees the potential
for a reduced role for Congress in
the administrative
process.
This consequence could be avoided if
Congress were
to confirm all political and Senior
Civil Service appointments but, among other things, this would
result in an

unacceptable politicization of the career service.

^

The

relationship between bureau chief and committee
chairman
acting in a policy-making subsystem is one of mutual

depen-

dence, and important to a congressman's influence
over

policy implementation.

No.

24

To force congressmen to deal

•-Quoted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 13,
~
(June 17, 1955) :691.
2

See David and Pollock, Executives for Government
for a discussion of Congress vis-a-vis the Senior
Civil Service.
,

p.

84,

.

strictly with political
executives would interfere
with
their direct access at
the program
level.

xt is perhaps for

these reasons that Republican
Representative Brown, cosponsor of the bill establishing
the Second Hoover Commission, submitted a strong
dissent to the Senior civil
Service
concept, arguing that such
a corps would "strengthen
and
further entrench the bureaucracy

Interest group reaction lined
up on both sides of the
commission's report on personnel.
Not surprisingly the
federal civil servants and their
unions were skeptical.
in
the first place the Commission
report lacked any treatment
of the security-loyalty issue
and made almost no mention of

employee-management relations.

But beyond that, the American

Federation of Government Employees
was quick to note that,
unlike the First Hoover Commission,

the second one ignored

any role for employee participation
"in the formulation and
improvement of federal personnel policies
and practices. "2
In addition, top civil servants questioned
the selection,

promotion, and transfer conditions of the Senior
Civil Service proposal and many found the uncertainties
and risks not
worth the rewards. The Commission's emphasis on
performance

evaluation was a particular sticky point with the public
employees.

Others feared that the proposed Senior Civil

^Second Hoover Commission, Civil Service Report,

—

pp. 89-90.
2

—

The Governmen t Standard 55, No.
1955):1.

7

(February 18,

..
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service Board inevitably
wouXa ™a.e selection ana
promotion
decisions based on partisan
or ideological grounds.^
«ot
least, .any career officials
questioned the mobility
provisions Of the Hoover
proposal, not necessarily
based on any
personal inconvenience but
on the grounds that their
professional commitments lie with
specific programs or
agencies.

Chester Newland concludes from
his study of top federal
civil servants that very few
were generalist managers;
"many
were expert managers, but
nearly all were confined to
narrow
specializations in specific
organizations.
Thus
again,

long established sub-system
relationships would prove hard
to change

Other groups upset by the Hoover
Commission and ones
with clout in congress were veterans'
organizations.
The

American Legion was opposed to forty-six
Hoover recommendations affecting veterans. ^ A number
of these were from the
commission's report on Personnel and Civil
Service

,

for

example, those limiting veteran's preference
in appeals and
reductions-in-force. The veterans' groups played
an

important role in shaping negative Congressional
attitudes
-"-See the statement by James Campbell,
National President of the A.F.G.E. in The Government St andard
55, No. 8
(February 25, 1955) :2, which questions the Senior Civil
Service concept and the role of the selection board in
particular

Chester A. Newland, "Professional Public Executives
and Public Administration Agenda," in Professional Public
Executives, ed Chester A. Newland (Washington: American
Society for Public Administration, 1980), p. 12.
.

3

New York Times

,

30 January 1956,

p.

25.

.
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to the overall
personnel report.

support for the Hoover
proposals oa.e .ro™ two
primary
sources, besides a awindXing
„.^er of Congressional Republicans:
the Citizens Co™„ittee
for the Hoover Report
ana
political executives. The
citizens Co™„ittee was a
bipartisan organization of
businessmen, academics,
university
presidents, bankers, and former
Congressmen and Cabinet
members.
Its Chairman was Clarence
Francis, chairman of the
board of General Poods
Corporation, originally
formed by

Hoover to develop outside
support for the First Commission,
it continued to perform
that function
for the Second,

its

prominent membership insured
public attention to a message
that was carried in speeches,

news releases, special school

courses, and its publication,
"Reorganization News." While
it claimed a major role in
the broad acceptance of the proposals of the First Hoover Commission,
political conditions
in 1955 were not ripe enough
for it to have much of an
1
impact
The other major source of support for
the proposals of
the report on Personnel and Civil Service
came from the

President and top level political executives.

Although

Eisen.hower showed relative indifference to
most of the Com-

mission's recommendations in hopes of avoiding "issues

This paragraph depends on the New York Times 20
ruary 1955, p. 29, and the Congressional Quarterly WeeklyFebReport 13, No. 24 (June 17, "1955) :693.
,

pacea With political

a^te,^

the senior ci.il Service
proposals.

maeea, as Oavia ana

Polloc. point out, it was
in his interest to
create a corps
Of top level careerists
with a hroaa understanain,
of government goals ana responsive
to the President rather
than
particular interest groups.^
^^^^
^^^^^^^
Sen.or corps concept because
it wouia break up

established
symbiotic relationships in
the sub-system, the
Presiaent
supported the concept for that
very reason. Political
heads
Of depart„,ents found
grounds to support the plan in
the hope
that they would obtain a group
of more competent,
neutral

career officials and greater
managerial flexibility.
With mounting union and veteran
opposition, wide disagreement among academics, and a
highly partisan

Congress,
the congress failed to act on
the Commission's personnel
recommendations. Basea on the
recommendations of a Career
Executive Committee appointed by the
President
in 1957,

Eisenhower went as far as he could without
legislation
toward creating the Senior Civil Service. 3
Through Executive
Order 10758 a Career Executive Service was
establishea in
March 1958. The Order provided for a Career
Executive Board

William R. Divine, "The Second Hoover Commission
Reports: An Analysis," Public Adminis tration Review
15
~
~
No. 4 (Autumn 1955):268T
2
3

David and Pollock, Executives for Government

,

p. 82.

See Van Riper, "The Senior Civil Service and the
Career System," Public Administration Review 18 (Summer 1958):
189—200.
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to prepare a roster
of

eli.iMe career executives
„.o were

to be available .or
flexible assignments,
.i.ite. though it
was, the House denied
appropriations for the Career
Executive
service in 1959, leaving
a host of political
issues and

administrative problems
unresolved.
The Anatomy of a Failure

unlike the reform movement
which culminated in the
Pendleton Act of 1883, the
story of the Second Hoover

Com-

mission is largely one of
failure.

Yet, like the prior

"successful" rerorm
reform f^ffoT-ieffort, i-u^
the motives and forces that
contributed to the creation, the
recommendations, and the
failure of the Second Hoover
Commission are complex. The
initial impetus for the Commission
came from a Republican
congress heady with a new found ally
in the White House and
a public sympathetic with
the goals of securing a smaller

government and a balanced budget.

The 83rd Republican

Congress saw in the Commission's proposals
for a clear separation between career and political
officials, more political appointees, and the politically
neutral Senior Civil
Service an opportunity to reduce the power
of a bureaucracy
dominated by Roosevelt-Truman Democrats. The
85th Democratic
Congress, however, seeing in these same proposals
a weakening
of Congressional influence in administrative
decision-making
and a corresponding centralization of administrative
control
in the Republican President, never let the proposals
get off
the ground and withheld funding when Eisenhower unilaterally

.

trxed to initiate the™.

Eisenhower, although trying
to
ignore the bulk o. the
Commission's proposals,
.ia and the
personnel recon^endations
in his interests.
Vet Eisenhower
had no investment in
the proposals, no
programs that would
gaxn from them and no
commitment to institutional
change
Thus he had no reason to
fight with Congress over
the Senior
Cxvxl service proposal.
indeed, such a fight would
have
been an uphill battle,
confronting not only a partisan
Congress but also a highly
skeptical group of top level
federal
employees and veterans'
organisations. His political
ally,
the Citizen's Committee for
the Hoover Co^ission, had
by
now depleted its political
capital. After all, it took
the
murder of a President to catapult
the original reformers to
success

There were real problems plaguing
the civil service:
the difficulty of securing and
holding competent career and
political officials; deficiencies in
training programs, pay,
performance evaluation, and dismissal
policies; the low
prestige and morale of the service; and
the lack of agreement upon the proper balance and relationship
between politically appointed executives and career
administrators.
The

Hoover Commission did not approach these
problems with the
advantages of the one-eyed man in the kingdom of

the blind,

but viewed them between large partisan and
philosophical

blinders.

Thus, the standards that guided the Commission

were conditioned by its particular vantage point.
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created with the justification
of reducing waste and
inefficiency, the Commission
continued to justify its
activities in its Final^eport
by the need to save money
by
reducing government activity.
Even at the end of

its report

°^

^™Hiel_and_Civ^^

the Commission claimed a

savings of $48,500,000 if its
proposals were adopted.
But clearly economy was not the
sole or even the
primary standard to which the
Commission wanted the civil
service to conform. And, unlike
its most recent predecessors, neither was executive leadership.
indeed, the Commission and its creators distrusted a
strong executive.

Although its personnel proposals had implications
for
executive control of administration— generally

making it

stronger— these were implications that finally
resulted

in

the Commission's failure.

The primary criterion by which the Commission
judged
the public service was whether or not it was politically

responsive.

From the Republicans' perspective in 1953 it

was judged unresponsive to the political will of the American

voting public.

Diagnosing that the source of the bureauc-

racy's irresponsibility was the presence of career officials
(who,

moreover, were Democrats) functioning as policy-makers,

the Commission prescribed sharpening the separation between
the career and non-career administrators and neutralizing the

political and emotional attachments of the permanent bureaucrats in a Senior Civil Service.

The Commission believed

this remedy would allow
an increased number
of political
appointees to respond to the
will of the people
through the
political party. it has
already been noted that
simply
adding more political
appointees might be
counterproductive
in addition, serious
problems also may arise from
a reform
that emphasizes responsiveness
to political leadership,
Heclo-s words, "without a sense
of the civil service's
independent responsibility to
uphold legally constituted
institutions and procedures, political
control of the bureaucracy
can easily go too far. Any
single-minded commitment to

m

executive energy is likely to
evolve into arbitrary power. "1
Watergate is a clear example as are
executive abuses ranging
from partisan involvement in the
CIA and FBI to welfare
administration.

Accompanying this attempt to secure

a

more responsive

bureaucracy, was the perceived need for
a bureaucracy more
representative of conservative values.
Republican

cries for

more patronage and Eisenhower's efforts
to oblige by
ordering Schedule C and supporting the Willis

Directive

indicate Republicans' perceptions of an
unrepresentative

administration.

Not only were Eisenhower's appointments

evidence of the desire for a new business orientation,
but
the technical, managerial emphasis of the Commission's

pro-

posals,

such as that calling for a neat, clear line sepa-

rating politics from administration, also suggests an
^Heclo, A Government of Strangers

,

p.

244

.
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unexamined faith in the
application of business
techniques
to public administrative
problems.

Although it is manifest that
the standards applied
by
the commission were in
response to the political
conditions
of the time, there is no
explicit acknowledgment in
the Commission's report of its political
purpose.
Undoubtedly, the

commissioners were well aware of
the political implications
of their personnel report
and one can only surmise that
they
believed that restricting their
analysis, conclusions, and

language to a managerial-technical
orientation would give
the report an aura of objectivity.
Yet, herein
lie two

deficiencies:

1)

it covers up the possibility that
the

problem of obtaining and retaining
competent public servants
is determined more by the larger
political environment and
character of leadership than by the
technical
factors of

selection and organizational structure, ^ and
from top administrators— both career and

2)

it withholds

non-career— a clear

picture of just what the national policy is with
regard to
the civil service. Even more devastating, the
Commission's
Report completely ignored those values which are basic
to

P^^^i^ administration.

As a result, this major effort to

solve the key problems of the civil service in the 1950s~

selecting and holding competent higher public servants and

balancing administrative continuity with political responsiveness

—was

at odds with the goal of achieving a truly

^See Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change
of Administration," p. 149.
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responsible public aa™inistration.
new generation of reformers

Whether the efforts of
a

in the 1970s were any
closer to

this ideal will be the
focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER

III

THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE
SERVICEPROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

"I ca.e to Washington,"
President Jin^y carter
reminded

Americans in 1978, "with

a

promise and the obligation
to
rebuild the faith of the
American people in our
government."!
It was President Carter's
diagnosis that the loss of
faith
was attributable to "not
enough merit in the .erit
system.

There is inadequate motivation
because we have too few
rewards for excellence and too
few penalties for unsatisfactory work."
"The sad fact is," his diagnosis
continued,
"that it is easier to promote
and to transfer incompetent
employees than it is to get rid of
them. ... You cannot
run a farm that way, you cannot
run a factory
that way, and

you cannot run a government that
way."

The Carter prescrip-

tion for these ills was government
reorganization with civil
service reform as the "centerpiece."
A large dose of this
"absolutely vital" medicine would, it was
promised, "restore
the merit principle to a system which
has grown into a

bureaucratic maze.

It will provide greater management flex-

ibility and better rewards for better performance
without

'"This and the next few quotes from Jimmy Carter,
Federal Civil Service Reform," address to National Press
Club, Weekl y Compilation of Presid ential Documents
14, No
„

(March

2,

1978) :435-38.

~

"
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s

compromising job security
'^y.

"1

'

,
Aft^v applying
After
this remedy
=,

"and only then can „c
have a government that
is efficient
open, and truly worthy
of our people's
understanding and
respect.
I have promised
that we will have such
a government, and I intend to keep
that promise. "2
'

Many people simply dismissed
such promises flowing
from
the mouths of mere do! +-i
=r,^ as
politicians
mane rhetoric or vacuous
symbolism. Perhaps they
L-uey were.
were
r„+- k,
But
by granting Mr. Carter
the benefit of T.ne
!->,=,+the aoubt
doiih+- that
u,his promises were made in
good
faith, more interesting
questions are raised.
i

Several

questions Shall be the concern of
this chapter, others will
be discussed in Chapter Seven.
Here we shall ask first what
administrative problems and political
forces gave rise to

President Carter's promises and what
were the political
dynamics that resulted in their
putative fulfillment in the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
Secondly, we shall ask
what assumptions its sponsors made
and what values and standards are sought through this Act,
particularly Title I V
provision for a Senior Executive Service.

Finally, what have

been the political reactions to and what
are the political
implications of the Senior Executive Service?

Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address,"
Weekly Compilat ion of Presidential Documents 14, No. 3
~
(January 19, 1978)
^Ibid.

:

95

.
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Ml?lini_strative^

£oiiti^a]_Answer|T

A fundamental administrative
question that the Second
Hoover Cormnission had
unsuccessfully attempted to
solve was
how to reconcile the competing
needs for continuity and

change.

The Commission's failure
was due primarily to its
inability to provide the correct
political answers to those
individuals and groups that
possessed political power,
a
political consensus on how best
to balance the President's
need to control the bureaucracy
with employee rights and

merit protection proved to be
elusive throughout the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s.
After Eisenhower's Career Executive
Board was starved
out of existence by Congress, an
Office of Career Development
was established in 1961 by the
Civil Service Commission to
improve the selection and development
of top executives,

primarily by maintaining a central listing
of career officials at the highest levels. This effort
was superseded in
1967 by President Johnson's Executive Order 11315
creating
an Executive Assignment System. The Executive
Assignment

System established three types of positions within
the supergrades GS-16, 17 and 18: Career Executive Assignments,

Limited Executive Assignments, and Noncareer Executive
Assignments.

It was designed to provide government-wide

^From a book with the same title by Claude E. Hawley
and Ruth G. Weintraub (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co.,
Inc.

,

1966)

.

.

career opportunities for
executives and broaden senior
civil
servants, identification with
overall government objectives
rather than just one agency
or
program.

The Executive

Assignment System also included
a Career Executive
Inventory
system Which provided
biographical information on

personnel
in grades GS-15 to GS-18,
as an aid to agency heads
in
filling executive vacancies.
^
The Executive Assignment System was only one approach
used by Johnson to meet his
staffing needs. Less formally,
the Kennedy- Johnson Administrations attempted to establish
political control of the

bureaucracy by placing politically
loyal officials in key
senior positions, whether career
or noncareer.

Like Philip

Young under Eisenhower, John Macy
under Johnson served as
both chairman of the civil Service
Commission
and Special

Assistant to the President for personnel.

And following long

established tradition Johnson, just before
leaving office,
blanketed-in a number of non-career appointees
into the

career service and "cleared" some loyal
Democrats for career
appointments. 2 Thus upon inheriting the Presidency
in 1969

Nixon sought to tame a bureaucracy he perceived to
be hostile
by continuing the trend of politicizing the higher
career

^See Mel H. Bolster, "The Strategic Deployment of
Exceptional Talent: An Account of the Career Executive
Roster's Short History," P ublic Adminis t ration Review 21,
~~
No. 5 (December 1967) :446-451
.

2

See the "Malek Manual" for a discussion of KennedyJohnson manipulations of the merit system. Reprinted in The
Bureaucrat 4, No. 4 (January 1 976 4 31-3 3
)

:
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levels.

..e "Male./May Manual"
is a testament to
the Nixon
Administration's strategy to
control executive branch
personnel.
A part Of this strategy
was Nixon's proposal for
a
Federal Executive Service
patterned after the Second
Hoover
Cor^ission's Senior civil Service.
intended to give the
Administration the tools to insure
that politically responsive officials held key
positions, the proposal evoked
intense opposition from federal
employee unions and Congressional Democrats and met
disaster in 1972 in the House
Post
Office and civil Service Committee
after passing the Senate.
The abrupt end of the Nixon
administration did not
reduce the pressures felt by chief
executives to control the
bureaucracy. The long-term trend of
increasingly politicizing the civil service in order to
prevent bureaucratic
"sabotage" continues. ^ At the same time,
a trend traceable
to the Civil Service Act of 1883
persists.
In the late
1950s Van Riper argued that the civil service
system had

become overburdened with "red tape, greater
procedural controls, more restrictive dismissal procedures,
and
more and

more review and appeals boards—all in the name
of justice,
security, and fair play for civil employees. "2 This
emphasis
Ipor a discussion of the trend toward greater
politicization of the bureaucracy, see James L. Sundquist, "Jimmy
Carter As Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term,"
Publ ic Administration Rev iew 39, No. 1 January/February
1979) 3-11, and Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 68-76.
2paul P. Van Riper, H istory of the United States Civil
Service (Evanston, Illinois:" Row, Peterson and Company, I'gsf),
(

:

p.

529.
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on "neutral protectionism"
and "legalistic complexity"
was
invigorated following Watergate
revelations

merit system.l

of raids on the

.et the irony of these two
trends-increased
politicization and merit
protectionism-is that neither
can
fully succeed without
triggering intense pressure
to

emphasize the other.

Administrations arrive believing
that
bureaucratic power constitutes
a threat to their
political
goals. The number of political
executives is increased,

career executives are screened
for their loyalty, and
"dissenters" are banished. Almost
simultaneously, efforts to

protect career officials from
political influence and merit
abuse are initiated which encourage
further politicization.

It is no wonder that the
problem of accommodating both
continuity and change has proven to
be tenacious.

When Jimmy Carter launched his White
House career, he,
no less than his predecessors,
was concerned about getting
control of a powerful federal bureaucracy.
To an extent
never approached by prior occupants of
the Presidency, Carter
made this concern the major platform of
his campaign.
His

campaign rhetoric seldom got beyond the level
of promises to
clean up the "horrible bureaucratic mess in
Washington" and
to institute "tight, businesslike management
and planning

See Chester A. Newland, "Public Personnel Administration; Legalistic Reform vs. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and
Economy," Public Administration R eview 36, No. 5 (September/
~~
October 1976) 529-3T^
:
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techniques" in governmeniernment. ^
y

rnu^
The

^
downpayment
for such

promises was Carter's
..success" as government
manager and
effrciency expert while
Governor of Georgia. Vet,
though
sparse on substance, Carter.s
criticisms of bureaucracy
and
promises to reorganize
government touched a tender
spot with
the voting public.
Public opinion polls since
the mid-1960s have shown
that voters have little
confidence in government to
solve
problems and believe that
government programs are not well
run, that they are inefficient
and wasteful. 2 The breadth
and depth of public
dissatisfaction with government is
seen
in Proposition 13-type efforts
from coast to coast and
the

subsequent spending and tax-cutting
fever which has overcome
congress. Both popular and academic
literature have
reflected this public disenchantment
by repeatedly criticizing the civil service system for
its contributions to the
"crisis in confidence.. .3 Seizing upon
this widespread public
'^'^2^ Marshall,

o
V,-,
Rgp"blic

.

175, Nos. 8,

Efficiency Expert,'. The New
(August 21, 28, 1976) lis .

.'The
9

2

For a summary of recent public opinion
James L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Confidence polls see
in Government,"
get ting National Priorities, Agenda for th e
1980's, ed
Joseph A Pediman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1980), pp. 534-38, and Roger H. Davidson,
"The Politics
of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Compensation," in
The Re wards of Public Service eds. Robert W. Hartman
and
Arnold R. Weber (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1980),
pp 55-66
,

.

.

3

For specific criticisms of the civil service system,
see Nicholas Lemann, "Seats at the Banquet, " The New
Republic 177, No. 18 (October 29, 1977) 16-20; "What's Wrong
With the Civil Service?", Washington Monthly 9 (April 1977):
:

.

.

agitation. Carter interpreted
his election as a mandate
to
do "something., about the
bureaucracy, .ot surprisingly,
the
public's preference as indicated
in the polls was "for
„ore
restrictive rather than more
permissive treatment of government employees

once in office. Carter's
concern for getting cc^ntrol
of the bureaucracy went
beyond the level of a campaign
theme.
The difficulties of persuading
a large, professionally
oriented bureaucracy with loyalties
to Congressional, state,
and local clients to respond
to the policy directions of
a
new President became real. One
of the first
steps for

Carter was to call for the
implementation of zero-base
budgeting throughout the executive
branch, ostensibly to
require the agencies to justify budget
requests in terms of
their individual missions. When Congress
allowed the
National Center for Productivity and
Quality of Working Life
to expire in 1978, Carter established
a National Productivity
Council to replace it.^ The Council, charged
with coordinating federal productivity improvement activities,
was an

attempt to indicate the Administration's seriousness
about
50-61; E. S. Savas and Sigmund G. Ginsberg, "The Civil
Service: A Meritless System?", The Public Intere st No.
32
(Summer 1973): 70-85; and Robert G. Vaughn, T hi~Sp oiled
System (New York: Charterhouse, 1975)
-•-Davidson, "The Politics of Executive, Legislative,
and Judicial Compensation," p. 66.
2

Congressional Quarte rly Weekly Report 37 (June 16,
1979):ll57:
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-proving .anage^ent of
government resources.

The .a„inis-

trat.on also established
a Regulatory Council,
designed to
review government regulations
with an eye toward

.aking the.

cost-effective.

In addition, a series
of government reorganrzatxon plans were set forth.
But the centerpiece of
the

carter administrative reform
efforts was the civil
Service
Reform Act of 1978.
Sorting out the Administration's
real intentions
behind the vigorous pursuit
of civil service reform
is no
easy chore. They are a
mixed bag; in one sense the
purpose
was purely partisan politics;
reform was merely cosmetic.
By 1978 the carter Administration
was in desperate need of a
legislative victory, having been
rebuffed repeatedly by an
alien, though Democratic, Congress.
in the "nonpartisan"
issue of civil service reform.
Carter saw the potential for
legislative success. From another vantage
point, civil service reform and the SES particularly
would provide
a

mechanism to shake-up the subsystem and make
the bureaucracy
more responsive to future presidential
initiatives.

More-

over, relationships between career
bureaucrats and political

appointees have grown more distant and less
incestuous,
product of the high turnover of political officials

a

and the

growing tendency to get to Washington by running
against it.
The Carter Administration did nothing to mitigate
these
phenomena and came into office with a high degree of mutual

distrust and even hostilltyl
marking the relationship
between bureaucrat and
politician, it would be
difficult
not to conclude that refer™
was intended to control
the arn,y
Of "mutinous" bureaucrats,
.t the sa.e time, given
Carter's
background as engineer and
reputation as manager, one
cannot
overlook the good-faith but
naive intent to create an
administrative process more on the
model of the private sector
as
a remedy for what was
K^^j.y perceived
widely
Derceiv^r^ as low
r.
government
productivity.
i

Indeed, Carter's stated
purposes in pushing civil
service reform legislation were
to increase governmental
efficiency, defined as increasing
productivity with less
inputs while, simultaneously,
increasing the protection of
employees against political abuse. 2
From the Administration's perspective the merit system
was saddled with three
major problems: abuse of merit
principles, disincentives to

^The story is told by James Sundquist of
a top career
entering the office of the'^bureau
^^01'?^^%"^^^^^^
chie^ I political appointee— and being greeted
u i
"I
hate
It every time I see you walk through that with:
door,
because
you represent everything I despise mostthe
Sundquist also quotes an assistant secretary bureaucracy."
as
expected on coming to Washington that I would be saying, "I
working
intimately with a career staff. But it's surprising,
it
nasn t been that way. I meet only with other
political
appointees. We talk to each other." From "Jimmy Carter
As
Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term,"
Public
Administration Review 39 (January/February 1979) :8T
•

2

Alan K. Campbell, "Civil Service Reform as a Remedy
For Bureaucratic Ills," in Making Bur e aucracies Work ed.
Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1979), p. 157, and Jimmy Carter, "Federal Civil
Service Reform," Message to Congress, W eekly Compilation of
Presid ential Documents 14, No. 9 (March 2, 1978) :444
,

.
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effective management, and
lack of opportunities for
women
and minorities.
The third problem was
attributed largely to
restrictive veteran preference
rules while the first
problem
was the product of a civil
Service Commission charged
with
the contradictory roles
of advising presidents and
protecti ng
the merit system. The
emphasis was placed by the
Carter
Administration on what Civil
Service Coimnission Chairman
Campbell termed the "semi-paralysis
in administration-^
referring to the inordinate length
of time it takes managers
to fill vacant positions,
resolve discrimination

complaints,
fire employees, and settle
adverse action appeals. The culprit was identified as the tangle
of rules, regulations, and
procedures that "impede the ability of
top political appointees to select, motivate and manage
their staffs," while
also failing to prevent merit abuses. ^
Thus the Carter
reforms were an attempt to re-open the
back door of the
civil service.
Perhaps most importantly to the Administration, outstanding performance was neither
encouraged nor

expected by a system in which pay increases were
automatic
and performance appraisals pro forma. Using
broad public

dissatisfaction with government as leverage. Carter presented
-'-U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Post Office
and
Civil Service, Civil Service Reform, Hearings on H.R. 112 80,
A Bill to Re form the Civil Service Laws 95th Congress, 2nd
Session, 19 78, p. 20.

2

Alan K. Campbell, "Civil Service Reform: A New
Commitment," Public Administrati on Review 38, No. 2 (March/
April 1978) :1oT:
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congress in March 1978 a
co^pIeK refo™ pac.a.e
that incX.aea
the provision for a
Senior Executive Service.
The SES was
seen as the Key to the
Administration's managerial
crusade
Providing additional fuel
for a major reform
effort
were senior career staff
and line administrators.
Like

political appointees, many of
these executives also found
their work lives governed
by an overly centralized
system
bound by self-defeating rules.
^
Many career officials with
managerial responsibilities
agreed that the system weakened
their ability to do their work
by making it impossible
to

hold employees accountable and
to reward outstanding executives or to penalize poor
performance. Career and political
executives alike agreed that
Congressionally imposed pay
caps and pay compression in the
top levels from GS-16 to
GS-18 to Executive Level I provided
little material incentive
to excel.
Civil Service Commission executives
were bothered
not only with the system's deficient
management practices
and executive training and development
programs, but they
also had a long-time concern for the
growth in appointments
of political appointees to top positions
that tended to put
a cap on career advancement.
In addition, the Commission
hoped to bring order to the multiplicity of
hiring authorities in the supergrades and more control over
the total
See Herbert Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal
Personnel System," in The Federa l Government Service, 2nd
edition, ed. Wallace Sayre (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-

Hall,

Inc.,

1965), pp. 58-59.
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numbers in the executive
cadrs.^

career officials in the
civil service Co™ission
had
been working since the
Nixon years on proposals
to create a
corps of professional,
government-wide managers in
the
federal service. When
Carter's policy staff made
inquiries
Shortly after the election,
C.S.C. personnel were ready
with
an SES-type proposal. As
one participant in the
reform

process related, the SES Task
Force that was charged with
developing a proposal had little
to do since a well-developed
plan designed to meet the needs
of career executives already
existed. 2 Another top civil
servant noted regarding
the

Carter reforra that "the whole
damn thing was conceived by
civil servants. ... The
proposals were developed by people
in the trenches like me and
people who work
for me who are

career civil servants.

They're the ones who have seen what

is wrong with the system and
proposed what should be done to
fix it."
According to this view, career bureaucrats
"are

not necessarily dedicated to maintenance
of the status quo,
but often review programs and procedures
to improve their
^For early thinking of C.S.C. staff, see Personnel
Management Project, Task Force on Executive Personnel,
Initial Option Paper," July 27, 1977, and Personnel
Management Project, F inal Report Vol. II, Appendix II,
"Task
Force Report on Senior Executive Service," December
1977.
,

2,

.

interview with reform participant, Washington, D.C.,
.

August 1981.
3

"rl

/

Naomi B. Lynn and Richard E. Vaden, "Bureaucratic
Response to Civil Service Reform," Public Administration
Review 34, No. 4 (July/August, 1979):334~

•
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effectiveness" and see. support
of political leadership
to
carry out their proposals.^

Prom the perspective of
the professional
personnel
Officials the primary purpose
of the SES approach was
to
"mandate management." Important
but secondary goals were
to
provide for more systematic
executive development and managerial training and to bring
more women and minority group
members into senior positions.
Thus, as in earlier reforms,

the basic administrative
framework was provided by the
bureaucracy itself. But it is
important to note that the
initiative for reform was ptjiiticai,
^
political
in i-h^ithat a= decision
was
made by the politicians to undertake
reform "prior
•

•

to a

detailed analysis and diagnosis of
the problems. "2
In broad brush strokes, the
Senior Executive Service^
created a corps of top government-wide
managers, composed of
positions formerly in the General Schedule
16-18 and Execu-

tive Levels IV and V.

it promised a compensation system

"designed to attract and retain highly
competent senior
executives"; and to "recognize exceptional
accomplishment";

^Sally H. Greenberg, "The Senior Executive Service,"
The Bureaucrat 7, No. 3 (Fall 1978):16.
2 Steven

Knudsen, Larry Jakus, Maida Metz, "The Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978," in Public Personnel Management,
ed. Donald E. Klingner (Palo Alto, California:
Mayfield
Publishing Company, 1981), p. 129.
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performance appraisal system
designed to ensure that
pay
retention, and tenure are
based on successful
individual and
organizational performance and
that executives are held
"accountable and responsible"
for the performance of
employees under them; flexibility
to political managers
"to
reassign senior executives to
best accomplish the agency's
mission"; and protection to
career executives from "arbitrary
actions" and "prohibited personnel
practices."
It promised,

in short, all things to all
people.

Within the SES compensation includes
base pay, performance awards, and Presidential rank
awards.
Six
SES pay

levels, ES-1 to ES-6, range from
$54,755 to $58,500 per year
as of January 1, 1981.
However, from 1979 until January
1981, executive pay had been frozen by
Congress at $50,112.50
although the rate of executive pay
established by the President as of October 1980 ranged from
$52,247 for ES-1 to

$61,600 for ES-6.

Career SES members (non-career SESers are

specifically excluded) are eligible for

a

lump sum perfor-

mance award of up to twenty percent of their pay.

Under the

1978 legislation the number of awards presented were not
to

exceed fifty percent of the SES positions in the agency.

Up

to five percent and one percent of the SES members are

eligible for Presidential rank awards of Meritorious Executive and Distinguished Executive respectively.

Recipients

of the former award received a lump sum payment of $10,000

while recipients of the latter award receive $20,000.

In no
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case may SES members receive
more in salary than that
authorized for Executive
Schedule Level I, that is.
Cabinet
members. As further incentive
SES members are allowed
to
accumulate annual leave without
limit and upon retirement
substitute cash, and they are
eligible for sabbatical leaves
of eleven months no more
than once every ten years.
The

details of compensation have
been described here for two
reasons:
1) it will be argued that the Carter
Administration
assumed that an economic model
of behavior was appropriate
to apply to public administration
and 2) it
will be argued

that the emphasis on economic
incentive has contributed to
severe problems in the SES
implementation.

Closely tied to compensation is the
performance
appraisal system. The heart of SES is
the attempt to link
pay, promotion, and awards to
performance.
To

be eligible

for an award the executive must
receive a "fully successful"
rating. Any SES member receiving an
"unsatisfactory" evalu-

ation must be reassigned or transferred.

if a senior

executive receives two "unsatisfactory" ratings
in any five
year period or two less than fully satisfactory

ratings, for

example, "minimally satisfactory," in any three year
period,

removal from the SES is mandatory.

When removed because of

performance, the SES member has no right of appeal, but must
be placed at a GS-15 level or above.

The Act specifies that

performance appraisal is to be based on both individual and

organizational performance and is to include such factors as

.
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in,prove.ents in efficiency,
productivity, ana quality
of
«ork, including reduction
in paperworK; cost
efficiency

timeliness of performance;
and meeting affirmative
action
goals
The SES provisions attempt
to encourage mobility
but
unlike the Hoover Commission
proposal, do so in a way
which
recognizes the realities of
specialization and the benefits
of continuity. Career
executives may be reassigned
to any
position within the agency for
which they are qualified,
but
may not be involuntarily
transferred to another agency.
Thus, executives may exercise
their preference to remain in
their specialist fields when they
move to another agency.
Yet, because the SES is based
on the notion of rank-in-theperson, in theory mobility is
facilitated. Executives may
be appointed to positions as
high as Cabinet rank without
losing their SES status. As Chester
Newland notes, "SES
stops short of creating a government-wide
generalist executive corps, but it provides a framework
within which profes-

sionals with that sort of public service
orientation may
have somewhat greater opportunities to
create such a corps

through their own ef forts.
The SES is protected from politicization in a number
of ways.

Appraisal of performance is precluded within 120

-'-Chester A. Newland, "Professional Public Executives
and Public Administration Agendas," in Professional Public
Executives ed. Chester A. Newland (Washington: American
Society for Public Administration, 1980), p. 24.
,
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days of the appointment
of the
Liie head
nf the agency or
neaa ot
the
appointment of the career
executive's immediate
supervisor
Who is a noncareer appointee.
While removal from the
SES
for unsatisfactory
performance is not appealable,
a member
xs entitled to an informal
hearing before an official
of the
Merit systems Protection Board
(M.S.P.B.).
if a career
official believes removal is
occasioned by the political
executive's partisan preferences
or is charged with misconduct, the right of appeal
to the M.S.P.B. exists.

m

addition, the Act provides that
the total number of noncareer
appointments in SES positions may
not exceed ten percent of
all SES positions and the total
number of limited term
appointees may not exceed five percent.
Therefore, at least
85 percent of SES positions must be
filled by career executives.
Furthermore, under the Act, the Office
of Personnel

Management is authorized to designate
certain "sensitivepositions as career reserved positions.
The latter provisions have moved beyond the attempt of
the Hoover Commission
to establish a sharp politics-administration
dichotomy. The
SES structure allows for a flexible
intermingling of career
and noncareer appointments.
The above summary reflects the final shape of the

reform legislation.

However, as regards the SES there was

surprisingly little amending of the original recommendations
of the Civil Service Commission's career staff by the Presi-

dent or Congress. Perhaps the most significant changes made
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by the Administration
were to reduce the percent
eligible
for perfor™ance awards
from the recor^ended 75%
to 50%
to
add the Presidential rank
awards, and exclude
noncareer
appointees from eligibility
for all awards.^ Thus
again it
is notable that the
career personnel
ad^ninistrators had a

central role in shaping the
SES

.

changes made in the Con-

gressional process will be noted
in the next section.
The Politics of Reform ;

Legislative Success~
If not apparent in the early
stages of reform, there

was no disguising the political
nature of the Carter reforms
When they were placed on the
Congressional agenda. Clothing
civil service reform in a management
costume makes it no
less political. Carter had prepared
for his legislative
initiative well.
mid-1977 a Federal Personnel Management
Project, composed of nine task forces
and close

m

to 150

people, was organized to begin the
process of garnering the
support of the executive branch and Congress. ^
Key roles
were played by Alan I. Campbell and Jule M.
Sugarman as

chairman and vice-chairman of the C.S.C. in
developing the
support of career employees. Congress and interest
groups.

^Sally Greenberg discusses differences between the
Carter legislation and the Task Force proposals in "The
Senior Executive Service."
^See Felix A. Nigro, "The Politics of Civil Service
Reform," Southern Review of Pub lic Administrati on 3, No. 2
(September 1979 ): 196-239 for a detailed description of the
creation of the Personnel Management Project and the
reform's legislative history.
,
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Heading the Project was
D„i,ht Ink, a respectea
federal
career executive, and the
Task Porces were composed
largely
of career executives.
t=ov f„
The Task
Force on SES, for example
was composed of three
career civil servants.
Thus unlike'
the Hoover Co^nission Task
Force approach, the Carter
project
attempted to get initial
support from the executives
them-

selves
in addition,

the Task Forces served as
spring boards

to generate support among
the attentive public.

Hearings
were held in large cities
throughout the country and conunents
were solicited from close to
1500 individuals and groups in
and out of government.
To further generate executive
support a working group of Assistant
Secretaries for Administration from each of the major
departments and agencies

was established to review Administration
proposals. Finally,
a legislative task, group was
established to develop Congressional contacts. Members of the relevant
House and Senate
committees were briefed and committee staff
were invited to
participate in the Task Force studies.

President Carter was himself heavily and directly
involved in the effort to generate support.

Campbell notes

that Carter devoted "parts of several Cabinet
meetings to the
issue and there was active Cabinet discussion."^
Cabinet

members were asked to contact congressional people with whom
^Interview by John Macy, "Campbell Reflects on Reform
Process," Public Administr ation Times 2, No. 2 (January 15,
^
1979):4.

.
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they dealt.

Also Carter „et personally
with congressional
co^ittee staff members, both
Democratic and Republican

movers of

the House Post Office
and civil Service Co™„ittee, and leaders of the
American Federation of
Govermnent

Employees

Chairman Campbell was the key
Administration spokesman
meeting with editorial boards
of newspapers, public
interest

groups, groups of career executives,
union leaders, business
organizations, civic groups, civil
rights organizations, and
professional associations. "l met,"
Campbell says, "with
editorial boards of literally dozens
of major newspapers
across the country. out of that came
overwhelming editorial
support from newspapers like Th^JTev^rk_T^
Chicago
Tribune, Chicago_Sun_Tim^ Washington P
ost, and Los Angeles
Times. More than 200 editorials were
written in favor of
civil service reform. There's no question
that helped us,
and it helped us because we had some
difficulty arousing

substantial interest on the Hill in the legislation ." ^

His

work paid off as support for the reforms was
received from
wide variety of groups: Business Roundtable and
Common

a

Cause, Ralph Nader and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the

National Civil Service Reform League and the American Feder-

ation of Government Employees (AFGE)

.

But although support

'See Harlan Lebo, "The Administration's All-Out Effort
on Civil Service Reform," National Journal 10, No. 21 (May
27, 1978) 837-38
:

.

"Campbell Reflects on Reform Process," p.

3.

.

was broad, it was not
ot: intenc,^.
^
intense, ^-k^
therefore,
securing support
from the House Post uj-rice
Office and Civil
r^.rM Service
o
Committee was
crucial
AS in earlier periods
of history, the issue
of civil
service reform had little
salience for Congress.
Campbell
and the Personnel Project
members had to generate
interest.
On the one hand, civil service
reform became for many
mergers of Congress a safe,
good government issue.
Further
more, the 95th Congress
reflected to a great extent the

dissatisfaction with government that
existed in the country
congressional support for public
expenditures and for publi
employees and their unions was down.
At the same time,
however, there were pockets of
potential intense opposition
among Congressmen with large civil
servant, veteran,
and

union constituencies, particularly
on the House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee.

Opposition to the reform legislation by veterans'
organizations was fierce. They saw the
Administration's
attempts to remove veteran's preference in

hiring, promotion,

and reductions-in-force as "a litmus test
of whether they
could continue to enjoy strong congressional support."^
In
the end veteran's preference was largely untouched,
except

significantly in the SES where veteran's preference was
eliminated.
^

Equally opposed to the Carter legislation were

"Civil Service Reform Likely This Year," Congres sional Quar terly Weekly Report 36, No. 37 (September 16,
1978):2460.

^
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public employee labor
unions.
unions
supported the bin ir.
^

n
.
Only
the AFGE leadershio
^^snip

inclusion of a Title
vtt
whxch established
public sector
collective h
^-^a.ning rights
under law. Yet
even aft

"»

—

reforms.

r

::.::::r::::;

pv^^n

o.

tt-j-h,

^-l.

rr:::":

Administration co^pro.ise
the

''^^

the .ationax

.._t

easur. K^p^o^ees
„.io„

^^^^^^^^
the bill, hoping to
o secure greater
concessions for labor
However, support of
refor. b. the ...h,
the largest public
sector union, helped
to diffuse union
opposition.
The senior executives'
skepticism toward the SES
was
based on the belref
belif^-F -1-1^-,+that xt would open
both the front and
back doors of the service.
the reassignment feature
of
the .ES many executives
saw the possibilities
of department
heads replacing career
officials "with political
or other
•

m

^^^f^ll!!!^!!!!!:::^'^^

'° "'^"^ individual liking...3

on •Reform.r^^^e^e'rarTi^erir^So^^r;.^^^ "'^^'^^
Joel Haveman, ^^wTIl-lhi^ve;:
T' I 'August 21, 1978) :1;
the Federal Personnel Game? " m f^^^ Carter's Rules for
(October 29, llTl^^HlTnf ' n %£i2i}£i^Iournal 9, No. 44
Ayres, Jr., "President's Civil Service Rn 1m :

°™°"d

2

R^f"™

Act of ^978?"";.^?34!'

^""^
President's Plan for
Changing thrciv?r?;r""^"cSystem,"
Public
Administration
Revili JO,
_S_51J_ew
38
No r^TnW.^'"'
NO.
4
(July/August 1978) 301
:

.

'

—

^

same time, too

—

expont--;
r,
"txves

were doubtful that
a ten percen
t
Un..t on noncareer
appointees wouia prevent
a dete rmined
Administration from
politicising r

an,

any system can be
manipulated. Some ob
^ --"^servers
Sun..uist .o. example,
.o.. ....
t.e ten percent
Ximit
on noncareer
appointments is too hi,h
and that a much
sharper distinction
between career anr^
and noncareer must
be
established to <-r-o=.-i
create a^ competent
managerial service.
In addition,
n, career
care^e^r civil
^itt^i
servants were skeptical
that
Objective performance
evaluation was possible,
believing
that personal favoritism
and political bias can
never be
entirely eliminated.
. particular concern of some
was that
an unqualified political
appointee would be making
work
appraisals which had important
career significance.

—

.'There

is no way," one senior
official claimed,

"for a political

appointee to distinguish
between good performance and
servile
performance of a i>uDorainate.
"
2
subordinate^
Many executives agreed with
one bureaucrat's view that
the SES "is an obvious attempt
to
politicize the civil service
system.
Nothing more and
nothing less. "3
^^^^^^^
^.^^^^
^^^^^^
separation, reassignment, and reduction

pp.

3_if^''^^^^^t'

"J^'^y carter as Public Administrator,"

Richard E.
tives ^?n?M.^p^^''^^'''^ to Change," Vaden, "Federal Execu^f^'rti^ns
Administration and
Socie;v 12, M
bociety
No. 1 (May 1980) :106.
^Ibid., p. 105.

.
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pay, .any executives
spoke of a ".eturn to
the spoils
system...
.h. consequences of
politicization, ™any
critics
warnea, „oui. .e a civil
service in which technical
Kno„le.,e
and expertise suffered
and "yes ™en" were
substituted for
"constructively critical and
politically neutral profes-

sionals
The House and Senate debate
reflected a variety of
political concerns. There were
those like Senator Percy
who
blamed the bureaucracy for
the declining reputation
of
congress, and others who used
it as an all-purpose
receptacle
for complaints.
It is not credible, Percy
pointed out, that
95% of the civil servants get
satisfactory ratings and 98%
get periodic pay increases
when bureaucracy is frequently
"unresponsive, insensitive, and
lackadaisical." it is this
kind of bureaucracy that "creates
the huge amount of mail,
the huge number of phone calls,
and the great number of
visitors we have."^

Other members appeared to be concerned
that the
reformed civil service would give the
President too much
power.
Republican Representative Ashbrook argued that

Carter and the Democrats were trying to
manipulate the civil
service, citing what he believed were Carter
abuses in

^Ibid.
2
3

Rosen,

"Merit and the President's Plan

.

.

.",

p.

U.S., Senate, 95th Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record 124, No. 135 (August 24, 1978) :S 14269.

302.

Personnel^actions an. intense
Administration Io..,in.
for
the bill.
Republican Benjamin Oilman
reminded his House
colleagues that the Carter
reforms were "remar.abl,
similar
to the infamous 'MaleK
Manual' and noted that
Man May, its
author, had not only
congratulated Carter on his
reforms but
had received inquiries
from members of the Carter
Administration regarding ideas in
the manual.
Like partisan

congressional debates in earlier
reform periods, members
supported or resisted increased
Presidential control of
administration depending on whose
ox was being gored.
But others, both Democrats
and Republicans alike,
argued in support of the bill
that every President should
have the right to manage the
federal government.
replying to Ashbrook, Udall recited
the problem of securing
a responsive bureaucracy.
"when the Nixon people came in,
they wanted to make some changes
and

m

they found all these

Johnson-Kennedy people, who were held over,
were holding the
reign of power, and they could not
get rid of them. Eight
years later

am screaming and yelling that the Nixon
holdovers are there when Jimmy Carter gets to
town.
I

'President-

Philip Crane in January 1981

.

.

.

will get from this bill

^U.S., House, 95th Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record 124, No. 126 (August 11, 1978) :H 8455:
2

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, C ivil Service Reform Act of 1978, Rep ort on
H.R. 11280, 95th Congress, 2nd session, 1978,
See
p. 421^
also Sheila A. Hershow, " 'Malek Manual' Author Hails Carter
Plan," Federal Times 14, No. 3 (March 20, 1978) :1, 6.
^
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u.e..c.e. ..a

..e .o.e„.en. .......

Kep.e3en...e .e™..^..,

...

^^^^^^^
agreed that Presidenfc^
esidents are prevented
"from effectively
managing the entities
over Which
which they
th. presumably
preside "
ae^ina^n,
co.Xea.ues ..at ..e
..proposition
£>iil,

-cxuaes frustration over
t.e inaMlit.
-trzen to get proper service

n

„entaXU.

of the average

fro™ Government,.,
oerwins.i

argued that this
frustration is felt because
the civil service bureaucracy often
does not respond to the
public
interest or the directives
of a Presiaent. ..what
we are
trying to do in this
bill,., he concludes,
..is to give the
President the legitimate
authority a chief Executive
should
have...
in a Congress that
was quite aware of the
public
anger directed toward
federal government and in
a setting

where memories are short,
thr.rt,
an argument
calling for increased
Presidential control over
bureaucracy was persuasive.
At the same time, there
was concern in Congress for
the potential contained
in the Carter bill, and
particularly
in the SES provision, for
politicizing the
civil service.

Especially vocal on this issue
were Senators and Representatives from districts containing
large
numbers of federal

bureaucrats.

Echoing the bureaucrats' fears
Senator Mathias

Ibid., p. H 8456.
2

Congress, 2nd session. Congre ssional
Rennr-H 124,
^ OA " J^"""^^^
Record
No. 140 (September 11, 1978) :H 9362.

~
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from Maryland claimed
that "it would be
relativel
m..e than lo.

,,.3e CS.S. .ositie.

L

3e..iee, particularly
30 because career
e.ecuti.es
could be reassigned
and demoted without
cause "l Noting
^of
+-K
=
that the Nixon Whitp ro„o«
attrition in career
ranks to
place partisan
appointments in rne
the civi]
civil service,
Mathias
warned that the SES
gives
ves
Pre^-iH.r,^Presidential appointees
g
power to
create attrition
"t.on. 2 ^in the end, most
Congressmen appeared
to
be persuaded that
there
nere wer^^
were sufficient
protections in the
SES to prevent
political abuse.
4.

.

•

-.

The final issue raised
in Congress by the
Carter
reforms also relates to
the issue of the
rne
political power of
congress vis-a-vis the
President. Congressional
actions
w.th regard to supergrade
manpower needs have
historically
been based on the desire
to maintain the
influence of
congressional co^ittees over
the executive agency. ^
,
result, authorizations for
supergrade positions have
been
ad hoc and chronicaUy
slow, a situation that
C.S.C. professionals hoped to remedy with
the reform legislation.
In the

debate over the SES the struggle
for influence was manifested
mpts of Cong ressmen to exempt

bi^^

"their agencies" from

also the remarks of Senator
StIviL of
2

aLs^!

P

s"i4273!

Ibid., p. 14294.

For a discussion along these lines,
see Hugh Heclo
(Washington: Th^ BrooKin%'s"lns?i-

tsH^-Tf-mf

—
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SES requirements-

The ci^^y^^i-^
debate record shows
a string of
amendments aimed at exemni-inr.
exempting favorite
agencies, all of
which were defeated
exceot
'"""P^ for- amendments exempting
the FBI
the CIA, the NSA,
and the Defense
ense Intelligence
Intell.'a
Agency (dia)
congressmen ha. support
.ro™ „.n. career
executives in t.esl
attempts to exempt
agencies fro™ SES
provisions. .i,e
congressional co^ittee
^em.ers ana sta„s,
executives are
orientea pri^ariX, to
specific programs ana
organisations
rather than a govern.ent-„iae
perspective. Though many
executives are expert
managers, "nearly all
Care: confinea
to narrow specialisations
in specific organisations "l
-f

consequently, the SBS was
seen as an attacK on their
program
orientations and their
professionalism.

For political reasons
Congress was quite serious
about
linking performance ana rank
awards to performance,
order
to justify such "extravagance"
to their constituency such
a
linkage had to be maae. As
future events wouia prove,
congress aid not proviae for
the awara system without an
expectation of future legislative
or aaministrative

m

limita-

tions.^
Perhaps the most striking observation
about the Congressional debate was its brevity.
There was comparatively
"Professional Public Executives and Public
'ruL>±xc
A^m-;
/j^^^i^"^' Agendas,"
Administration
p. 12.
R^.n-innft'^M''^''

^* Feinstein,

speech before the Mid-Atlantic

Oc?obef 2l?\"^80:'p.'4?''''""''
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little discussion
about the SES
qpq and
. ^ few
^
questions were ask.H
regarding the likely
effects of the SES .a
.
appraisal

svst.rr,.

ana .ses were
.e,.e3.ea or prepare,
.e. ..e ..^p...^
implicit in the qpQ
'"^'^
performance appraisal
systems
Indeed, there was no
effort to
t-o assess
the real level of
.overn.e„t pro.ucUv..,
or .o ae.e.op
a..er„aUve approaches
for re„ar.in, ana
motivating p..xic employees,
nebate was
Short because Congress
is onl, rarely
capable o. a sustained
interest in an issue ana
civil service refor™
is never high
on the congressional
agenda for very long.
Members attempted
to derive as much
political mileage as
possible from the
refer™ debate and then
moved on to the next
crisis. The
carter Administration was
thankful for this rapid
movement
for all along it had
feared that delay would
be the tactic
used to defeat its
legislation. To move the
legislation
through the House committee
and floor debate Carter
astutely
called on Morris Udall,
vice-chairman of the civil Service
committee. All observers agree^
that Udall's legislative
skill and respected reputation
were crucial for passage of
the bill.

That the Carter Administration
in 1978 successfully
established a corps of senior
government executives where

other Administrations had failed
is due to

S

Coalit^nr;

f^^'^^^u^'P^^'

S^Pte^r^r?^^^

^^^^^ Sawyer,

a variety of

"Udall

's

Delicate
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factors.

«

,,.3t ,Xance tHe reason
Carter succeeaea
le.isxauve., ,3 ,u.te
3i„p,e:
w.3 t.e «rst U.e
t.at
such a proposal had
k
been ma^=
made by a Democratic
President to a
Democratic congress.
Conarf^^a
d,
But gxven the failure
of most other
carter legislative
initiatives, it is clear
that other
factors contributed to
success. Prom the early
planning
stages to final passage,
reform was supported by
intense and
sustained presidential
interest. Carter needed
a victory
and had staked much
political capital on his
ability to
reform and manage the
bureaucracy. Carter was
able to begin
hxs tenure by appointing
three new co™,issioners
to the c S C
"with no need to defend the
past.
In Campbell and
Sugarman, Carter found
energetic and effective
spokesmen who
were quick to learn the ways
of Congress. Campbell
successfully captured broad, if not
deep, public support,
concomitantly, the SES provisions
were almost totally the product
of C.S.C. planners, and it
was widely agreed among line
managers and top career officials
throughout the civil service that changes were needed.
4.

Fortuitously, the political climate
for reform was
ideal.
Public pressure to "make government
work" was
irresistible. Carter and his legislative
managers effectively used the Proposition 13 mentality
to justify the
creation of the SES. When the legislation
was presented to
-"-Jule Sugarman, "What the Administration
Wanted,"
Bureaucrat 7, No. 2 (Summer 1978) :8.

„^
The „
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congress, .He
.a„.„.3t.a..o. .o..,.3.
ana Co.,.e33.o..
supporters kept the
pressure on for a aul v
'"^^'^ °' '''^
-t, not allowing extraneo
'^'"^^ '°
effort
B
-cause the legislation
was consi.erea in
the 2na
session, when Concireqc;
^
gress was pressed
for time, debate
and
polarization was forestall
estalled. Moreover,
with the vote on
reform taken shortly
before the
-hh^ m
y befor^^
November elections,
a safe
good government
position to
.
" present to constituents
was
given to Congressmen. 1
^•
At the c,.r.o
same time. Congressional
attituaes haa become
iess sympathetic to
the alarms raisea
by public employees
ana more in tune to
the notion of
squeezing more out or
of less.
le<!=!
As Sugarman points out,
civil
service reform in 1978
was "a coming together
of a great
-ny forces which haa previously
operatea in ignorance of
one another. Suadenly
a moment seems to
arise when all thes
forces are unitea and
the momentum exists for
real change "2
Whether or not the legislative
success of the Carter Aaministration was responsible
for ieai,
real positive
r^o^^tUr^ change
remains
to be assessed.
*=r=i

•

^^^j2g-£2ij^y:Os__o^j mplementatio n;

Reaction and Chano^

In the American governmental
system, often there is a

wide disparity between promising
certain public policies and

^-^-^^-^^

There is even a wider gap

Reform'Acttf'L78""'p?'l3^'"^'
2

Sugarman,

"^^^

^-^^ Service

"What the Administration Wanted,"
p.

8.
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between the promise
and
na the ar^h.'.
achievement of intended
consequences.
That this feature
i^ure char.r^^
characterizes the American
•

PoUe.
^^^^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^
political force«5
orces in +-v,,^
the implementation
of t^o-Licy.
policv
Attempts
,
to implement the
Senior
lor Execiif-n
..o c
Executive
Service in the federal
Civil service iil.3trate
..e polities
poii.,
txon and su,,est the
tenuous relationship
between promise
and actual performance.^

J

.

When the SES became
effective on July 13,
1979, 98
Of the approximately
7,000 eligible people
"voluntarily.
entered the new service.
Many,

5»

perhaps n,ost, did so

believing that the SES
was the only alternative
for career
advancement. Less than a
year after the adoption
of the SES
Lynn and Vaden concluded
from their study of senior
executives' attitudes that
"there does not appear to
be a great
mandate of support for the
Carter proposals.
clearly,

nar^^top^bur^^

for

the SES was "the only
ballgame in town."

of impl'em^ntaUon ^""see^^of ^ °' ^i*^"*"" °" the problems

^^^iSis
(c:mbrIdg:r'„L'L^iAu

1^

"Ber^eLlf'^^L^^rSro-r
e"?ts!

1^1'^?.'.^^^^^^^^

m^^^'^.i^^

(Washington,'"?!; Thfikar*'^
TnllilTtL
Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher
^'
ESRA Thf'oi?
(Syracuse,
iNew Yorx. Syracuse
ii^oll^i|if~^^^5^i2^^
University Press, 1968)
.

Richard

E. Vaden, "Bureaucratic
Responsf toVf;n^S"
Reform," Public Administration
Review ?q
Krr^\?^r/''^
39, No.
4 (July/August 1979)T34T7~

Morale o. senio.
executives in t.e su™.er
alreaay at a Xo„ level
.ue to Carter's
...ash
udfan tne
the h
bureaucrat-"
ca^pa.^n in sup^rt o.
the

re.o™ legislation.

„i,,

.^Ple^entation o. the S.s,
a hi,h ae^ree o.
nneertaint. „as
added to the Uves
livf^Q of
r^-F
4-u
the bureaucrats by
a new performance
appraisal syste. and the
approaching 1,80 Presidential
election.
indeed, Oeneral
.ccountin, office,^
Protection Board, 3
,,,,,,,
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^

Association^ surveys of
senior executives'
attitudes toward
the SES reveal a serious
discontent, if
not hostility, in

the top ranks.

The PEI;« survey of
April isgl, ,or example
found that 24. of its
respondents felt that the
SBS should
be discontinued!

The surveys indicate
particular sensitive areas.
Eighty percent of the MSPB
respondents felt that the SES
Offered insufficient incentives
to retain competent

can
NO.

Executive
rAl'lTlTToTs^:- Pubfif
^31?^^^^-^^^=^^^^^^^
3

Service: How We

(May/June 1981

Director ^6fficr^fp'''"'°""\"^

^eport to the

F^^°fi5'M~~S~^^^^^

called

^" EHblij^fldministration Times April 15,
^^''''''^
Committee on Post
'^nd'rtvfi Service,
i
Senior Executive Service Hearings
Before thf c K
Sggg^hgSubcomgi|^
ee on-^.vxl Service 9/th ron^^.o.
.1
27-32, hereafter cited as Senior
1?"'.PP?v»^,?"' Service, Hearings,
Executive

^T^nd
Office
1981,

.

.

.

1981.

^" Senior Executive Service, Hearings,
1981, pp°^67-72^^^''^'^

160

e^Plo^ees, e.ea.X, a
.espon.e .o

Congress. onaU.

.„,„3e.

tx.e, .any respondents
appeared to feel insulted
,he
bonus system.
Twentv-fr,,,,Twenty four percent
in the Feiaa survey
wanted to discontinue the k„
^""^
altogether, while in

not .^prove performance,
30. indicated that
it was unXi.ely
that the opportunity
or salary
salarv increases
ir.^vy for
will increase
motivation, and 44. said
that the ^ssiMlity
of a salary
decrease was unli.ely to
motivate. Such figures
seem to
confirm the observation
i-hatrvarion that a unique
characteristic of
-ny in government is that
financial reward
is not their

Chief inducement to good
performance. . major
proportion of
government executives has
chosen public service for
the
personal reward found in
serving the national purpose,
such individuals will not
be inspired to better
performance
by the remote promise of
an annual financial award
or

bonus. "1

At the same time, it is clear
that deep dissatisfaction with regard to
compensation exists among SES
members.
Performance appraisal is also the
source of intense
concern among top career officials.
Among GAO respondents
41% indicated that performance
appraisals were having a
negative effect on SES morale and
37% agreed
that appraisals

would not improve performance.

Although it appears that

"Executive Accountability: Will SES
, ntf^"
Make a
Difference?," The Bureaucrat 9, No. 3 (Fall
1980) :6.

most executives suDDort t-h^
upport the concept
of performance
evaluation, specific
criticisms are
apparent.

.n the c.o surve.

* Of the bureaucrats heiievea
havin, a personal
reiationS..P With an influential
person „oul. influence
ratings.- 3,,
beUeved agreeing with the
philosophical beliefs of
the
current Administration
would bias performance
ratings, and
69% agreed that one'c;
one s abxlity ^to
negotiate with supervisors
would influence ratings.
igs.
A third
thn'rH of
r,f *.u
the executives in
the
M.S.P.B. study believed
bonuses did not go to the
S

best

performers but to management
favorites and 50% felt
that
bonuses go disproportionately
to executives at the
top of
the agency.
general, then, senior
1
executives do not
see a linkage between
performance evaluations

m

and pay,

awards, or other personnel
actions.

Taking the SES as a

Whole, federal executives
saw little evidence that the
promised management efficiency
and effectiveness was to be
a
consequence of its implementation.
Thirty-six percent of
the FEIAA respondents, for
example, believed that the SES
had had no effect and 52%
believed that it had hindered

hr,r,„=

Statistics Confirm this tendency
f^'^t
those executives in the higher ranks of

to skew
the sTs.

in ^qfio
In
1980 out of the 1,614 individuals receiving
performance
awards, more than 1, 400 were in the top
^Lfr^
o""""
three grades.
See
Philip Shandler, "The
oap on Pay Skews Bonuses, GAO Reports," Federal Column,
The Washington
Star August 3, 1981, p. 4.

r

,

——

2

management efficiency.^

With skepticism
c=v»r,^
and discontent
so
widespread among executives
ves, reports
reoor^= announcing
the early
death Of the SES would
not be surprising.
•

A crucial test for
the future of the
SES

is the

transition from the Carter
to the Keagan
Administration
The law does not allow
performance appraisals or
involuntary
reassignments within 120
days after the beginning
of a new
Administration or appointment
of a new agency head.
Many
Observers were anxious to
learn whether
or not the Reagan

Administration would encourage
"voluntary" „oves of career
executives within
t-ho 120
on day
^
ithin^e
period
i

or engage in wholesale

of SEs'me^be^'^towardnhf'refo'""'''" --essing attitudes
include:
D. Anthon^ Buttlrf !e?d
-pi^^r''"'DOL SES; Performance Appraisa?
Evaluation of
qi^/
System:
Promise Pending,"
?
paper delivered at th= ?

^

Department," and Char^e^A

P^^l^^^^nary Assessment From One

sponsored by the State University
^
Of nSJ Yo^k If^ u
^"^^''^^ Binghampton, NY, October 28-29/
1981
mov7r M
"Attitudes of Federal Employees
Tow^;^ pi°?
Appraisal and Merit Pay: Implications
for
r?R? implementation,"
Tn, ?
"T^"^^
CSRA
'

•

Public_Admi^^

}^^^Tl|4^W-pFt?I^I^-V^^
letT7~lTllT"^^Political
Reform and Government

'

Management:
The Case
Cas; nf^l'
of the Senior Executive Service,"
paper prepared
southern Political Science Association,
MeLhis'^T^^
Memphis, Tennessee, November 5-7,
1981; and Peter Colby and
Patricia Ingraham, "Civil Service Reform:
The Views of the
" ^^view of Public Personnel
Admin:
"
fstratiorr^r"
istration
""^riSf
1 (Summer
1981
75-89
)

:

.

Lanouette in "SES— From Civil Service Showpiece f^^!^^^"^.'^To Incipient Failure in Two Years," National
Journ al 13
(July 18, 1981):1296-99, already has sugge
sted its death.
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Service in April iqRi

v

°^ the Merit System
Protection Board claimed
that there was "no
specific eviden<
cri;.c
^
thai- SES
that
^e^bers have been
pressured to vacate
their
positions through
resignation,

retirement, or reassignment"

aur.n, the i20 da.
period nor „as there
evidence that the
-ratoriu. on performance
appraisal was being
violated ^
O.P.M. director non
Oevine testified that
between Znau.uracareer SBS .embers had
been reassigned and
that he had no
information that these
moves were involuntary. 2
on the
other hand. Congressional
Democrats have claimed that
some
abuses have occurred,
citing an inordinate
amount of movement^at the Departments
of Energy and Agriculture
and the
0PM.
i„ defense of these
3
personnel

changes, some participants insist that they are
the result of minor reorganizations and the necessary
replacing of retirees,
general,
and surprisingly to many
observers, it does appear that
the
Reagan Administration has not
abused the intent of the 120
day waiting period. One
suspects that there are two likely
explanations. r±LST:,
First in most
moc^ SES
ci?c
positions expertise is the

m

m

^Senior Executive Service, Hearings,
1981, pp. 30-31.
3

Noted by several interviewees.

.
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-cona,

i3 Xi.e., that
the new .^ministration
^ciuion has found
most
qpQ members
u
uiubr bES
s willing
winSr,rT to ^ ,
follow the

J

rr,

4-

political
-L-LTiicai
leadership
^
l

whf^n It IS
When
provided.

The reactions or
of seniorsenior ^civil servants have
been
•

-.

agencies to give
bonuses— NASA

-

the

ma..™™
.

congress to t.e
...t ro.n.

qRA and
SBA,
MSPB-awarded them
^^^^

^^^^^^^^

^
^

congress reacted angrii,
and swifti,.
zn ..ne 1980, the
proportion o. SES positions
eii.i.ie .or performance
awards^
was reduced .rom S0»
to 2S.
.o indicate good
faith and
protect the bonus system
from complete destruction,
OPM
director Campbell instructed
agencies to limit bonus
awards
to 20% of those eliaible
m*-u
______^^^^^igible
At the same time. Congress,
whose
.

.

SS^i^ilcutf;;

slr^Ice

E^S^Htiv^Service Per^irman;:
utive Servic4 Performl^I
3^_^^^___ice^erforj«^

£i£l^Jt22k^

P^rCl'""

^

£4^:^ti^22L^t_Senior
5^ii:2tJ,2£*_At_Senior Exec-

sional'sL%^e"r'[n'i:^en?i:o to\' ' -"-P^--<3 Congresreporter regarding the
bonuses exclaimed
^»
?S ?
'^^"'"^'^
made more ?han he and
^ bureaucrat
^"^f
*° '^^"^"e the bonus
system. Perhaps the sto?v ?='o^
nonetheless
true that Cong?lss was udLJ n°?^

^

.^IpB-d?a

sible lor Pva^nJ^-'^''

"

? ---- - so^e—

"''""'"^^

w:shrng?o'n:i!^!f\"„\^^ri"^?!^'

S°^'^<3=

^'^^-^^^^^^

se?^

(those respon•
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pay is linked to
executive salaries,
salar.-.
continued to impose
-impose
cap on pay.

With the

n^r,

A

^

1

'

tives increased ^uj.y
only

^
a

congressmen and Execu-

.

53.^
355%

between

Mamh
^

i 0-7-7
^^^^
and May 1981

while the coc:+r^*:
cost Of
l.v.ng increased by
over 47%.l
.

a half ao.en levels
of

.

P^^her

responsiMXit.-so.e of „.o.
other-

wise would be paid
as much
n as ?61,
$61 finn
r
600— [were:
getting the
same $50.]19
T^
j
0,112.
undoubtedly, many
executives entered the
SES believing that
the bonus awards would
alleviate this
situation and some few
Congressmen supported the
award
system as a way around
the pay cap.
When Congress reduced
the amount of bonuses
available
Dxe tne
the resnH^
reaction was predictable
Morale, which was already
low, dipped even
lower

Officials were bitter,
believing that they had
been lured
-to the SES on false promises
and then
betrayed, that

congress had reneged on a
promise.
senior Executive Association
(SEA,

the interests of SES
members.

Almost immediately a
was formed to represent

its first act was to file
suit

in October 1980 in U.S.
District Court to overturn
Congressional action with regard
to the bonuses, an action
still
pending. The SEA has grown
to 800 members, a small
percentage, but even its existence
is significant.

May l,^l|81?''

'^''''''"tives

^Shandler,

Association, "Pay Fact Sheet,"

"The Federal Column."
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That morale iq
cin^rp
IS suffering
is also indicat^H
^naicated by
k
the
eJcodus of i^enior
senior ^executivPQ
^v-^
urives from
government.
"Th<. retirement rate for
p
Federal Executives
^ederal
Cgs-15 to SF^ r
r-

.

" "

P^, cap „as
15.5. in March l„s,.
28 9. i„ „
°
'
^^'^
6. in March
1980 ana .4
^^'/o in August"
1980
^
ao of
As
mid-1981
retirement rate for ^Fq m u

"

;

•

•

•Lur bi^s

members of

^.i t

^

2

38,.
such a loss o.
expertise an.
experience win 'Certainly
certainl have
H
an adverse effect nn
°" governmental performance,
perhaps
making the establishment
of cne
the SES a strange
.
irony
The reduction in
performance awards „iu
li,,,,
It much more
difficult i-r.
'"^'"'^^
i"to
the -S.
SES
.
a system which
emphasizes pay as a
motivator
Why Should a CS-ls
accept more responsibility
in the SES
When the Chances Of
a bonus are almost
nil.
fact,

^

m

m

the

employees say they are
li.ely to ,oin the SES
if a 30b ^hey
wouxa li.e were offered
to

them.-

executives already
skeptical of the fairness
of the bonus
^;;^^^^^^_-^-tion^in the number available
has
created

May l,\'98l?'
"""^ ^^^^ ^heet,"
S^r^llr-ThrPed""?"'
Federal Brain Drain,"
June 1, 1981, p? 41
Newsweek

Senate,'^Coli?te"onVof"""'^ statement before
-SI. ^„is sL\\-ent

the U.S.

f=^t:^^tlt^^J^^-

^Senior Executive Service,
Hearings, 1981,

p.

29.

.

greater doubt i-h;=i-fk^>.
that bonuses
can be awarded fairly
to the
large number of
deserving executives.^
Pi^^Uy, ,He
reduction of bonuses
confirmed to so^e
executives that
congress had a totally
distorted view of SES
productivity
congress, action on
that part of the S.s
which is conside;ed
the most innovative
and
a Its
its core,
cor» leads
i =
many to believe that
the SES is destined
to be merely a
"paper project. "2
For congress, the
issue of bonuses and pay
was seen in
l.ght of two political
realities:
the widespread mood
of
budget cutting and the
widespread perception that
government
productivity is low and
bureaucrats are unaccountable.
In
order to justify to
constituents spending millions
of
dollars for bonuses to
well-paid bureaucrats.

Congress had
to link bonuses clearly
to improved performance.
When the
bonus awards turned out to
be greater than expected or,
more

precisely, when through press
reports the public perceived
that bureaucrats were exploiting
them again, and when
congress became concerned that
bonuses were not linked to
performance, 3 the bonus system was
put in jeopardy.
Accountability:
DifferencS?'' p^^|^""^^

Will SES Make a

"ith participant, Washington, D.C.,
August

1981.
3

to Representative Jamie Whitten,
Representafiv» Li''"^'' Schroeder,
Chairwoman of the Subcommittee
on Civil Service notes that "the press
has reported that
friends of agency management, to
ret'i'rTL^''^
T"-""^
employees
as going away gifts, and to exceptionally
large numbers of top agency management."
Senior Executive
Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 161.

«vn%!

"
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Constituency P^^essure
pressure also
=i„ made
raising the pay
f y cap
politically difficult
ficult. „
.

.

However, by the end
of 1981 the
crisis of low morale
and earlv "tirements
in the SES had
created such pressure
for lif.i.,
^^^^

ac,.iesced.

Xn mid-Oecember
1981 Congress raised
the cap

-o.,SO,ll..SOto,ss,SOO.^

congress, however, did
not
breaK the traditional
lin. between executive
and congressional pay. Andrew
Feinstein
einstem, staff
<;^ = <=f
Director of the House
Subcommittee on civil
Civi: c;er-,„-„„
Service, argues that
"this linkage
exists for two reasons.
First, pressure to
increase executive pay creates pressure
to increase congressional
pay
second, most members of
Congress do not think a
career civil
servant .
should make more money
.
than elected representatives." 2 If the
performance awards are used
to get around
the pay cap the pressure
for pay increases is
reduced.
"it
is not in the interest
of Congress to reduce
this pressure
to raise the cap, and
therefore, it is not in their
interest
a great number of
bonuses to be awarded.
^he
.

t^^w

istratiorTrilfi^; iTTsV-

^Hbli^^-

t"' ^^^^"^
Pay iHHTiiSi-i^'a cale study
'bv it;elf
r."""^
itself.
It
appears, however,
that support from th^ cf^^
,j
P""-!--!^
0PM, anf inLLe preLure^?rom
tiSeie'"''°;;'
Senior Executive Association and Washinaton n r
,
^""^ ^^^^^^^
forces for change
?he'fact tL^rr'"°"
^^^^ Congress recently had
voted
r
deduction, undoubtedly,
sof^en^d'resi^ta'^cl!""'
.

^

^Andrew A. Feinstein, Speech before
the Mid-Atlantio
"^^^^"^^
Beach,^^i^g\^n^L'r
October
21, 1980, p. 4.
O~:^5'r?llorp.'4?'^""'^^'
3

Ibid., p. 5.

.

congressional response
to the SPq ho
system and pay
linkage suggests that
any
ny etfort
effori- ^r.
to create and
motivate a
professional corps o.
executives .asea on pay,
„UX .ee
extre.ex, .i„,c.Xt.
w.en promises o.
increasea .oneta.,
rewa.as are ™aae, „Hen
a s.ste™ is
preaicatea on economic

-centives, it

is not unrealistic
to expect executives
to
want these rewards.
It is a ga^e in
„Mch,

under current

political conditions, the
cards are stac.ea
against executives
What effect raising the
pay cap will have on
executive
attrtudes and performance
remains to be seen. Given
the
already tenuous position
of the bonus system,
the pay raise
may place the bonus systen.
in deeper political
trouble.
Strong support from the
Reagan Administration may
keep the
system at its present level
but to expect an increase
in the
available awards is fantasy.
Breaking the linkage between
congressional and executive pay
is almost certainly
out of

the question, although
House Speaker Tip O'Neill has
indicated he is in favor of
delinkage.^

another area where change is
possible is the 120-aay
moratorium on performance appraisal

ana involuntary within-

agency reassignments.

Although denying that the 120-day

period was overly burdensome, 0PM
Director Divine in testimony to a House Committee raised
the question whether the

^SEA Newsletter. Vol.

1,

No. 4, July 1981, p. 5.
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- - p---

an Administration's
tenure

q„oh

....

restriction late in an
create a Hei,.tenea
frustration over t.e
^naMiit. to c.an,e top
bureaucrats. ..e Oemocratic
House '
on the other hand,
"feels strongly about
the 120 days
Any attempt to change
the 120-day protection
for civil
-rvants would, under the
current conditions of a
Republican
President and Democratic
House,' i"^s<^iPitate
precipitate a
. highly
hpartisan
debate.
•

.

^"'^'^

^

.

-ministration

Reflectiri2_on Doctrine,

Mgig!Et ions7~and~v£T Tj?^

m

selling the SES to Congress,
senior executives, and
the public, the carter
Administration stressed the need
for
better ••management." p^om
the Administration's
perspective,
efficient and effective
management had two faces. it
would
give political managers the
tools to secure and reward
greater responsiveness and
productivity, defined in terms of
Administration goals, while, at the
same time, giving the
individual bureaucrat a greater
incentive to strive for
professional competence. Better
management, to the Carter

senior Executive Service, Hearings,
1981,

hoaringsf Ibid!,''p':'™?''^''"

*° ''^^'"'^

p.

'^"'^'^"^

3.
^^'^
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Administration, wawa. t-h^
the answer for
the problem of
continui^
continuity
and chanqe
^
Jt xs true
It
that the SES does
recognize
zo a
to
^
greater extent than
^
th^r. ^
previous reform attempts
the specialist

-

::

Z

"""" "

--'^^

'

e_i.:. ::r

~

=°rP3. .ut

tries
encourage professional
competence „hiie gi.in,
p.,,,,.,,

;t

"^"^"^^

—ore.

SES aces provide
career civil servants
a number of
protections against
politically motivated
action

And ,et, taKen as

a whole,

the emphasis of the
SBS has

been on «a.ing the
.ureaucrac. responsive to
political leadership rather than on
developing a valuable

achxeve broad public enas.
ends

resource to

Th» crc
The
SES ^
does nothing to reduce
the numbers or layers
of political appointees
at the top of
the bureaucracy.
Consequently, the most
1
responsible
positions remain closed to
career officials. It
removes
from career executives
the right to appeal
decisions that
reassign them to less
responsible work, reduce their
pay,
and separate them from
the SES.
It institutes a bonus
system
whrch may foster sycophancy
rather than independent
judgment
and disciplined skepticism.
It does little to prevent
those
executives who have served one
Administration at senior
levels from being shoved aside
by the next, further discour-

aging initiative and attenuating
institutional memory.

ment,"'pp! 562-63!'''

''""^ °* Confidence

At

in Govern-

•
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~tte.

.0 ..e .roaa p..,,.
,„,,,,3,

^^^^^
Political acceptance
or such a notion
of
n^.remains a major
obstacle.

-art Of the Carter
Administration promise was
made to
women and minority
qrounc,
P^^^^^-g to increase their
^
proportions
the higher levels
of rne
the civil
civil service.
Veteran
preference was identified
as the .a,or obstacle
to achieving
greater representativeness,
and proposals were
made to change
xn Significant ways.
Veterans' .roups and
their congressional supporters won a
major victory when veteran
preference
was eliminated only in
the SES
.t the feeder levels,
os-13
to 15, there was no
change in preference rules.
And yet
even without Congressional
timidity on this issue,
the Carter
Administration appears not to
have taken its own promises
seriously, by rejecting key
affirmative action recoMnendations of the Personnel
Management Project. ^ Undoubtedly,
the Administration decided
that affirmative action
•

m
.

.

was too

controversial an issue and
opposition to changes in veteran
preference too intense to risk
defeat of their bill
Thus
representative administration in
terms of women and minority
group members was not a concern,
making administration more
representative of a managerial outlook
.

was.

"°"ard, "Civil Service Reform: A
Jv^LJ;^''"''?
Woman's Perspective," Public Administration
Rev?ew
Revi
M
ew 38, No.
4 (July/August 1978) :305-309.

Minor,-

^

in the carter
Administration the
emphasis on ..„ana
»ent.. transited
into an emphasis
on.

^--ation.

oiitioaioontri:

.h.. „.,h Heco.s
cogent re.ar.in,

oT

.he
N^xon .a.rnrstration.s
concentration on management
stii:
-..s tr.e,- ..however
apoiiticai the management
concept mi.ht
seem rn theor,,
operating in the government
context o.
Washington it could be
nothing hut

poUtical.-l
approach to securing
responsible administration

win

problems of continuity
and change.
If carter's emphasis
on management was not
new, his

application of particular
motivation theories to
public
administration was. Both
Carter's 1978 State

of the Union

address and his message to
Congress transmitting the
Civil
service Reform bill made
the assertion that senior
managers
.n government "lack the
incentives for first-rate
performance
that managers in private
industry have. "2
seeking a
remedy for the senior civil
servants' "inadequate motivation," Carter/campbell assumed
that higher pay is the primary
incentive for executives. rui
For tne
the f^r<=^
rirst time, a ma]or civil

m

•""Heclo,

S^orrxVAugust

A Governm ent of Stranaers

r>

»i

7=;

'Refolds'

^^^t^^^^'^^'^^^^^
5Hblic_MEin^^

^sTAy/

IsrsuTs-TlL

"Message on Civil Service Reform."
transm.^ti:^^.^^''^'''
transmitted
to Congress on March 2, 1978,
in U.S., CoAqress
House, Conmiittee on Post Office
and Civil Servic^ rivi^

Pf^Ji^^-^5^t_of_l^^
Congress, 2nd session,
197

87~^7Too:

'
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through t.e pereo^ance
appraisal.
Pa.X .o.entzen,
P.esio. ..e
..e ori,i„.
app.oac. .ea.
The bonus system was
based on Taylorism
^dyiorism, th.
the economic man,
rational man, going back
to the
<-iie 1900 's
s, .n^
and private
e^e...! one ,la.in, irony
is t.at the SKS is
base, on the .yth rather
than the reality of
private enterprise. Another is that
individuals who should have
Known
better failed to comprehend
the unique problems and
challenges Of motivating senior
public executives.
What are the implications
of making the dollar
the
primary motivator of senior
civil servants?
•

'

Pirst, many

executives deeply resent the
approach because it conveys
message that the executives
are not working hard enough.
Many executives feel they
are working to their capacity
already. 2 a GS-18 expressed
his feeling
this way,

a

"The

reforms are based on crass
materialism and fail to recognize
the performing professional
in nonmaterial
ways.

a professional supergrade
civil servant.

bonuses.

I

I

work as

do not work for

do my work in a professional top
quality fashion

-Senior Executive Service, Hearings,
1981,
1981.

I

p.

59.

^Noted by interviewee in 0PM, Washington,
D.C., August

3
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txve Sloths were
true.

second,

e^pHasis on „oneta.,
awards i„px,.3
t.at
competitive behavior is
bett^-r
better than cooperative.
Because
awards are iar.e and
li.i.ed, competitive
rather than
cooperative behavior is
encouraged, .orent.en
observed that
special monetary
recognition "tends
tends to
tn place
m
an additional
Prciu. on seX.-a,,randi.in„
.„e first- behavior
which is
destructive o. cooperative
tea. wor.... 2 Kven
though .an.,
perhaps most, executives
are not primarily
motivated by
promises of bonuses, when
they see that many
competent
rndividuals receive no
rewards, or perceive
that awards are
not fair, then morale
suffers and ill-win is
created
competitive behavior may
lead to a variety of
"bureaupathic-.
responses that are dysfunctional
in terms of the goals
of
the SES.
In particular, exaggerated
competition may undermine professional objectivity;
hinder the objective reporting
°^J^^ts^^specially when they are negative;
encourage the
'

Initia;°^:::?iL"s^""cha"^gI?^%": llf.'^''
^Senior Executive Service, Hearings,
1981,

p.

44.

Modern_Organ^^ (New York:
Alfred r\nonf°''lt^ir''"'r°'''
1961).
See
ali^^ederick
c"rThFyer's
"rUr^i Q
Performance Appraisal: A^Policy
Disaster ""publfo'r"
10, no. 1 (1981) -20t^Tl- ^^^ii:?-^^£sonnelJ^l^^
^
Lok

LesL'nTflFf^^^

and th;
'^"^^^^ Sectors," The Bureau crat

8? NO
3 ?Fa?i 19?Qrfr??'^f
1979):16-25 for provocative critiques of~^
nP^fo;^,:
performance appraisals and their

consequences.

176

hiding of mistakes;
qive rise
ric^ ^to a variety
give
of perverse
performance measures^es, and
anr^ h.-^.^
hinder communication
The.e is in the SES
.efor„ ana in the
^u^ti.ications
usea to achieve it the
aou.ie-ea.ea presumption
that higher
civil servants are
he.i^ =
best heia
accountable by external
checks
ana b. appeals to
their possessive
e,ois„.

it is one o. the

v.via lessons of
post-Worla War IX ^erica
ana particularly
post-Watergate that though
yn external
external r~h^
checks may be necessary
they are neither always
desirable nor sufficient
for
insuring responsible
aaministration. External
technical
Checks carried to the
extreme, like exaggerated
competition
-y create dysfunctions. More importantly, they
may hinaer'
the aevelopment of a
personal sense of responsibility
in the
public servant. Legal ana
technical checks can be
subvertea;
one's conscience may be the
harder taskmaster.
In his provocative piece
on "Official Liberality,"
Richard A. Chapman argues that
"conscience is something that

grows and depends upon
socialization.

If we tamper with the

official's socialization process
either before or after entry
into the public service
then we
.

.

.

development of the official conscience

shall be affecting the
.

"^

Clearly, the

emphasis placed by the SES upon pay
incentives ana measurable
performance standaras will affect the
aevelopment of official
conscience. Will SES affect it in ways
that are desirable?

.Richard
.

A. Chapman,

—

"Official Liberality," Public
'^^^

Administration 48 (Summer 1970) :135.

Will the emphasis
upon
pon ext^r-r^^i
.
external accountability
dull the
conscience to val.es of
p..Uc .o.alit. ana the
spi.it to
qualities Of imagination
ana courage, will
motivational
techniques that stress
inaiviaual monetae,
.ewaras aiscoura^e
xn the Official
conscience a con^itment of
service to a
broaa puMic interest
ana pn.lic values,
.he Carter/Camphell
response would undoubtedly
-Ly De
be no,
no but
hnt- how can
one be sure
without asking the questions.
Certainl, the problem of
the
pay cap on federal
executives should be remeaiea.
certainly
executives shouia receive
compensation approaching
comparabxlxty to their counterparts
in the private sector.
Equity
and the public interest
demana such a response.
Yet the
approach to developing an
official conscience compatible
with responsible administration
will emphasize the personal
satisfaction of contributing one's
professional skills to
achieving public purposes ana
the aignity of public service.
Finally, the central features
of SES suggest
that its

creators assumea the road to
responsible public administration to be technical and instrumental
rather than
political

and purposeful.

Wallace Sayre's criticism of administrative

reform in the late 1940s remains
relevant today:
"At a time
when the urgency, difficulty, and
complexity of governmental

performance are daily increasing

...

the public service

becomes steadily more dependent upon a cold,
impersonal,
rigid quantification of human ability and
worth in public

.

Pre.en.. ..e
^^^^

se.ve.. p.,po3es tie.
to poXic, ,oals.2
carte.-s
emphasis on pay and
bonuses for outsf.n^^
outstanding performance
and
tnreats of removal from
the qpq f„
P""-^ performance
suggests
that his Administration
did not understand
"that truly
."ective public administration
.s. above all,
dependent
upon effective political
action at the policy
level "3
Neither did the Carter
Administration understand
that
effective public administration
also requires political
leadership which inspires
and communicates a
sense of dignity
AS several interviewees
commented, the start to
restoring
confidence in government and
morale to public employees
is
for political Officials
to take the lead in
recognizing the
contribution of senior executives
and educating the public
to that effect.
Responsible public administration
is developed from the "stuff" or
of political
r^nlirir^^i leaders,
^
not managers.
Taken together these implications
suggest that the
i

^

''^^^"^P^
Purpose''"^Pnh?.-n\H^^''^'."^^^
PHMj^_AdjIlinistration Review
nri
ed.

'

Technique Over
R

(Spring 1948)

Seidman, Politics^osition,
(J^^Z^'^f
(New
York: Oxford uHT^^i?^Ttrp-ri¥¥7^9 and Power

Servicef^'p! 294!^"

WTT^

History of the United StatP.

:

137

3rd

r.-..n

s
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P-.ar. .auure

of the Carte,
refo^ers was the
^ispU .
opportunity to reco,„..e
senior civii servants
' '^'"^"^
national resource and
to
'° -strtutionalize
important public
values at the crucial
nexus between
politics
-Li-nics and ad
^
administration
IT
u
tion.
Hugh
Heclo correctly
v
correct!
claims that "the civil
servanfs value lies in
his or her capacity
to respond
-.ectivel. to a succession
o. different political
leaders
n. to Offer a service
that is .ore positive
and independent
than mere passive
"2
obedience
xence.
to some extent the
SES
recognizes this resource
by creating a corps of
senior
•

"

•

•

executives with demonstrated
managerial and professional
competence. On the other
hand, the Carter
Administration.
en-phasis on
political-managerial control
and the prominence
Of competitive
performance evaluation in
the SES do not bode
well for the provision
of objective, independent
judgment.
Furthermore, although the
SES structure may
increase the
possibilities Of senior
executives serving politicians
of
all partisan colors,
the necessary ingredient
for this to

occur fully-a political
consensus that top bureaucrats
are
valuable resources— is not
yet present. 3

^Hugh Heclo, Government of
Strangers

Government?"

P.'

f^^f^^"-*'

,

p.

246.

"^he Crisis of Confidence in
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It is possible that
within
xtnin thP
^
the SES framework
profes-

s.onaxs

.

p.,,,, ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^^

create a govern.entwi.e-corps
co^itted to public service
values, as Chester
.ewian. cXai^s.^
However, the concentration Of tKe SHS on
™ana,eriai concerns,
economic incentives
an. measurable performance
misses the chance to
he.in now tl
systematically socialise
career officials into a
service
Characterised by a public
service philosophy^ rather
than
market motives. Perhaps,
ironically, economic
pressures
wrll force future changes
in that direction.
Then the
consequences of reform may more
closely match its promise.
DO the British have
anything to teach in this
regard^
IS reform of the British
civil service on the path
to
creating a more responsible
public administration?
It is to

these questions that we shall
turn next.

^Chester A. Newland, "Professional Public
Executives
executives
and Public Administration Agendas,"
p. 24.
Marshall E. Dimock, "The Criteria and
Objectives
r.f
uf?^*"
of T,
Public
Administration," in The Frontiers of Public
Administration, eds. John M. Gaus, Leona rd
Marshall E. Dimock (Chicago: The University D. White, a nd
of Chicago Press,
1936), pp. 132-33; Marshall E. Dimock, A
Philosophy
Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); and of
Rosamund M. Thomas, The British Philosophy of
Administration
Limited, ly/S), for a discussion of-a
Dohl'fc"L^:?,?H2"'\'?f°"P
putiiic service philosophy.

CHAPTER

IV

THE FULTON COMMITTEE:
MINISTERTar
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER AwIcK

As was discovered in
examining United states
civil
service reform, it is
difficult to attribute
reform effort s
to any single cause
or group of causal factors,
but it is
possible to extricate, from
a complex assortment
of

political, social, and
economic forces, the
predominant
trends which both give
rise to reform and define
a responsible public administration
and which, consequently,
shape
the reform's recommendations
and actual administrative
Changes. Before examining
the Fulton Co^nittee
recommendations, then, it is crucial
to discuss, in some detail,
the
political environment or context
in which the Fulton Committee Report was conceived and
the major criticisms
of the

pre-Fulton civil service,

chapter V

will then describe the

report's proposals and discuss the
responses to them.
The Pre-Fulton Civil Service
To understand the reformers' criticisms
and to provide
a basis for comparison to the
post-Pulton service, it is

important to describe briefly the structure
of the pre-Fulton
non-industrial. Home Civil Service. After the
NorthcoteTrevelyan Report established the civil service on
the prin-

ciples of open competition, division of labor between
"intellectual" and "mechanical" tasks, and a unified civil
181
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—

these s.exetax
p.,neip,es.
e

-a

B. ™ost accounts,
the B.Uish
reacea t.e cu.^.nat.on
o.

st.uct^aX
development „,th t.e
endorsement o. tHe
.ort.cote-..eveX,an
principles by the Tomlin
Royal Co^nission of
lS2s-,,n
-„e p.e-Pulton, moae.n
civil service was
cHaracteri.ea
by a .i,ia structure
aiviaea into departmental
ana treasury
or general classes,
.he departmental classes
were composed
Of lobs restricted to
one department, which
controlled the
conditions of entrance and
service in those ,obs.
19SS,
the 1400 departmental
classes ranged in size
from

m

20,000 or
in the Tax Inspector
and Tax officer classes
in Inland
Revenue to just a handful
in the highly specialized
inspector classes.

-re

The general classes, on
the other hana, were those
classes common to all
departments, whose conditions
of
entrance and employment were
determined by the Treasury.
Those classes responsible for
the management of the service
were the Administrative,
Executive, and Clerical classes.
The scientific classes were
divided into the Scientific Officer Class, the
Experimental Of ficer Class, and the
scientific Assistant Class. There
was also the Works Group
of Professional Classes for
technical officers, engineers,
architects and draughtsmen, as well
as Legal, Medical,

Accountant and Economist Classes and
other technical and
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specialist cxasses
in IQfip

T

- H^ve

^

„Mc.

co^p.isea .V ,..erai
classes
^-Labses in all

m

_

ng

ana Speciaiis.
ciasses,
separa. an. 3subordinate to the
Administrative Class
Class, a:
th
.
although
the higher
Executive qrade=! of(-=„
often performed tasks
indistinguishable
from those in the
lower Administrative
grades and the
specialists often had
educational and experience
background
Of comparable quality.

Bach class had its own
grading structure and
pay seal e
and each civil servant
was recruited into a
particular cla ss
depending on his educational
background. Por example,
the
Administrative Class was
graded into Permanent
Secretary
Deputy secretary. Under
Secretary, Assistant
Secretary,
Principal, and Assistant
Principal while the Executive
Class
was divided into Higher
Executive Officer, Senior
Executive
Officer, Chief Executive
Officer, and Principal
Executive
Officer grades. Direct
entrants into the Administrative
Class were normally university
graduates of 22 or 23 years
of age, while recruits to
the Executive Class and
Clerical
Class were 18 year old
school-leavers with
'

"A-levels" and

16 year old school-leavers with
Q-levels" respectively. 1
Recruitment to the Administrative
class in the preFulton service was primarily
through promotion from other
"""^"^^ *° ^^'^ General Certificate of Education^ 'rrcprn^^examinations, usually taken at
age ?6
Recru^ti"to^.-^^''?^
Executive
class must have passed at
=^
lelst two rrp Advanced
level examinations, usually Lken at
age 18
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classes and direct(about, a 40-60

<=>t^+->^„

' examination of university
graduates
«Lfc;b

t-^+--;^

"
•

•

direct entrants

.ost pro.otees fro™
other classes, entrance
to the
Assistant i-rincipal
Pn'rif^^nai
grade was tJi!
by one or
of ^^,rs
two examination
methods. Method I
consistPrt
consisted r.f
of a written qualifying
examination in general
subiects
bjects, followed
fr.ii„
a ^
.-i

by, for those
successful, an interview
and a written examination
in academic

subjects Of the candidate.
s choice covering the
main honors
courses at the universities.
Method XI, which was
reserved
for candidates with
a first or second
class honors degree
consisted of a qualifying
examination similar to that
in
Method X. But instead of
further academic

examinations, the

Method II candidates were
tested by a team of assessors
in a
-ries Of intelligence and
psychological tests and interviews
designed to discover tne
the candidate's
c-anfli/i = ^^i
reasoning power,
maturity, composure, and other
"soff
criteria.

Neither

examination method was designed
to secure a candidate with
any specific body of knowledge.
Both were intended to
identify the intellectually
superior candidate in any
academic field.
Of those entering the civil
service directly from the
universities in the years 1948-1956,
78 percent came from
Oxford and Cambridge. The percentage
from Oxbridge increased
to 85 in 1957-1963.

The proportion of successful candidates

from fee-paying independent or boarding
schools went up from
31 percent to 37 percent, while those from
government
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supported schools

w(=.n+-

^--"t

At the same timo

to 30 percent.

proportion of those
successful candi
dates "who took
degrees
egrees in m
classics went up from 21 r.^
P^J^cent
94 percent,
to 24
while
xxe social
o
social sciences
fell from
9/i
^rom 24
percent to
1 T

m

•

•

-

percent

™a..e™a....„.,

3.en.3.

an.

re^a^ne. a.^ost „e,.,,,.,.,
^

....^.^..^

^^^^^^^

^

the PuX.on Co^,,,ee
appeals to ,ave witnessed
an upsurge
social an. aca.e^io
excXusiveness of t.e
.a^.nistrative Class.

-

once a member of

a civil

service class, the civil
servant's pay, responsibilities,
and promotion patterns
were
^^^^^^^^P--i^by the Class. Por example,
policy-maKin,

~tiS:%\L\"n'?;6f^Tl?5^^

ment to the Civil Service,"

^pvj^vtf.'
ser^ic^lntr^ncf eL'"""^"'" " ^^''"'^^e

""^^^^it-

civil
successes on
letter to the iTthor
^" ^
ntXrTl"°cV''^
relevant factors might include
" " ^"99^=ts that
^^^^^
II tJpe^exa'L'^ ^

Ca^ridqe°tenr?^^'^','""?^

fr^

elsewl^erf

tSS ^

-PeciallTofMethod
"""^^

students from Oxford and
^^"^^^^^^ admission than

studenL^^L'%^^nsiSe"'^^hTc^^lfle^eic%"^L"\^'c^?etr^'^^L
"''^"''^'^ t-"^
bl morf rnformeS
aboit'th; r^"''^"
=^^<^"1 heads of Oxbridge colleges are
e^ aL
''"''^ ^^^^^ officials, and Oxbridge collegls
tend^n^H
^'^"'^^^
Officers for each
coneae ..It "^H^ """^
^'^^ ^"^"^ university as
elsewhere!
^""^ constantly told they are superior
n^v'^f*'"''''"^^."''"
may be more at ease in the civil service
consequently able to give of their best interview and

r
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and administrative
duties
uries we^r^
were -hv.
the prerogatives of
the
.a..„,3t„...e ana K.ecu..ve
cXasses. Spee.aX.s.
„Ho .ou,..
.roaaer administrative
responsibilities Had to
transfer to
one Of these classes.
However, .ove.ent fro»
Specialist
Classes to Administrative
or Kxecutive Classes
was rare due
to restrictive procedurf:^^;
P.ocedures. Promotion within
class followed
the established grades.
For the Administrative
Class
training of the new entrant
followed the generalist
concept,
that it consisted chiefly
of short tours of duty
in a

variety of different jobs
during
period. Prom 1963, short

a two

year probationary

training courses were conducted
at
the centre for Administrative
Studies. Even after the
probation period, relatively rapid
movement from post to post
was common for members of the
Administrative Class. Employment in the service constituted
a career, although often
the
official thought in terms of career
in class rather than
career in the service. ^ Thus,
civil service employment
afforded the higher civil servant,
for example, great
security not only from arbitrary
dismissal but also from

competition from members of other classes.
In the pre-Fulton civil service,
the Treasury's role
in the management of the service
was of central importance.

At the ministerial level this was
suggested by the fact that
-'Great Britain,

CivilService, Cmnd

.

Committee on the Civil Service, The

3638

(June 1968), Vol. 1,

the Committee 1966-1968," p. 65.
F.C. Report.

"Report"^

Hereafter referred to as

.
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2!T

""""

----

°^
Cnancellor
^-Lior of
o£ the Exchequer
was the senior t..
Treasury

T

-a..o.,

..e Pe^anen. Sec.e.r.

... ........

p.esM.e tnan Pe.„anent
Secretaries
ments.

More

^-r»

^'^'^

the si.e,

Minister

y

ot.er depart-

-s

responsible for

pa„ recruitment

poiic., ana structure
of t.e eivii
service.
Xn addition, it had
control of the budget
ana
expenditures of the departments
and overall economic
coordination and Planning.
Given its financial and
personnel
responsibilities it is not
surprising that the treasury
„as
at the center of most
political controversies ^
.nd in the
postwar years it has been
the target of much
criticism
(which will be discussed
later)
.

T£^^iona]_Responsib^^
RumblTngs^^oF^Change

"

Also important to understanding
the dynamics of reform
is an appreciation of the
pressures being placed on the
traditional notion of ministerial
responsibility in the preFulton service.
The doctrine, in its idealized
form,
claims that the minister is
completely and fully answerable
to Parliament for the
actions of his department and the
actions taken by his civil servants
whether or not he has
^See Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky,
The Private

^P^^^^^^'^^i^^

(Berkeley: UnI;eFiTtF-5T^lifordiscussion of the role

and p^eer'of'the Se^^ury!^^"^"'

-
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authorized them

t^^

4-i_

h
IS obliged to

rec^irrr.

satisfaction o. Parliament
.e

"^^^""^

servant'

^"""-^^

^

-vii

in return for this
protection from political
pre °»uxe,
the civil <^(^rw^r.4- ^

J

"""^"^

""""" ^--^

—

less Of tthe m.nrster.s
views or party
affiliation, once
policy has .een aeter^ine.
.y the minister it is
the responsr.rlity of the civil
servant to carry it out
whether he
l^^es it or not. While
policy is .ein, formulatea
it is the
auty Of the civil
servant to provide to
the minister all the
.nfonuation available
regarding the issues,
even if it
conflicts With the minister's
Known view. Anonymity
or
confidentiality allows civil
servant, "i-r.
servants
to give their full
and
frank opinion to the ministerminister.
Information does not only
include "technical" cuvice
advice out
^
but political
nom-^„
advice
as
•

"It*

,

•

well;
is the Official's duty
to protect the minister
from his

it

"enemies"^ or from potential
adverse political repercussions.
The inevitable growth of
administrative discretion may
produce tensions in the relationship
between the minister
and his civil servants. But
the tensions may
be eased some-

what as the official comes to
know the minister's position
r»,-,^„=
George

Chapman, British Government Observed
(London(London.
Aft''" and
Allen
Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 38;

^^'^ "^"^^ servant was characterized in
this war?n''^^^-°5
^"terview with a retired civil servant who
had spent
soent most
™n=t of her career as a
higher civil servant.
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on the issues and
his approach to
problems.
The higher rank of
the more closely
with thrmin"^!"*
ftJ^ ^-q^ainted
feels
himself at Hber(-„
^r®"^ ^ ™in<3, the more he
tion of the policy
'^'^^ detailed
appUca'"°'^'f^
rank would ?hin/it bu?
"^atevff
ii^^
any step inconsistent comp^M^jrii?--"^''^''^^ ^o take
with
it
tI i.
step to be imperatively
thought such a
„
reoii;»H
difficulties and ask ior
represent his
i^struc^ions"?"^"^

-us,

in the traditional
view, the civil servant
has no real
power.
eritchley, as a higher
civil servant himself,
argued that the civil
servant s ..uthority is
delegated to
hxm and may, at the
co™.and of Parliament,
be instantly withdrawn." Echoing oale,
Critchley claims that the
civil
servant "speaks, not with
his own, but with his
master's
voice.
He is literally a
nonentity. Pew persons
outside
government circles know the
name of even one permanent
head

of a Department.

Constitutional theory demands
that he shall

be voiceless. "2

Behind this traditional view
of the duties and responsibilities assumed by the civil
servant is a prescription
for the character and
abilities co,™ensurate with
those
duties.
Sir Edward Bridges (later
Lord), former Permanent
Secretary to the Treasury and
Head of the Civil
Service,

believes that the qualities of
the best administrator
include the power of rapid analysis,
the capacity to
^H. E
"^^'^^r civil Service of Great Britain
(Great Britain:
loreat
:i
Oxford University Pr ess, 1941),
pp. 38-39;

'^'^^t^^ey' The Civil service Toda y
Victor rAit"
Gollancz, Ltd., 1951), p. 86^

(London:'

^
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recognize the essential
points in
.

.

^

.
situation,
a sense of
•

•

^^^^^^^

.-UPS, t.e capacity

to

tMn.

'

aheaa, tHe capacity
to

oia "
even balance between
tween orin.,
principle
and expediency,
and the
personal qualitif^c,
Arr,
-ties Of imagination
and perseverance
and
leadership.
Thp m'.r-Ji
civil servant is to
bring to his job
not
only a sense of ver^nr^^l a^^personal integrity and
honesty but also a
sense of fairness and
justice to guide him in
his dealings
w.th individuals and
groups, further, a
breadth of judgment
w-ll help him to see
problems from a larger
perspective, to
arrive at a balanced
judgment in the society's
interest
Balance and detachment
are also achieved
in the traditional

View by the application
of consistent principles
and rules
by the moderation of
radical ideas, by a liberal
education
and frequent job rotation.
Infusing this traditional
view

is the civil servant's
ethic of public service,
service in the national
interest,

"selfless

accepting constant abuse

from the very public they
serve, as a function of
their
profession. "
It follows that in this view
of responsibility the
administrator can be characterized
as a non-specialist, a

generalist, although by all means
a professional, a

Edward Bridges, "Administration: What
Is It' And
How r^J'^^l
The Making of a n Administrator?
ed A D,''"''
''?m''""'"
P^^sire^^ManchesterrManchester Unive-rsity Press,
ttse^:
tor
tor,

"

fn'^^hf^rr^''";
m
Th^Ma kmg of

Responsibility of the Administraan Administrator ed. A. Dunsire, p.83.
,

—

-

aoes not .se the
tools ac.ui.e.
professional training o.
a law.e. engineer,
or scientist
example, ..t abstract
.no„Xe.,e acquired
t.rou,H the
experience o. aoin, ana
o.se.vin, t.ose ai.eaa,
s.iiiea in
administration, acMevea
throu.K frequent ,o.
rotation
Bertrana Russell nicely
captures this point of
;

'

view:

u.e!/r,^oTi::^°L:?:jrs:^,:L\p-^i-

^

becomes more organized
"^"""^^
a m!
power in a grea? orqanization
Position
^
of
Of Ability /namelyr^hat^MchV"-''^^
"'""'"^ ^^^^
ifcallea
administrative:
it makes very Ut??e afff^'^"'''''^
-^^^^-'-e
difference what
the matter is th^+Skill required at the
^he k^nd of
man who can organize top'^?^^^'°"
'^'^
suocessfillv^Het''^
f^"^"
Lancashire cotton trade
^^i'* ^he
u
''^ S"<=<=essful if he
tackles the air defencL nf t
London, the exploration
Central Asia or th^
of
°' """'^^
Columbia to EngLnd
^"ti^'h
Por'^^"
""'^"takings he
"ill require no kno^leage
^wxeuge or
of cotton,
cotto^'°"'
no knowledge of
aeria] wRrf^^^ ^
"^^^^^^^ance with forestry or
nlJigatlon
His ^^iT
in thf sev^raf Lses'^'re^u^rr^r^'""'" positions will,
^^^^^ several kinds of
skill, but his ski?l n-T^
not depend upo^n^specia^^l.e^S
kn::?:.^ge^^%\^^^th;s\^'
happens,
as organizations increase
in size
th^t IL
°'
-re'and'mor: to^r^rthe''
•

r

h^nds'o^

^

^

^r^^

The abstract skill of the
generalist administrator partially
lies in weighing and synthesizing
the advice of the specialists, balancing the interests
involved, and judging
the

impact on the public interest.

Russell, Education_ai^^ the Social Order
n^f
P- 240; quoted in The
M^k?t
L^'''^."^'''-"'
Miki:iig_of_^7i_Adr^^
ed. A. Dunsire,
xiii^iv.
rinnHor.

pp.

'

In practical termc;

i-u^

^"^^ t'^^diUonalists
saw the
potentially best
administrators
strators a,
as those who
receive first
c ass honors
decrees at

,

Classical subjects,

the first olass
universities in
.s the ISS. Hacaula.
Heport .a.es clear

th^;^,L\"?^^r,^eXf-i-^le

the Civil servant
of

while still young; bSt
°"
"^""es
i t is af.o
should have recei;ed
*hat
he
the best tL '^^'f^?^^
nost finished education
liberal, the
tha^ A;
We think it desirable
"^"""^ country affords,
?hat^
considerable number of
civil servants of the
the
taken the first degrle
^r^rL'^rn^^^
We believe that men
Cambridge,
who
,^^
and twenty, in studies have Lgaged '-"^
two
^?
which h^,,!'
with the business of
^™«=<3iate connexion
"°
any
^"'^ °^ ""ich the
effort is merely to open profet!
?o ?f
the mind, will
'° ""^^^^
gener^^ly'be
every profession, suDerfor%^found^°in
business
of
i
19, devoted themselves
18
or
eraselves to the special
studies of their
calling. 1
•

^

'

It Should be noted that
the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report took
some exception to this
view by opening the
possibility of
competitive exams based on more
specialised studies in the
social sciences. The Report
again proved to be ahead of
its
time, as critics of the
civil service in the post-World

War II period questioned
the lack of specialist training
for
Civil service administrators.
Postwar criticisms, of course,
did not stop with training but
attacked the whole traditional
notion of ministerial and civil
service
responsibility.

That the notion of ministerial
responsibility was in
for a bumpy ride during the
1960s and into the
1970s and

1980s can be seen in a number of
case studies of
Ip.C. Report, Vol. 1, Appendix
B, pp. 119-21.

—

administrative decic?inn t«=v

1

Perhaps the crichel
oown
the Clearest
iXZ.stration o. the
,ro„in,
Press^res .e.n, p.acea
on the traa.t.ona.
..e„ o.

"

.-es
.

ana „h.ch haa .een
co„p.,sorU. ac^uirea .n

h. the

Mr

Passea into the hanas
o. the Ministry of
..ricuXt.re. .,ter
the war a numh(=>T- r^^^
-p-,
of farmers
were promisea by the
Ministry a
Chance to bia for the
land, but the promise
was never
honorea. ^t the sa^e
ti^e the Ministry of
Agriculture
refused to resell
resell! it 4-^
to a Lxeutenant-Commander
Marten, heir
of the original owner.
InstpsH 1-1,=
instead,
.
the mMinistry
decided to rent
the land as a model far™
to a "tenant from
some aistance
away whom they had chosen
in a rather arbitrary
fashion.-^
Marten, after attempting
unsuccessfully
-i

+-

•

to secure

redress for his grievances
through Parliamentary channels,
organized local political
pressure upon the Minister of
Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale,
who agreed to ask for a
"^^^ Vehicle and
Public Administration

Genera^AlfSr-lomf |;fW^"''
in Britain

'^'^^P"^"'

"

BriarSedg;mo?ir«|^^
Stoughton Limited IMHuf
Of power struggM;

L^^

=

i

"3-90;

'?" (London: Hodder and

^^r^S^^J^-^J-^-^^^

144^^^''''^'

p.

Representative and Responsible Government

,
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.ouna no ..ace

....er. o. co^.pUon,
...
was highly critical
of some nf
^
^h=
of the decisions
that had been
taken, the methods
used ar>^
^
used,
and j-v,
the ubehavior
of five of the
cxvil servants involved
,„ho were named,
•

•

xt noted that
of the decisions had
been made with inaccurate
information and Chastised the
civil servants for
deliberately
attempting to "mislead
applicants
PPiicants for
fn^ tenancies
into thinking
that their applications
had received due
consideration
When, in fact, they had
not, and for having a
hostile
attitude toward Marten,
"this attitude being
engendered
solely by a feeling of
irritation that any member of
the
public should have rne
4-^
the temerity
t-omf^r--n-w to
oppose or even to question the acts or decisions
of officials
j.ciais ot
of a
^ government
or
state department!""'"
.

-ny

•

v-^j-i-

When the report was published
Dugdale played down the
affair and accepted full
responsibility for
the actions of

his officials.

The political heat continued
to such an

extent that five days later
Dugdale resigned and a committee
was set up to recommend discipline
for. the civil servants.
Marten was reimbursed costs and
given the opportunity to
purchase Crichel Down.
The implications of Crichel Down for
ministerial

responsibility are clear.

In the first place,

raises the question of administrative
power, as
""Ibid.,

pp. 144-45.

the affair
a few

career
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officials acted arbitrariixr = ^
bxtrarily and unjustly
against an indi vidual to further
departmental policy in
the na.e of the
Ministry and with the full
°^
Cabinet and House
1
of
Co.r„ons.
.o Xon.er can a
Minister .e intimately,
nor
perhaps even vaguely
f^Tniiiov with
^^^^y i^amiiiar
i-ho large
lav-^^
wxizn the
quantities of
work, much of It
it technical,
tpnhr.i^..i
his department.
First,
Ministers average only
two years
vearc,
n the
4-k
y rwo

"

•

r

m
•

,

.

m

same job. Second,
not only must a Minister,
as Head of a Department
of state
attend to the demands
of administration but
he or she
remains a member of
Parliament. Thus the
Minister must
attend to his constituency
and party responsibilities
Third, the Minister, as
a member of the
Cabinet, is increasmgly involved in inter-departmental
discussions.
-;

Hence,

even when a Minister has
the inclination and energy,
they
are spread too thinly to
have sufficient time to
be involved
in every decision.^ it
is not realistic to
believe that
Ministers can be aware of each
decision taken in their name.
Given the size, complexity,
and positive nature of
contemporary government, it is
clear that Ministers must
rely on civil service
officials for advice. Advice from
senior civil servants most often
takes
the form of a

^Chester,

"The Crichel Down Case," p. 388.

T^^e_Private_Gov^
of Public
Money '^''130^''^^^^'^^^^^'Tesse
Blackstone, "MlHI^t^?^:
^f%^l^°'
f^ir^.Jid
^nd r^Civil Servants
delivered
Memorfa^ Lecture, London, no " date, for at the Gaitskeil
a discussion of the
bi!rd^n!
°" Ministers and the resources available to
cone
cope w^h
with their jobs.
,

"-iste..3 .r.e.in,.

...

..^^^.^^

^^^^^^^^

xs strictl, for
internal consumption,
because it reveals
as
explicitly as possible
t.e basis o. „.at t.e
aepart.ent „ants
ana (o.ten, its strate.,
,or ,ettin, it.^ But
even „itH t.e

best of intentions ana
the best analytic
capabilities, the
brief is an editing 30b.
By the time the
Minister is
briefed most optionQ
h^tro been
k^^
Prions have
circumscribed and most
decisions settled by the
civil servants, .hus,
Crichel Oo„n
showea that Placing
responsibility solely in the
Minister is
neither fair to the Minister
nor adequate protection
to the
citizen against arbitrary
government.
in the second place,

the Crichel Down investigation

was an attack on the principle
of anonymity. Officials'
actions were examined in detail,
names were named, and their
actions were criticized in an
official report and on the
floor of commons. Anonymity
had perhaps allowed frank
aiscussion, but at the expense of
individual
justice.

The

affair teaches that anonymity
is likely to allow civil servants to abuse their power and then
prevent disclosure of
that abuse.
In the third place, the affair
illustrates the power

of the civil service to pursue its
own policies.

It appears

that the civil servants closest to the
Minister continued
the policy of their predecessors despite
the fact that a new

^Ibid., p. 138.

2

Government had come into
nro power
power. ^
policy it appe..3 that
the

eivU

m
r

order to pursue thei
r

servants withHeX. in.o...
rma-

tion fro. the public
an. their Minister.
Thus the Crichel
Down episode suggests
that civil servants had
the power at
least for a while, to
frustrate the will of the
Oovern.ent
xn power (a theme to
be taken up .ore forcefully
by the
Labour Government of the
1960s) .
if administrators
were
not, then, the willing
servants of Ministers,
regardless of
their party, nor politically
neutral sources of information
and advice, now
how relevant
re^l f:^\r^n+- is 4--u
the concept of ministerial
responsibility?
,

Since the Crichel Down affair
it has been generally
agreed that a Minister will not
be held responsible for the
actions of his civil servants
(in the sense of being
expected to resign) where he had
no prior knowledge of them
or where the actions were contrary
to his known
policy.

At the same time, though civil
servants have more and more
been allowed or even encouraged to
take a public role,

anonymity of civil servants remains
the normal practice and
prescription. Where, then, does responsibility
lie?

The

affair is a pointed reminder that the theory
and practice of
ministerial responsibility is on a precarious
pedestal and

has led many critics to intensify their
questioning of
-^Ibid.,
2

pp. 393-94

.

Lewis A. Gunn, "Ministers and Civil Servants: Changes
in Wh itehall," Public Administration (Sydney) 26 (March 196
7)
79.
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Whether ministerial
responsiMXit. is an a.e.uate
aevice to
secure responsive
administration in contemporary

aemocrac,.

in addition to the
changing nature of
administration
illustrated by Crichel
Down, 4-u
y Crichpl nr^wr,
there were other changes
taking
Place in postwar Britain.
Economically, Britain was
going
through a period of decline.
its share of world trade
had
declined from 33% in 1900 to
22% in 1937 then to 15%
in 1962
From 1950 to 1954, British
exports had increased by
6%,
While those Of the European
Common Market countries
increased
by 76%; from 1955 to 1960
British exports increased by
13%,

common Market exports by 63%,
and from 1960 to 1962
Britain's exports increased 18%
while Common Market exports
grew by 50%.
1964 Britain's rate
^

m

of economic growth was

less than 4% per year, a rate
below any major European
country; the postwar policies of
the Treasury and the Bank
of England were widely questioned.
Not surprisingly, this
poor economic performance stirred
widespread self-castigation
and institutional criticism and invited
comparisons not only
with Europe but also with the United States.

Changes were also taking place in education which
were
to have an impact on society and the
civil service. Postwar
changes in education beginning with the Education Act
of

^Arthur Koestler, ed
Su icide of
Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1963), p. 10^;
.

,

a Na tion

(London:
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1944 that introduced
free ^""^^"^
public education and
continuing
,
through the 1963
19^;^ Robb.ns
d^uu
co^ittee on Higher
Education that
P.o.ptea the creation o.
new diversities ana
technical
schools lea to an
increase in the nu^ers
of students
entering and graduating
.ro„ universities and
polytechnic
colleges. The consequence
for the civil service
was
increased pressure to fina
places in the Aa^inistrative
Class for well-,ualif
ied university graduates
who were not
fro™ Oxbridge and to
re-evaluate the practices
making it
difficult for specialists
to enter the Executive
and .a.inistrative Classes.
•

socially, the country was
experiencing a perioa of
pessimism and self-criticism.
The reasons for this
malaise
are, undoubtedly, many
and complex.
it was partially due
to
the relative decline in
economic fortunes and, perhaps,
partially related to a sense
of declining empire, as the
war
and postwar period saw the
loss of overseas territories
in

the Middle-East, Africa, and
Asia, "the consequent loss
of
prestige and an open relegation
to second class power
status. "1 There was also a
changing value system which
affectea all sectors of society-political
parties, church,
busiiness, and education. Anthony
Sampson captures well this
ethos o f the early 1960s as it
relates to the civil service.

1.

"^^^.^^Iton Report: A Sociological

^X:^^;;'?ff'"^"'-^!?'_
Background
Analysis " Administration
,

Tr (SuJt^neri

9

70^1 81-82

.

aristocracy, pubUc school P^^^il^g^d values of
-dominate /o^.lZlnl
today ha^ffa-^.^r ""^^^^
stimulus, the Purposive
^"^^"^^ ^he
poJfcies anf
future which Britain i
"^^en eye on the
i^i^?
?ld ethos was -ulded
'''^^
""^^
^IJI
imperial machine. its by Se's^Slcce";
invincible
^"
stvle
?
to make big things
small, exciting things
seem
borlL
in the unconfident
fa-iUar:
but
context o?'t^r ^'^t'^'^^
ation-and the assumef
"^"^<3eP«cisuperforf
ty^hat' '"^^ "i^h itmerely succeeds in dispell?;^
li^K
curiosity and dulling
""""ng
the pragmatic outlook Spe^?Lnf ??ir""'
9roove-outlook,
are a 1 r?^;
with an age which suffers,
'^""P^"^
i^iiL t^ J Victorians,
an oppressive lack of
from
innnv^ft^^
fabric of the British ""°^^^i°n and zeal. The old
social and'^i?ticifh^?r'^has^fanef't"'''^ "^^^^-^ ^^s
failed to accommodate or
analyse the vast forces of
change which (wheSer ?hey
-.social
lik^Jt'or "°t)
no?f'°"
are changing
the face of the country.!

^

,

^

^

If the Sampson analysis
is

correct-that

a malaise, brought

on by the incongruency between
two competing values,
infused
all institutions and
leaders-then,
certainly, the civil

service and particularly the
higher civil service could not
escape unnoticed.
Similarly, Subramanian argues
that the basic elements
of the British administrative
system-the Administrative
Class, the dominance of the
all-rounder or amateur over the
specialist, anonymity of the civil
servant and the power of
the Treasury-were consequences of
the social and political
dominance of the landed aristocracy and
gentry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Although these elements
"continued undisturbed throughout a period of
expanding

franchise and mass democracy" in the late
eighteenth and

^Anthony Sampson, Ana tomy of Brit ain (London: Hodder
and Stoughton Limited, 1962), pp. 637-38T~
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early nineteenth
centuries,
19S0S,

t.e late 1950s ana
earl,

..tKe

discrepancy between
t.e elements o. t.e
a.^i.,.^nistratrve syste. a„a of
™ass society .aa beco.e
too ,larin, a1
Thus, it was wiaely
perceived that bureaucracy
was no lon,e r
representative of predominant
postwar attitudes or of
tho se
groups which had emerged
gea atter
aft^r the war as the
dominant
political force.
.3 Kingsley „aKes clear, if
pu.Uc aa™i„.stratxon is to remain
aemocratic, administrative
arrangements ™ust reflect the
character of the social
structure of
the nation.2 «any critics
believed that the time for
reform
was overdue.
Perhaps in response to this
national psychology of
pessimism and self-criticism,
perhaps in the more positive
sense of searching for solutions,
many people in the nation
turned their attention to
science and technology with the
hope that they would provide
an escape from Britain's
malaise.
Harold Wilson's often repeated
campaign theme of
1964 was that the "white heat of the
scientific revolutionwould be harnessed by Labour to
serve Britain.
Scientific
and business management techniques
applied to public administration were seen by many as a cure for
bureaucratic sluggishness and inefficiency. Many people were
adopting the
view of the Confederation of British Industries
(CBI) that

^Subramanian, "The Fulton Report," pp. 179, 183-85
2
.

215.

J. Donald Kingsley,

Representative Bureau cracy,
"
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••nu,neracy.

is as important
as Xiteracy.-l

.
many
true believers was
McHa^ara's Planning,
Programing,
Budgeting Syste™ (p.p.b.s.)
i„ the United- States
Defense
Department. The Pulton
Cor^ittee reported in 1968
at the
height Of this faith in
science and scientific
management, a
faith Shared by some key
committee members who
questioned
the efficacy of a notion
of responsibility
that valued

judgment over scientific
"objectivity."
g xternal Pressure; Critics
and Criticisms

These postwar social, economic,
and educational
Changes and the resulting
pressures on ministerial responsibility and the civil service,
although growing intense,
remained rather vague
vdyue.
Afi-^y all, it must
^
Atter
-:

4-

be remembered,

Britain's civil service remained
basically competent,
accountable, and honest (even Crichel
Down suggested no
criminal wrongdoing) and the object of
admiration
from

reformers in other countries, for example
the United States.
It was left up to journalists,
politicians,
and especially,

academics to give focus and specificity to
the amorphous
suspicions and to lead the assault on the higher
civil

service, a quite visible, but by no means helpless
"scape-

goat."

During the early 1960s, a string of books was

published expressing dissatisfaction with Britain's performance and position in the world and laying the blame solidly
^F.C. Report, Vol.

5

(2),

p.

509.
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on the civil service
mandarins.

Examples include The

edited hy „u,h Thomas
and especiaU.
.ho.as
Balch.s article, "The
.potheosis of the Dilettante"
in that
booK ,1,59);
^
^^^^^

Th^_,^^,^

_

Srmsh^overn^en^^

,1963,; suicide of a

Nation edited hy Arthur
Koestler (1963,; Micha;7^;;:;;;;;r'
The Stag nant Societ
ou„
(1964,
y
Ppi-o^ Shore's,
Peter
y ixao4),
g ntitled to Know
(1966); and The^^stem by Max
Nicholson (1967).! Each
was a
biting. Often bitter attack
on the civil service.
,

Brian Chapman held the view
"that British government
is unnecessarily handicapped
in dealing with the
problems of
the modern state by our
failure to revise archaic
procedures
and reform the policy-making

institutions; and that, further,

our tendency to disguise reality
by the use of myths [ministerial responsibility] has made
even the ordinary
management

of affairs more laborious than
it need be, despite the
strength and quality of the Executive
class. "^ Balogh was
more direct,
°^ British power cannot entirely be
Jvni!^''''rK^^?i^''^
explained by the venality of the voters,
the
politicians and the harshness of world events.folly of

The fact

" ^he Establishment (London: Anthony
1959), republished in 1968 as Crisis in the
Civil Service; E. Strauss, The Ruling Serv^ts
(London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961); Brian Chapman,
British
Gov ernment Observed (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 196371
Peter Shore, Entitled to Know (London: Macgibbon and Kee
Ltd., 1966); Max Nicholson, The System (London: Hodder
and
Stoughton, 1967); and Michael Shanks, The Stagn ant Society
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 196A)~.
uir^r.^
Blond

tI^;^^^
Ltd., ?'n?nf^'

"

2

B.

Chapman, British Government Observed

,

p.

44.

^^^^r^^'

^^^^^^^

-

Max Hicolson was even
™ore pointed in
Of the higher civil
service as a

characterization

..band of

ill-inf onned,

untrained, miscast run
.
full-i-imo
=
time amateurs,
doing
a little of
everything without any
coherent pattern. "2
The academic and popular
literature focuses on five
main cri ticisms-the
skills (or lack thereof) of
administrators, their character,
the class structure of the
civil
service, the lack of political
responsiveness on the part of
the civil service, and
the power of the Treasury.
Perhaps
the most persistent criticism
made of the higher civil
.

service was that recruitment
and selection procedures
the Administrative Class were
based on the assumption
those with a public school and
Oxbridge education and
personal qualities could best govern
modern Britain.

for

that

certain
While

administrators may have been educated
men they were still
amateurs, dilettantes, or, less
pejoratively, generalists.

According to the critics there were two
consequences
of this recruitment bias. First,
administrators
lacking

experience in business and social service
fields and
training in management techniques, statistics,

or economics,

failed to be effective managers of resources
and manpower
^Thomas Balogh, "Government by the Dilettante," The
New Statesman and Nation 52, July 28, 1956, p. 93.
2
^Nicholson,
The System

,

p.

436.

^

a n3,,„„,,

^

^^^^^^

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^
that a.„ini3t.ators
ai. not have the
technical o. scientific
expertise to advise
Ministers effective!,,
xhe result
BaXch bluntly asserts, is
that "when^ve^an^^j^o^^

^^i^^i^^^^^Jl^^-tSL^a^ecruiteij^^

The

solutions to this lack of
managerial and scientifi<LC
expertise lay in, first,
appointing more members of
the
Professional and Scientific
Classes to the top positions,
second, allowing Ministers
to bring in their own
expert
staff, and,

third, more training in
management and economics

for administrators.

Many pre-Pulton critics have
noted the dearth of
training subsequent to entry
into the Administrative Class.
The belief that administrators
could best

learn by practice

was prevalent; consequently,
the service had little or no
systematic training in management or
the social sciences.
A second popular criticism made of
the higher civil
service in the 1960s was that it was
inhabited by men who
lacked vitality, drive, and initiative.
A temporary civil
servant during the war wrote that "they
are not men of

imagination or action.

They are slow, cautious, and

^Balogh,
H. Thomas,
2

"The Apothesis of the Dilettante," in
Th e Establishment pp. 119-20, (his emphasis).

See,

ig^-llT""^'"

,

for example, William A. Robson, "The Reform of
Political Quarterly 35 (April-June, 1964):
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obstructive

Thoxr are
z^>-^
They
'shrewd- but not wise,
dependable but
not creative. They
are, too often cynical
rather than
realistic. They are small
men."l This
iiij-b cautious
cautious, conservative quality was attacker!
rtacked for
for- being
inconsistent with the
needs of postwar Britain.
»

,

•

Many critics pointed to
what they saw as the
inhumane
nature of the Administrative
Class. Administrators
were out
of touch with the problems
of the larger society;
they

lacked human sympathy and
sensitivity for working class
problems, possessing "a sense
of superiority to humanity
at
large. "2 certainly, the
Crichel Down investigation
provided
evidence that some administrators
possessed an "excessive
sense of self-importance"
resulting in broken promises and
the ignoring of "the fef^linnc
-ceeiings <-m^
or 4-i
the convenience of
individual citizens."^

Similarly, the focus of the service
was on London, and
most administrators lacked experience
in other
regions.

Thus the civil service was viewed as
closed and parochial (a
view compounded by the secrecy which
surrounded governmental
decision-making), lacking in interchange with
business and

universities, and especially as unrepresentative
in character.

Temporary Civil Servant, "Post-War Machinery of
Government, III— Government Administration and Efficiency
The Political Quarterly 15 (1944):94.

"

^Bosworth Monck, How the Civil Se rvice Works (London"
Phoenix House Ltd., 1952)
p. 23
,

o

.

"Notes and Comments, The Civil Service and Its
Critics," The Political Quarterly 25 (October 1954) :305.

^
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It has already been
shown that in the
pre-FUlton civil
service a selection bias
existed for graduates fro.
Oxford
and Cambridge, for former
students of independent,
feepaying schools, and for
arts rather than social
science,
5s or

natural science graduates.

One cause for this
selection

bias, the critics claimed,
was the increasing reliance
on
the oral interview in
Method II, where social class
biases
can creep in, as opposed
to the anonymity of written
exams.
Another cause was the lack of
a regular practice of
transfer
from Professional, Scientific
or Technical Classes
to the

Administrative Class.

During the 1950s only six percent
of
the new recruits to the lowest
ranks of the Administrative

Class were specialist transfers.

2

Although World War II had

the effect of lowering some of
the interclass barriers for
promotion, the critics argued that
informal, if not formal,

barriers to transfer remained in the
pre-Fulton civil
service. The result, critics argued,
was a higher civil
service which represented only a narrow
social class.

A fourth discernible criticism of the Administrative
Class, exemplified by the Crichel Down affair,
was that it
was not responsive to public sentiment or to changes
in

political leadership.

The charge was most often made by

•-Balogh, "Government by the Dilettante," p. 94.
Also
Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, From 18 70
to the P resent Day (London: Routledgp and Kegan p^mI Trifit-^-i.
1955) , pp. 65-84
R.

K.

2

Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain , p. 116.
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academics with socxalxst
«?n(-i
leanxngs, but not
infrequently by
conservative Party
supporters,
n-

that the civil service
thwartea the implementation
of party manifestos.
Blame was
sometimes Placed
placf^r? on
r.r,
+-k
the bureaucratic
structure and red tape
but Often critics felt
that Administrators made
conscious
political choices to
sabotage manifestos when
they conflicted
with departmental policy,
.he solutions most often
suggested
were to politicise the
higher civil service in
i-

'

some way, by

exther allowing politicians
to bring in political
advisors
or making advice given
by top officials public.
Although much of tne
the ori
criticism was directed at
the
higher civil service
xvice in nt^r^^^^^i
^
general,

m

squarely on the Treasury,

some of it was focused
.

a few critics faulted the

Establishments Divisions-the
Divisions concerned with
staffing-with inefficiency due to
a failure to

use scien-

tific management techniques.

others faulted specific policy

decisions championed by the Treasury/
such as on balance of
payments. But in one way or another,
the criticisms often
boiled down to distrust of the
Treasury's power. Balogh
argues that the power of the Treasury
was consolidated in
1919 when the Permanent Secretary of the
Treasury was recognized as Head of the Civil Service.
This was followed by
making the consent of the Prime Minister
necessary for any
vital appointments in all departments.
Since the Prime

Minister could not have first-hand knowledge
of personnel
matters, the power of appointment was given
essentially

to

209

the „eaa of the

civU Service.^

effect was to reduce
the departmental
minister's power in relation
to his top
cxvil servants and the
Treasury, since career
advancement
now rested within the
civil service structure.
Through the Second World
War and postwar period
the
concentration of power in the
Treasury's hands continued
until the early 1960s
when, as will be noted,
the attacks on
the Treasury's power
resulted in reorganisation,
still,

to

many critics in the years
just prior to Fulton, the
Treasury
possessed a monopoly of
policy-making power that should
be
trimmed by separating its
financial and personnel functions.
Internal Pressures: Civ il
Servants and Unions

Certainly a great deal of noise and
heat was generated
by the academic critics of the
British civil
service in the

late 1950s and early 1960s, but
perhaps the rather more
quiet pressure applied within the
bureaucracy had a greater
impact on the actual changes, Richard
Chapman and
J.

R.

Greenaway, in tracing changes in the pattern
of recruitment
and classification and training in the
British civil service,

observe that "the original impetus for reform

[of the civil

service] came primarily from high-ranking civil
servants

"'"Balogh, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante,"
pp. 86See also, William Hampton, Parliamentary Affairs 17
~
~
(Autumn 1964) :431.

87.

.

.

^
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themselves
es. m1

T?/-^v^
For
example,

'.the

proposal for 'one
classwas first considerea
within the service C in
19433, long
before it was publicl,
"
aiscussed ^ Many top
civil servants
the early 1960s were
taking the unusual step
of publicly
Chastising the civil service
ana calling for change.
Por
example, an Assistant
Secretary at the Ministry
of Defence
was warning in 1964 that
management shouia be taken
more
seriously in the civil service.3
others, like K. a. s.
Brown,
a Principal in the
Administrative Class of the civil
service,
called upon his peers to
develop a better problem-solving
attitude by recruiting more
specialists, training administrators in the use of management
techniques and
.

-

in their

substantive areas, and breaking
down the barriers in communication between aaministrators
and experts.^
But perhaps more important than
individuals for
creating internal pressure for
change have been the positions
taken by civil service staff
associations, particularly those
representing Professional, Technical,
Executive and Clerical
Classes. The early postwar years
witnessed a number of
departmental committees and informal
inquiries into the

—

Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dyn amics
of Administrative
T.^J^^'^i^^t^- Reform
of
(London: Croom Helm Lt a., 1980)
p . 159
.

^Ibid., p. 161.
3

Class,

^* N^i^"^' "Management and the Administrative
Public Administration 42 (Summer 1964 ): 11 3-1 22

^R. G. S. Brown, "Organization Theory and Civil Service
Reform," Public Administration 43 (Autumn 1965): 327.

—
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possiMlities Of ch.n,e,
all of „.ieh
".enectea the
aissatisfaction enpressea
ana tensions felt
a.on, the
various professional
groups in the civil
service.. •! Hach
association callea for
changes in civil service
recruitment,
selection ana promotion
practices, class structure,
pa„ ana
conditions that „ouia
benefit their members.
Thus, the
institution Of Professional
civil Servants, representing

-

professional,
-L,
sci
p^n^i
^
scientific,
technical, and most of the
specialist graaes, in its
testimony to the Pulton
Committee
complainea that "management
ana aa^inistration at the
higher
levels are still almost
exclusively the monopoly of
the
Administrative Class," despite
the fact that
*.

-f-;

•

"over the last

century the Government has
become involvea in the complex
economic, technological and
social problems of moaern
society. "2 To remeay this
monopoly by the Administrative
Class, the I.P.c.S. callea for
the abolition
of class

divisions in the higher civil
service, which would allow top
aaministrators to be recruitea from
executive, scientific,
and professional as well as
administrative grades, and an

increased flexibility of transfer
between classes. In
similar ways, other staff associations
were urging administrative changes upon the Treasury.
By the early 1960s criticism from
within ana outside

B^f^vKetorm

'^''^P"^"
,

p.

162,

—

and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative

2f.C. Report, Vol.

-

5

(1),

p.

286.

^
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the Treasury had reached
such

pea. that the Treasury
was
reorganl.od so that a aoint
Permanent Secretary was
a

^de

responsible for finances and
economic planning and
another
aomt Permanent Secretary for
pay and management of
the
civil service through the
Establishments Divisions of
the
Departments. it was reorganised
again in
1964 so that it

lost its planning functions
to a new Department of
Economic
Affairs.
In early 1968 a new
Management Services Division
was created in the Treasury
to perform operations
research.
Nor was the training of
administrators overlooked.
1963 a centre for Administrative
Studies was established
Which, among other activities,
started a short course on
economics for Assistant Principals.
After the 1964 election
which brought Labour into power, there
was a great influx of
economists into the Treasury, although
most of these were on
a temporary basis.
In addition, efforts were made
in some
technical departments to move specialists

m

to top posts,

although again, the success of these efforts
may be
questioned. But again the point is that changes
were taking
place— some to address administrative needs, others in
response to political pressure; whether these changes
were
merely cosmetic or were of substance is a matter for

debate.

For a more detailed account of these administrative
reforms, see Roger Williams, "Administrative Modernization
in British Government," Internati onal Soc ial Science
Jou rnal 21, No. 1 (1969) 100-115
":

.
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The^CataT^it

~

into the cauxaron of
refo™ already bubbling
with
acaae„ic ana popular
dissatisfaction, pressures
fro™ staff
associations, and discontent
fro™ within higher
civil
service itself, was
dropped the party politics
of 1964
Although Change was
occurring, largely out of
sight, the

political personalities
and issues in the mid-1960s
provided a catalyst that
for a moment brought the
myriad
pressures and actors together
for a burst of reforming
activity. Whether or not
the activity produced a
radically
new ingredient (as many
of the reformers had hoped)
or
merely a puff of smoke will
be investigated in Chapter
VI.
If leftist academics
were critical of the

civil service
for its lack Of political
responsiveness, it is not surprising that Labour politicians
were also suspicious of a civil
service they thought was powerful
enough to misdirect and
stifle the Party's manifesto.
This suspicion was given vent
by The Fabian Society pamphlet
issued in 1964, The Adminis trators.l Written by Robert Nield,
later to become a member
of the Fulton Committee, Shirley
Williams, Labour MP

appointed to the Fulton Committee only
to withdraw when she
was appointed Minister in the Government,
and Thomas Balogh,
an academic economist closely identified
with
Wilson, The

Administrators clearly had an influence on
the thinking of
Ia Fabian Group, The Admini
strators (London- The
Fabian Society, June 1964)
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the .a.our Government
ana Xater the Pulton
Co™,ittee
-aee. it Has .een o.ser.ea
t.at ..t.e .uXton
Co^ittle.s
report looks remarkahlv
markably like an
expanded version of
The

MiEiilMtrators

.

The pamphlet, an
upaate of a Pa.ian
Heport iss.ea in
^
1947 that was itself a
precursor of much of the
later
criticisms, char.ea that
reform of the higher
civil service
was a prerequisite for
the Labour Government
or any ,overnn-ent to carry through
policy changes. The civil
service is
an anachronism, the
report went on, ana fails
in three basic
respects:
its amateurism, its
negative approach to problemsolving, ana its closea
and secretive formulation
of policy
TO make the civil service
more professional, more
adaptable,
and more creative the
Fabians proposed widening
the net of
recruitment, allowing freer
movement in and out of the
service, creating an expanded
and more scholarly training
school,
abolishing class aistinctions
between specialists ana administrators in the higher civil
service, increasing the number
of specialists and political
appointments and,
finally,

separating personnel management
from the Treasury. As will
be seen, their findings and
recommendations were in many
ways an exact image of the Fulton
Committee proposals.
5"": •"''?^°™ ^""^ ^''^"^e in British Central
Administration '"^S^
Aoministration,
Political Studies 19 {June 1971) 220.
:

t^^'r"-"^

Committee for the Fabian Society, The Reform
'^"^^
"^""'^on: Fabian Publi cations

-
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Haroia wnson ,.ve
expression to .abo^.-s
suspicion o.
the evil service by
co^piainin, that "whoever
is in of.ice
the „hi,s are in power.-l
„ore recently, Labour
„p ,cny
Benn captured the
continued frustration with
the civil

service by ar^uin, that

a civil

service policy .as
developed

over a long period of
ti.e which "draws so.e
of its force
from a deep commitment
to the benefits of
continuity and a
fear that adversary
politics may lead to sharp
reversals by
incoming governments of
policies devised by their
predecessors, which the civil
service played a great part
in
developing. "2 civil servants
prefer a consensus politics
Which minimizes public
controversy and change and thus
"it
is not a coincidence that
governments of both parties appear
to end up with policies
very similar to
"3
each other.

In its evidence to the
Fulton Committee the National

Executive Co„™ittee of the Labour
Party showed how administrators might secure ministerial
compliance with the
administrator's policy.
°^
5°^= °"
a department
the Minister T""^
knows nothing of-some of it research which
work
i'"P°'^tant results which are never
shown
to'?t''M°''"'=r
to
the Minister; some of it planning
work which may be
deliberately concealed from him, either
because it might

••Balogh,

"The Apothesis of the Dilettante,"
pp. 111-12.

y ggjjj^^ „^j^^ ^^^^
^ Constitutional civil
service.
Lecture given to Royal Institute of Public Administration, January 28, 1980 (Nottingham: Institute
for
Workers' Control, 1980), p. 5.
^ibid., p. 7.
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Civil service secrecy,
its control of information,
and its
ability to set the framework
in which policy is
™ade are
only a few ways top
civil servants .ay exert
influence over
policy.
in the view of Labour
these characteristics
justified their reform efforts.

A key figure in the civil
service reforms of the
1960s
was, of course, Harold
Wilson.

Wilson brought to the social

and political environment
of the middle 196 0s a
background
Which gave him sympathy with
the attacks on the Administrative Class. Wilson, a
chemist's
(pharmacist's) son from

Yorkshire, was described by one
member of the Pulton Co™„ittee as a man of "humble
background"2 „ho had an aversion
to
aristocrats. He went to Oxford with
the aid of an academic
scholarship and eventually taught
economics there. Yet it
is likely that as a statistician
in the civil service during

World War II he continued to feel the
strong class bias of
British society as it was manifested in the
Administrative
Class to specialist relationships. Emerging
from what
Wilson considered ill treatment by the
Administrative Class
during these war years was his critical opinion
of it.^

Ip.C. Report, vol.

5

(2),

p.

At

655.

2

Characterization given in interview with member of
Fulton Committee.
30f

Noted
1980.

m

interview with Lord Armstrong.

London, April

.

.

the same time his technir-ai k
technical background gave
him a belief in
science, technoloqy and sr-,- „„4- c
gy
scientific management that
was the
underpinning for much of
Wilson's reformist .eal
Thus Wilson brought to
the 1964 elections not
only a
deep rooted suspicion of
the British upper-class
but a
professional expertise in
economics.
Robert Presthusl has
Characterized the
ne election
elen-ion as a confrontation
between the
Establishment and Meritocracy.
The Conservative, Sir
Alec
Douglas-Home, a product of
Eton and Cambridge, a
believer in
the wisdom of the amateur,
and a member of a Scottish
family
Whose title dated back
fourteen generations, representing
the traditional qualities
of birth and character was
being
Challenged by Wilson and Labour
who represented progress
through science and management.
Accepting much of the
academic and Fabian criticisms
of British society and the
civil service, Wilson described
the conservative period in
power since 1951 as thirteen wasted
years. 2 one observer
has noted that "Harold Macmillan,
as Conservative Premier
from 1957 to 1963, seemed to be
largely unconvinced of the
need for reform.
By contrast, Wilson wanted to be
,

remembered as an activist, a reformer.
"^^2^^^^ Presthus, "Decline of the Generalist Myth,"
T.
ui ic
Publ
Administration Review 24 (December 1964 ): 211-16
•

2

John P. Mackintosh, The Government and Politics of
Britain (London: Hutchinson University Library,
1970), p. 150.
Frank Stacey, British Government 1966-1975, Years of
Reform (London: Oxford University Press, 1975),
p. 2.
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Dur.n, the campaign,
wiXson e^phasi.ea that
he intendea
to restructure the
government machinery. xn
a revealin,
raaio interview by Or.
Norman Hunt^ (later to
be named to
the Pulton co^nittee,
Wilson indicated that as
Prime
Minister he would increase
the number of temporary
appointnients of outsi
df^^r-c to
outsiders
increase the number of
scientists and
economists in the civil
service, increase the number
of
political appointees in the
Prime Minister's office,
give
responsibility for economic
planning to a new ministry
separate from the Treasury,
and introduce more
,

scientific

management techniques into the
civil service.
True to his promise, one of

the first acts of the new

Labour Government in 1964 was
to appoint
cal advisors and create some
new

a number of politi-

posts for economists and

scientists.

For example, economist Thomas
Balogh was
appointed Economic Advisor in the
Cabinet Office, Robert
Nield became Economic Advisor to
the Treasury, the post of
Scientific Advisor was added in the
Cabinet, and, as already
noted, the Department of Economic
Affairs was created
to

make it easier to bring in outside
expertise.

The spirit of

reform quickly engulfed the Wilson Administration.

In quick

succession between 1965 and 1969 were reports from
the
Mallaby Committee on staffing local government,
the.

Maud

Committee on management of local government, the Seebohm
^Interview with Harold Wilson by Norman Hunt, "Whitehall and Beyond," The Listener 71, March 5, 1964,
pp. 379381.
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Co..ittee on local authority
personal social services,
the
Redcliffe-Mau. Royal Co..ission
on local .overn.ent
structure
England, and the Select
Co..ittee on Nationalised

Which recommended that
the Post office should
become
corporation. The Cabinet

industry

a

public

itself was a target for reform
as

Wilson in 1968 implemented

a

reorganization scheme. ^

one

point is clear, in the mid-1960s
the appropriate nature of
responsible public administration
was being questioned and
the mechanisms to secure
responsibility were being

a

sought.

Fulton was part of this flood
of dissatisfaction and reform.
Wilson was not alone in the drive
for
reform.

During

this period Parliament was also
trying to reform itself.
1967 the House of Commons set up three
new select committees, in addition to the three
already existing Public
Accounts, Estimates, and Nationalized
Industries Committees,
to improve the Parliament's oversight
of administration.

m

Also in 1967 was the establishment of a
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, or Ombudsman, to
investigate

administrative actions on behalf of the Crown.

It was in

this climate that the House of Commons Estimates
Committee

investigated the problems of recruitment to the civil
service in 1964-65. ^

As Brian Smith observes, "although

Isee Richard A. Chapman, "Administrative Reform in
Britain," Administration 18 (Winter 1970) 326-41, and B. C.
Smith and J. Stanyer, "Administrative Developments in 1967:
A Survey," Public Administration 46 (Autumn 1968) 329-79, as
well as F. Stacey and R. Williams for accounts of the reform
context of which Fulton was a part.
^Great Britain, Sixth Report f rom the Estimates Commit~
tee, Session 1964-1965
:

:

.
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primarily concGrned with ^^^7i^
Civil Service Commission
recruitment
methods, the Committee,
ree, und^r
under the influence of
the pervadi..
ng
reformist atmosphere
Pnere, drew
dr^^w attention
•

•

4.

•

to the policies under-

lying recruitment, such
as the structure of the
Service, the
task of Government and
the need for expertise
and specialised Skills...! The
committee criticized the
Treasury for
its lack Of Change to
meet new demands upon
government and
were specifically
J-y critio^i
critical of +-u
the isolation of civil
servants
from the rest of society,
the lack of mobility between
government and business and
universities, and
the lack of

specialists.

These areas should be investigated,
the Committee recommended, and called
for .'a committee of officials,
aided by members from outside
the civil service, ... to be
appointed to initiate research upon,
to examine, and to
report upon the structure, recruitment
and management of the
civil service.. .2 it should be noted
that Conservative Sir.

Edward Boyle was one member of the
Estimates Committee quite
pointed in his questioning of the then Joint
Permanent
Secretary of the Civil Service, William
Armstrong, regarding
the need to open up the service and for
more interchange
with the outside. Sir Edward was shortly to
become a member
of the committee which he recommended.
^Smith, ..Reform and Change in British Central Administration,
p. 220.
.'

2

Great Britain, Sixth Report from the Esti mates Commit~
tee, Session 1964-1965, p. xxxv.
.

'
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The_Creation

Because a head of
government .ay fina it
difficult to
xnxtiate investigations
of those agencies and
individuals
xmplen,enting his policies,
the

reco^endation of the Esti

mates Coro^ittee provided
Wilson the justification
he
apparently had long wanted.
On February 8, 1966, Wilson
announced in the House of

colons the aovern^enfs
acceptance

Of the recon^endation
"that a co™„ittee should
be appointed
to examine the structure,
recruitment and management,
including training, of the
Home civil Service.
Wilson
anticipated that these "very
broad terms of reference
will
require a fundamental and
wide-ranging inquiry. "2

concept of responsible administration
about to change in
some radical way? Did Wilson
intend

to turn the traditional

notion upon its head?

Wilson went on to say that "the
Government's willingness to consider
changes in the

Civil

Service does not imply any intention
on their part to alter
the basic relationship between
Ministers and civil servants.
Civil servants, however eminent,
remain the confidential
advisers of Ministers, who alone are
answerable

to Parliament

for policy; and we do not envisage any
change in this fundamental feature of our parliamentary system
of democracy.
J-Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates
5th series. Vol. 724 (1966): 210.
,

(Commons)

^Ibid.

Thus,

the tension inherent
in attempts to refo™
„.re
reveaxea-tensions .etween the
need to change and the
need
for continuity. The
boundaries for the Committee
on the
Civil Service were
established and a premonition
of the

nature of its recommendations
was given.
The committee was composed
of twelve meters appointed
by Wilson plus a small
staff of civil servants.
On first
glance the Committee appeared
to be a well-balanced
group
representing a cross-section
of society with three
academics
(political scientists), two MPs,
two Permanent

Secretaries,
two industrialists, one
trade unionist, one scientist,
and'
one economist. On closer
examination it is clear that
the composition of the co™,ittee
was designed to give Wilson
the recommendations that he
wanted. Lord (John) Fulton,

vice-chancellor at the University of
Sussex until 1967,
was appointed as Chairman. His
active teaching life had
been in philosophy and politics at
Balliol College, Oxford
(providing a threat to Jowett, the Balliol
tutor who had
influenced Northcote and Trevelyan)
More importantly,
.

Fulton had served as temporary civil servant
during the war
years 1942-1944 as Principal Assistant Secretary
at
the

Ministry of Fuel and Power.

He was at the Ministry when

Harold Wilson became Director of Economics and
Statistics in
1943.

It was here, while pulling their night-time "fire

.

watching" duties,

.

that the two .en had
occasion to tal.
about the complaints
that each had against
^

the .andarinsWilson for their mistreatment
of specialists liKe
himself
and Fulton for their
lacK of initiative and
inventiveness 2
For Fulton's service to
the country, indicated
to some
extent by his service on
numerous boards

and commissions, he

was made a life peer in
1966 by Wilson's Government.
Perhaps
because of his wide involvement
in other areas or perhaps
because by 1966 he had no real
interest, Fulton was chairman
in name only. 3
his war-time link to Wilson,
his sympathy
with Wilson's perspective, his
public prominence
was

apparently enough for Wilson.
The second academic on the
Committee, Professor Simey,
Professor of Social Science at the
University of Liverpool,
had also recently been made life
peer by the Wilson Government.
Simey was the only academic member of
the Committee
who had a special interest in public
administration,

although this does not appear to have been
the primary
reason for his selection. The most likely
reason was that
Simey was a member of Wilson's Lancashire
constituency and

a

''"During the war, civil servants took turns
their office buildings at night to put out fires watching
that might
result from German bombing.
.

2

.

First noted in interview with Lord Armstrong. Also
discussed in Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt The Civil
Servants (London: Macdonald General Books, 1980), p. 29
,

^Several interviewees noted that Lord Fulton was
rather ill-informed and provided no real guidance for the
committee

1
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Labour sympathizer.

He had most recently
gained notoriety
When his Wife refused to
ta.e the title of .ady.
The third
academic. Dr. Norman Hunt
(later Lord Crowther-Hunt)
Pellow
and Lecturer in politics
at Exeter College, Oxford,
was a
close friend to Wilson and
shared his thinking.
The two Members of Parliament
were Robert Sheldon,
Labour, and Sir Edward Boyle,
Conservative. Boyle had
already publicly expressed
his criticisms of the civil
service as member of the
Estimates Committee. Sheldon,
a
product of technical college with
engineering training,
shared the thinking of those who
believed that civil servants
should be individually responsible
for their actions.
Similarly, Robert Nield, Economic
Adviser to the
Treasury from 1964 and Chairman of
the Fabian Group respon^^^^^
Thej^dmi^^
was very close to Labour
,

'

Ministers and highly critical of the "amateurism"
of the
Administrative Class.
The other members of the Committee included
Sir James
Dunnett, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of
Labour; Sir
Philip Allen, Second Permanent Secretary in the Pay
and

Management side of the Treasury; Walter Anderson, General
Secretary of the National and Local Government Officer's
^In Parliamentary debate, November 1968, Sheldon
argued that the ability is needed within the Civil Service
"to lay blame or give praise upon individuals so that they
can be rewarded when they have been successful or be
reproved when they have been unsuccessful." Great Britain,
Mgj^sard's Par liamentary D ebates (Commons)
5th series.
Vol. 773 (1968):1611.
,
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Association; Sir Wi
T i ;
^
Wixliam
cook, Deputy chief
Scientific
Adviser, Ministrv
nistxy of t^^-p
Defence, with longtime
experience in
the civil service,
servicf^- Sir
q-Jv xt
Norman Kipping, retired
Director
General of the Pe.eration
of British Xnaustries;
Sir aohn
wall, business executive,
with many years experience
in the
-vil service, who shortly
after his committee
appointment
was made vice-chairman
of the Post Office Board.
Servl ng as
secretary to the Committee
was R. „. l. Wilding, then
,

<~,-f

a

Principal in the Treasury but
to become an Assistant
Secretary in the new civil Service
Department.
The committee was large by
postwar standards, ^ but its
Chief Characteristics appear
to be the strong representation
Of known civil service
vxce critiVc.
critics and the uheavy representation
of current and past civil
servants. AH the members
were

undoubtedly influenced by the mood
of the country, the
thinking of the new Labour Government,
and the recent wave
of critical literature.
Even the civil servants

were pulled

along by this wave-afraid to resist
its pull for fear of
reflecting on the conservatism of the
Service.^
The committee appointments and structure
gave rise to
skepticism among many observers regarding
the ability of the

^Timothy J. Cartwright, "The Fulton Committee on
the
Civil Service
Britain," Canadian Public Administration 12
(Spring 1969) :92, notes that the Fulton Committee
had twelve
members while the average is eight.

m

2

As one interviewee, a civil servant on the Fulton
Committee, noted, he supported the controversial first
chapter and many recommendations, lest the skeptics and
critics
point to the civil service as being against change.

con^ittee to produce an
effective refo™ document,
critics saw the heavy
representation of

so^e

civil servants as
an

attempt to sabotage real
reform, though others
saw it as a
tactic to insure that
recommendations were implemented
Others noted that the
Pulton Committee was a
Departmental
committee of Inquiry, not a
Royal Commission. Some
observers
saw this as a downgrading
of the investigation into
the
civil service, since Royal
Commissions have more prestige
and more authority to call
people and papers. ^ At the
same
time, the departmental
committee may have more flexibility
and be less threatening to
witnesses since oral testimony
is
not published. Nonetheless,
the committee assembled and
began its work as a body of
prestigious,
'

well-educated,

public spirited men and, ironically,
largely amateurs with
regard to the task at hand.
The Fulton Debate and Emerging
Themes of Reform
If it is correct that "administrative
responsibility"
is a concept that captures the competing
values inherent in

political debates over civil service reform, then
it should
be possible to organize the criticisms and
actions
aimed at

the British civil service in the 1950s and
1960s under this

rubric.

Yet the dynamics of the reform process do not

necessarily make this an easy task.

It is clear that much

of the academic and popular literature in calling for, among

^Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 26.

other thina-^
ningo, .e.s
o-^ secrecy
in decision-making,
more
P^^liarnentarv oversight,
ovp>T-ci rrv,*more specialists,
y
technicians, and
soc.al scientists,
better management, and
abolition of the
Class structure, „as
stressing the themes of
openness or
comprehensibilitv
ity, political
oniT+-i^ =
responsiveness, professionaltechnical comnetenno
^r^A ^
Petence, and
representativeness. But these
new
standards perhaps left those
who were charged with implementing the Changes bewildered.
Por as William Armstrong,
Permanent Secretary and Head
of the Home Civil Service,
complained.
"<

i

The demand that administrative
processes <,hnni^ k

-

in
^^'"^^^ ^^^--^^
erriciency
effiS^ncv'"'
'^°r
deplore the meticulous scrutinv of
Parliamentary Committees and the
Ombudsman
"These conflicting ideas and demands,"
Armstrong went on to
say, "are not simply represented
by different groups
.

.

.

f

in the

population:

they can frequently be found together
in the
same speech or report."-^
Nor were the signals coming from
politicians less
confusing. While members of Parliament were,
on the one
hand, attacking civil servants for their
lack of initiative

and drive, they were, on the other hand,
criticizing them
for their lack of responsiveness and were
establishing more

^Sir William Armstrong, "The Role and Character of the
Civil Service," The Proceedings of the British Academy 56
—
^

_

(1970), p. 213.

~

—
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detailed accountability
through Parliamentary
con^ittees.
At the same time, civil
service
vice staff ....
associations wanted to
make it easier for their
members to move into
administrative
Dobs or to increase their
members' status
•

relative to the

Administrative Class while
simultaneously protecting
their
own members from competition
from either outside
or insidle

the civil service.

Thus the themes and
prescriptions

Offered by the various
critics, though clear when
standi-ng
on their own, were often
conflicting and confusing to
administrators when examined in the
aggregate.

Out of this maelstrom of the
reform process it can
also be observed that the
higher civil servants themselves
had a role in initiating reforms.
By the time the Pulton
Committee was appointed, several
changes had been made in
administrative organization and procedures
in the direction
the critics were urging. At the
same time,
however, it is

notable that the values pursued by the
civil servants were
often different than those pursued by
the external critics.
Those running the machine were often concerned
with internal
efficiency and keeping the machine well-oiled
while protecting the status and character of the Administrative
Class

and the basic principles of ministerial responsibility.

Many external critics, however, were out to provide
Ministers
.

with alternative sources of advice and make the Administrative Class more egalitarian.

s
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Thus,

the implications for
ministerial responsibility

Of the political debate
were confused, certainly,
its ma.or
components were under attaC,
hut at the same time,
Wilson.
charge to the Pulton
CoMnittee, undoubtedly
reflecting
-aority Parliamentary and higher
civil service opinion,
„as
to preserve the basic
relationship between minister
and

Civil servant found in the
traditional notion. There
was no
agreement in society. Government,
or civil service about
the
character of a responsible civil
service.

The reform dynamics that
culminated in the creation of
the Fulton CoMnittee were,
thus, a whirlpool of professional,
political, and personal motives
and values that resulted in
conflicting themes of reform. How
did the Fulton Committee
attempt to reconcile these conflicts?
Can they
be

reconciled?

To these questions we shall now
turn.

CHAPTER

V

THE FULTON COMMITTEE:
OPERATION
REFORM, AND REACTION

'

The Fulton Cownittee
was created in response
to a
complex set of political
events. .Ms chapter
„iu continue
to trace the process of
reform, focusing on the
i™,ediate
influences on the Pulton
Co^ittee and its findings and
reco^nendations. That reform
is a continuous or cyclical,
rather than discrete, process
can be seen by examining
thl
reactions to the Pulton Cor^ittee
Report, its implementation,
or lack thereof, and the new
wave of criticism that followed
Fulton.

The Conunittee at Work
It is clear that the establishment
of the Committee

was the result of almost inexorable
political pressures that
coincided quite nicely with the political
aims of Harold
Wilson. Certainly Wilson wanted the
Committee to complete
its work as quickly as possible so that
he could publicly
report that his Government had reformed the
civil
service.

Thus,

the Committee was working under political and
time

constraints.

Did the Committee keep the question of the

proper nature of

a

responsible civil service open while

examining evidence and exploring options?

Was the Committee

essentially a political gimmick, a facade, or was it
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a

thoughtful attempt to
secure responsive
administration.
During the two and a
half years the

Co^ittee took

report,

to

there were indications
that research and
empirical
evidence r„ight provide
guidance for Committee
deliberations
There is almost unanimous
agreement that Dr. Norman
Hunt
(now Lord Crowther-Hunt)
made a vital contribution
to providing the committee with
research assistance and
overall
momentum and direction. In
an unusual step, the
Committee
commissioned a Management
Consultancy Group to examine
the
work of the civil service.
Serving on the Group were a
civil servant who had climbed
the clerical and executive
ladders to work in the Organization
and Methods Division of
the Treasury, a management
consultant in industry, an executive from British Petroleum
Company Ltd., and Crowther-Hunt,
who was given leave from Exeter
College for over
a year.

Between October 1966 and April 1967
the Management Group
evaluated the jobs of some six hundred
civil servants,

covering twenty-three blocks of work
and twelve departments,
and investigated the relationship of
administrators to
specialists.

Serving as liaison between the Committee and

the Management Group, Hunt kept the
Committee informed of
the Group's findings and progress and the
Group in touch with
the Committee's reactions. ^ According to
Crowther-Hunt his

tenure with the Management Group served to mold his
ideas on
a number of issues, particularly the need
to abolish the

•^Interview with Lord Crowther-Hunt, London, July 1,1980.

class structure and nr-^^^r.
create unifxed, grades.
it is significant that Crowther-Hunt
It cites E. K.
Ferguson, the British
Petroleu. executive, as
being especially influential
on his
thinking. The British
Petroleum company personnel
were
organized into a unified
grading system and employed
job
evaluation and management
by objective techniques.
The Management Group
found^ that officials in
the
Administrative Class were
characterized by lacK of continuity in the job, relative
isolation, lack of management
skills
and experience (particularly
in accountancy and
•

.

pvt.

costing,

statistics, economics, operational
research and computer
systems work)
and largely irrelevant educational
backgrounds
It is not surprising that
these inadequacies are
incorporated into the Fulton Report
since Crowther-Hunt
wrote the first draft of the Report.
By his own account, 2
the Report would likely have
been much different if the
Secretariat of the Committee, R. w.
L. Wilding, a career
Treasury official, had written the first
draft rather than
himself.
That his draft was allowed to act as the
workingdraft is itself a case-study of Committee
behavior. But the
crucial point is that the entire Committee was
influenced by
Crowther-Hunt, who had a key position, a keen interest,
and
,

.

'"Great Britain, Committee on the Civil Service,
The
Civil Service Cmnd. 3638 (June 1968), Vol.
2, "Report
Management Consultancy Group." Hereafter cited as
F.C. Report.

^a

1980

Interview with Lord Crowther-Hunt, London, July
J-

.

1,/

perhaps n,ost importantly,
the tirne to devote to
the Co^Utee-s work, unlike any
other member. Crowther-Hunt
himself
and his draft were strongly
influenced by the structure
and
management style
j'-Lt: or
of ^a r^r-iw^+-^
private corporation.
.

.

There were also other research
efforts commissioned by
the committee:
a large social survey
of the civil service,
a survey and interview
with selected Administrative
Class
officials, a follow-up survey
of administrative officials
to
compare progress and to check
validity of the selection
procedures, and a historical study
of reports
on the civil

service since the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report.^
addition,
volume 4 provided a mass of factual
and statistical material
from the Treasury and Civil Service
Commission.

m

But it is

unlikely that any of those had a great
impact on the Committee.

The "Social Survey of the Civil Service"
was published

a year after the main Report; other
researchers were not

even called in by the Committee for further
discussion.
Thus "there is reason to wonder how useful for
their delib-

erations the Committee members considered the sponsored
research, and how closely the Committee members read the

research documents prepared for them."^
If academic research had little or no influence on the

Committee, perhaps direct observation and comparison did.
"'F.C.

Report, Vol.

3,

"Surveys and Investigations."

Richard Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil
Service," in The Role of Commissions in Policy-Making ed.
Richard Chapman (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 20.
,
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Between September 1966
and reDruary
Februarv 196
lQfi7
7 groups of the
Corrunittee visi
f(=»rl
v-^-^^^
visited
France, Sweden,

and the United States
fo r
four to five days each.^
Certainly, Cor^ittee member
s were
impressed by the youth of
civil servants in top
policymaking posts, the extent
to which Ministers chose
their own
staff, and the
"professionalism" of higher civil
servants
that they found in each
country, and hoped to
incorporate
these "strengths" into the
British Civil Service. Yet
one
may wonder, along with
Richard Chapman, "how firm a
grasp
the committee actually had
of the experience of foreign
countries" 2 or whether the
Committee had thought much about
the desirability or the
difficulties of transferring these

characteristics to the British system.
Finally, it is possible that the
evidence presented to
the Committee was influential in
shaping their thinking
about the changes needed in the civil
service.
The evidence
was certainly massive-152 written
and 250 oral submissions
of evidence— and marked by "a remarkable
consensus of

opinion. "3

Although some testified to the strong qualities

of the civil service,

"there is a large measure of agreement

on the major problems that now need to be
solved and on some
"'F.C. Report, Vol. 1, Appendix C, "Impressions
_.
of
Civil Services in France, Sweden, and the United States."the
2

p.

21.

Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service."

This quote and the following quote from F.C. Report,
Vol. 1, Appendix K, "Main Evidence on Important Topics,"
^
p. 181.

Of the reforms that
should be introduced for
this purpose."
Yet it is also Clear that
much of the evidence came
from
staff associations naturally
seeking to protect their
members intere^i-c:
•
r'^v
^
t:erests.
For example,
the First Division Association, Which represents
members of the Administrative
'

Class,

opposed integrating the top
structure with specialist classl
Professional interest groups
furthering their special
interests, for example, the Royal
Institute of British
Architects, argued for the need
to give specialists more
experience in administrative work.
Business firms or associations calling for more efficient,
economical government,
for example the British Institute
of Management, emphasized
the use of new management techniques
such as management by
objectives and the need for internal
efficiency audits.
There was a great deal of evidence from
individuals and
groups (e.g., the Fabian Society, the Labour
Party)

interested in reform for a variety of political,
philosophical reasons. And, indeed, there was evidence
from

thought-

ful academics and civil servants or ex-civil
servants.

Yet,

Chapman's assessment that "the main characteristic of all
this evidence was that it did not analyze in depth but

merely identified the problems from various viewpoints and
suggested possible solutions

is correct.

There appears to

be no attempt to analyze alternative solutions in light of
-"Chapman,
p.

23.

"The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service,"

the given problems
or, indeed
indeed, i-r.
to evaluate the
various
perspectives of the problem,
DroKi^rr.
^
to assess the impact
of solutions upon one another
nother, or
ot- 4-^
to recognise
contradictions in
the various proposals.

certainly, it is difficult
to .now what the
i™„ediate
influences were upon the
Co^nittee's decision-.aKing.
it
appears, however, that
neither research, observation,
nor
evidence played a crucial
part in shaping the

Co™ittee-s

recommendations, with one
exception, the Crowther-Hunt
Management Consultancy Group.
Criticisms and solutions were
well-publicized before the
Committee was even created (for
example, Th^ Administrators)
and these pre-Co™,ittee arguments, along with the political
needs of Wilson, were the
primary influences on the
Committee's thinking. Also,
given
that the Con^ittee membership
was, to a great extent, politically allied to or sympathetic
with Wilson, it
is not

unreasonable to suggest that the
Committee's effort was a
political expedient to help Wilson
create a reforming image.
Findings and Recommendations

Although the Fulton Committee brought little
new
evidence or analysis to its Report, perhaps

the Report did

attempt to integrate the solutions into a
clear, radical
vision of responsible government. Certainly,

the Committee

perceived its recommendations to be innovative:

"The Home

Civil Service today is still fundamentally the
product of
the nineteenth-century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan

Report.

The tasks it
It facp<:
races are ^^,
those of the second half
of
the twentieth centurv
inury.
Thi=,
;„
^
This IS what we have
found; it is
what we seek to remedy.. !
examination of the Report's
findings and recommendations
win suggest the nature of the
Report and its view of a
responsible civil service.
The Pulton Co^nittee's
starting point is the finding
that "the basic principles
and philosophy of the C
nineteenth
,

century Northcote-Trevelyan
] Report have prevailed:
the
essential features of their
structure have remained," in
particular, the tradition of the
•all-rounder" or "amateur.
In the meantime, the role of
government has changed-it is
more positive, more technical,
more complex,

"

and more inter-

national.

Yet,

"the structure and practices of the
Services

have not kept up with the changing
tasks.
is in need of fundamental change. "^

...

The service

The Committee found six

main inadequacies:
1.

The service is based on the philosophy of
the

amateur, where the ideal administrator is
the gifted layman
who, moving frequently within the service,
applies
his

practical knowledge and experience of the government
machine
to any problem.
The cult of the generalist "cannot make for
the efficient dispatch of public business" and, thus,
"is

-•-F.C.

2

Report, Vol. 1, p. 9.

Ibid., pp.

9,

^Ibid., p. 11.

10.

=

.
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Obsolete at all levels
ana in all parts of
the Service. "1
The system of classes
2.
impedes

the work of the
Civil service by hampering
its adaptability to
new tasks
preventing the best use of
individual talent, contributing
to inequality of
promotion prospects, causing
frustration
and resentment, and
impeding entry into management
for

qualified specialists and
technicians.
Scientists, engineers, and
other specialists do
not get the responsibilities
or authority they ought
to have.
3.

TOO few civil servants are
skilled managers; they
neither see themselves as
managers nor have the training
in
4.

management
There is not enough contact
between the service
and the community. The civil
service is not aware of new
developments in business or in the
universities, nor
5.

has

recruitment produced

a

service with a wide social and educa-

tional base.
6.

There are serious problems of personnel
management.

There is little career planning, too
frequent movement to
unrelated jobs, and little reward for individual
initiative
and objectively measured performance.
The key principle adopted by the Committee to
guide

development of the civil service was, "look at the
job
2
first."
By this the Committee meant that managers in
^Ibid.
^ibid., p. 13.

the

service must review
lew t-h,^
the +-=ov
tasks xt xs called
upon to perforn,
and the alternative
ve ways
wav^ of r.^
^
performing
them, then find out
what skills are needed
and, finally, find,
train, and place
people in the jobs.
That job evaluation was
the "one hasic
guiding principle" to
govern the development of
the service
suggests the strong
influence of the Management
Consultancy
Group and, more important!
v the k
"portantly,
basic value guiding the
Fulton Committee document.
.

-,

•

TO address the problems
the Committee made 158
distinct
recommendations-some quite specific,
others ra.her vague.
Only the primary recommendations
need be noted here, since
the cult of the generalist
was the primary evil rooted
in
the civil service, the
recommendation to weed it out was
to
staff the civil service with
"men and women who are truly

professional."!

Professionalism, to the Committee, was

"being skilled in one's job-skill
which comes from training
and sustained experience" and
"having the fundamental

knowledge of and deep familiarity with
a subject that
enable a man to move with ease among
its concepts." The
service should develop greater professionalism
among the

specialists by training them in management and
providing more
opportunities to move into administrative positions.
For

administrators, more professionalism meant greater special-

ization during their early years in particular areas of
^This and the following two quotes from F.C. Report,
^
Vol. 1, p. 16.
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administration, either areas
concernea with social
probl,.ems
or those concerned with
economic and financial
problems.
Changes in recruitment
policies were also reco^ended
to destroy the philosophy
of the amateur. .
majority, with
four dissenters, ut^xievea
believed i-h^^
that a= »"preference for C
,

the]

relevance" of the recruit's
academic work to his future
job
Should be Shown by a heavier
weighting of relevant subjects
(politics, economics, science)
and experience in the
entrance examinations. stress
was placed on recruits having
a greater understanding
of numerical techniques and
quantitative methods as solutions
to problems.

A Civil Service College whose
purpose would be to
contribute to increasing the
professional nature of the

Service was proposed.

The College, in the Committee's

opinion, would provide training
courses in management and
administration and conduct research into
the problems of
administration and policy.
To end the monopoly of the Administrative
Class gen-

eralists over the provision of advice to
Ministers, the
Committee advised the creation of Planning
Units headed

by a

Senior Policy Advisor who would assist the
Minister in
planning future policy and evaluating current

policies.

The

Committee stopped short, however, of recommending
that the
Senior Policy Advisor would share responsibility for
the

affairs of the department with the Permanent Secretary;
the

Permanent Secretary was to remain responsible for overall

departmental activities.
in addition the

Co^ittee proposed that
late entry

.nto the service should
he expanded.
Their view was that
late entrants fro.
industry, the professions,
and universities would hrin, in
new ideas and reduce
the isolation of
the service. Por the
sa.e reason, they
thought it desirahle
that there be .ore
.ove.ent in and out of the
service by
specialists, economists,
and professionals,
similarly, to
strengthen the control of
the Minister over his
department
and to provide alternative
sources of advice
the Co^ittee

supported the increased use
of personal political
appointments by Ministers.

A key proposal to end the
dominance of the Administrative Class generalist was
to
abolish all classes and to

replace the system with

a single,

covering all civil servants.

unified grading structure

The proposal would remove

horizontal barriers to movement
into the Administrative
Class by merging the Administrative,
Executive, and Clerical
Classes into an Administrative Group
and vertical barriers
by allowing free movement from one
occupation (scientist) to

another (administrator)

.

The uniformly graded structure,

similar to the U.S. civil Service and
British Petroleum, was
to enable more specialists to move
into policy-making
and

management positions and to promote better management
of
personnel and more efficiency.
In the Committee's view the creation of a grading
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structure would allow
the application
i-FXicarion of the
t-h. principles
of
accountable management.
"Accouni-^Ki
Accountable« management
means
holding individuals and
ptnri units
„r.-;^responsible for perfonnance
-asurea as objectively as
possible.^
•

•

. ,ra.in, structure,
the opinion of the
Co™„ittee, wouia facilitate
individual
job analysis, management
by
.
obiectivpc, and departmental
J uDjectives,
efficiency audits so that
performance could be measured
against cost or other
objective criteria and
individuals
could be held personally
responsible for their performance.
Lrke the Carter reform of
1978, an important component
of

-

"accountable management" was the
linkage of annual pay
increments to performance
evaluation.
Through reform of the
grading structure and use of
modern personnel management
techniques the Co^nittee believed
that more flexible,
econ-

omical, and efficient use could
be made of staff and promotion
could be based on uierir
•.
merit- rather
r-^t-Viov than
seniority
and class
membership.
•

TO implement these proposals the
Committee recommended

the establishment of a new Civil
Service Department which

would absorb the functions of the Civil
Service Commission
and manage the civil service. A new
department was needed
because many civil servants lacked confidence
in the Treasury
and many believed too much power was concentrated
.

in a

Treasury that exercised both financial and personnel
functions.

Consequently, the new department was not to be

^Ibid., p. 51.
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predominantly
4=^staffed k,,
Y staff
by officials
who had spent most
of
their careers in the
Treasury.
.

Finally, the Co^ittee
noted that the
professionalised
cxv.l service ™ust
"guard against the danger
of isolation"
and that "it should
remain the
uis servant of ^
democracy and be
responsive to the control
of Ministers. "^ Thus,
a greater
amount of openness and
wider consultation with
societal
interests was recommended.
This would require eliminating
unnecessary secrecy and a
modification of the traditional
anonymity of civil servants
by allowing civil servants
to
explain publicly what their
departments are doing, closer
links with the community were
to be achieved with the
new

recruitment procedures-more in
and outers, wider basis of
recruitment, expanded late entry,

m

particular, more pref-

erence for relevance would, the
Report assumed, ensure that
recruits "become more representative,
geographically,
educationally and socially of the nation
at large. "2 Greater
departmental responsiveness to Ministers
was to be achieved
by the Minister making more personal
and political appointments and also by giving the Minister
greater freedom
to

change the Permanent Secretary, Senior Policy
Adviser, and
Private Secretary when he came into office.
A number of observations should be made about
the

Fulton Committee's findings and recommendations.

First, as

^
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already su..estea, its
findings we.e largely
not .uch .ore
than a co.pUation o.
t.e current .asMona.Ie
criticises ana
were little affected
its own research and
evidence.
zts
crxt.cisms of amateurism,
ignorance of managerial
skills
Class barriers to
promotions,
and so forth "follow
slavishly

the political view which
had developed and on
which the

Government was determined
to act."l

clearly, the Report was

a

product of and tactic in the
larger political debate.
Second, many of the
Committee's recommendations
"merely confirmed developments
which were going ahead in
the
Civil service quite independently
of
[the Pulton] enquiry. "2

Since the war. Prime Ministers
had brought in their own
political advisors and certainly
since the 1964 election

departmental Ministers had felt free
to make political
appointments. In effect, the Committee
was just recognizing
and blessing an initiative that
had already
taken place.

Likewise, the service had already made
improvements in the
use of specialist staff, training
programs, and recruitment
procedures. Thus in under-rating the changes
that had

already occurred, the recommendations of the
Committee, as

/Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971): 222.
.

2

"Editorial:
Reforming the Bureaucracy," Public
Administration 46 (Winter 1968) :368.
3peta Sheriff, "Factors Affecting the Impact of the
Fulton Report," International Review of Administrative
Sciences 36 (1970) 220.

~

:
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one ^e^ber reflected
later, were ...roa.Xy
conservative "l
in aadition, ™any of
the recommendations
were consistent
wxth suggestions of the
staff associations and
even the
Treasury, xhe concern
to secure acceptance
of the Co^ittee-s proposals by the
civil service and
Government precluded
radrcal change. Furtherraore
the limited terms of
reference
given to the Committee
hindered it fro™ examining
,

the civil

service-s relationship with
Parliament or the civil
servant's
relationship with his Minister.
The Committee was conStrained from an explicit
exDlinit- attack
^t-i-o^u on
ministerial responsibility.
•

The fundamental reforms that
the Fulton Committee
hoped to secure were also
precluded by the ambiguity of
their recommendations. The
158 proposals contained something for everyone, with the
result that they were often
vague or conflicting. Creating a
more professional civil
service would increase its power
vis-a-vis the politicians
and conflict with efforts to achieve
more political control.
Greater use of management techniques and
managerial control
tends to conflict with a bureaucracy open
to public participation. While the Committee expected the
higher civil

service to remain a career service, it also called
for

increased late entry, more temporary appointments, more
interchange of staff, and more movement in and out of the
•'Sir James Dunnett, "The Civil Service: Seven Years
After Fulton," Public Administration 54 (Winter 1976): 372.

1
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service,

other examples could
be cited
t-itea, b.t
but tv,
these conflicting proposals are
sufficientJ^ricient to
f o illustrate
the failure of
the com^nittee to
consider its ,oals tKou.htf.u,
and systematically ana to pursue
them consistently. On
the other hand,
the pluralistic nature
narure of the ^
Report's recommendations
perhaps made for a hm^r^if^^y
broader base of^ acceptance
than would
have been likely otherwise.

^

1

Despite the ambiguous nature
of the Fulton Report, it
has, at the same time,
a clear emphasis on
managerialtechnical approaches to achieving
a more efficient, professionally-competent administration.
The Committee found a
civil service which was, in
their estimation, amateurish,
incompetent, and unprofessional.
Attempting to apply new
standards of performance to the
civil service, the Committee
adopted the techniques and language
of business. A competent
civil servant was one proficient in
using the techniques
of

quantitative management and expert in a
substantive area of
policy. Clearly influenced by the
intellectual environment
of the mid-1960s and the Management
Consultancy Group, the

Committee sought to replace informed judgment with
positivist
techniques and a liberally educated generalist with a
technically trained "professional."

So although from one

perspective the Committee's proposals were rather lackluster,
their implications were indeed radical in the context of

traditional British democratic politics.

Attempting to

redefine the prevailing notion of responsible administration,

.
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to establish new
e„ criteria
crii-or--;=> for
n
judging
the civil service,
the
Fulton Co™.ittee Report
challenged the notion of
ministerial
responsibility and the nature
of the political system.
Prevented from
jom e^vni
i o-; ^-^
explicitly
discussing and examining
ministerial responsibility by
its terms
termc! of v=<=
y ICS
reference, the Committee's
recommendations to establish
"accountable units" of work,
reduce anonymity of
administrators, and recruit more
technically trained civil
servants nonetheless struck
at the
center of the traditional
notion. To implement these
pro•

.

posals fully would possibly
require a modification of the
political system itself; to a
great extent the conduct of
public affairs would pass to
professional and managerial
experts
The failure of the Committee was
not necessarily in
undermining the notion of ministerial
responsibility, but in
not discussing nor apparently understanding
the implications
of their managerial approach for
responsible administration.

As Parris suggests, if the "Fulton-type
technocrats" were
adopted, it is possible that the British system
would

break

down because administrators and politicians would not
be able
to understand each other.

^

For while top administrators

^See "Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy,", p. 374,
and Lord Plowden and Sir Robert Hall, "The Supremacy of
Politics," The Political Quarterly 39 (October/December
1968): 368, for discussion of this view.
2

Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969), p. 315.
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wouia spea. t.e Xan,.a,e
of expertise ana
presu.a.l, co^e
fro. ^iaaxe ana „o..in,
clas. .ac.^.o.nas,
poUUcians wouia
co.e preaorainantly fro™
upper-.iaaie class Oxbriage
backgrounds. Essential
ingreaients of .utual trust
ana unaerstanding would possibly
disappear eroding the
policy-^aKin,
process. The Pulton
Co™,ittee thus ignores the
implication
of changing the fragile
but crucial relationship
between
administrators and politicians.

A further question not
considerea by the CoiMnittee
is
the impact upon the attitudes
and ethical
standards and

behavior of the civil servants
of giving preference to
those
trained in relevant specialties.
Fulton left no doubt that
pre- and post-entry training
for the
civil service was weak

in a number of respects.

Yet, as Chapman suggests in his

provocative article "Official Liberality,"
perhaps the
socialization provided by a classical
education and traditional on-the-job training "instills
acceptable codes which
may temper the possible excesses of
bureaucratic power."!
It is possible that traditional forms
of training in the

civil service impart a concept of morality
or conscience

which would be sorely lacking in

dominated by technicians.

a

public administration

Is having

more statisticians and

economists an important concern compared to having civil
servants with a high sense of public service and ethical
^Richard Chapman, "Official Liberality," Public
Administration 48 (Summer 1970) :132.
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appreciations

Are the two incompatible?

Perhap. not.

But

Fulton fails in not concerning
itself with the moral i.piications of a more managerial,

technical training program,
just as the Carter reformprc?
rerormers f^ii^^
failed to discuss the implications of performance appraisal
and bonuses on officials'
attitudes.

Finally, like their American
counterparts, the Committee was remiss in not understanding
that public administration is not just technique, that
administration and management are not synonymous. Where the
term "management-

suggests the application to the problems
of government
techniques that assume commensurable values
and measurable
social goals, the term "administration"
suggests "a process
of balancing and optimizing, in which,
by definition,
goals

can never be exactly fixed, tasks cannot be
exhaustively

specified and the methods chosen must themselves take

account of value judgments on the part of the administrator
and in the society at large which affect both priorities
and

modes of procedure.

"^

Where the goal of management is to

control and manipulate, administration seeks to "adjust

relations in
and values." 2

a

manner which satisfied a plurality of purposes
While no individual member of the Committee

would deny their commitment to democratic administration, as
a whole the Committee failed to pursue that commitment in a

'-"Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy," p.

^Ibid.

372

.
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consistent and thoughtful fashion.

g£^AM£gl_Rgactj^n- ^^

^^^

j^^^^

If the Fulton Committee was
a politically inspired

enterprise which produced a political
document, it is not
surprising that the reaction to the
Report was also politicized. The immediate reaction was
mixed, ranging from

enthusiastic support to enthusiastic
denigration.

Roger

Opie, an economist who had served as
a temporary advisor

under Labour, argued that the power of
the civil service
should be curbed by implementing the Fulton

proposals at

once.^

On the other hand. Lord Simey, a member of the
Com-

mittee, issued a reservation to Chapter

1

that pronounced it

unfair to the civil service by not recognizing the
great

contribution the service had made to Britain.

The proposals,

he argued, were not radical changes but evolutionary in the

direction the Service was already moving.

Undoubtedly

speaking for the Treasury and many higher civil servants,
Simey posited that while modern quantitative techniques are
needed, they do not "supercede the importance of the funda-

mental qualities of judgment" and "decisiveness, and the

ability to understand how the reshaping of values may be
embodied in and implemented by public policy."^

Likewise,

Lord Helsby, former Head of the Home Civil Service, denounced
•'-Roger Opie, "Implement at Once," New Statesman 75,
June 28, 1968, pp. 859-60.

^F.C. Report, Vol. 1, p. 102.
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the Report and asserted
that it had a "rather
imperfect
understanding" of what a
professional is in the British

government.^

F. a. Bishop,

a

retired Permanent Secretary,

noted that Fulton had put "the
cart before the horse" by
focusing on the lack of professionalism
and specialists
rather than studying the machinery
of government-its size,
the proliferation of departments,
overlapping
functions.^

In

The_Listener, Eric Hobsbawm accused
the Committee of "cloudy
thinking" because the quality of its
analytic work was
particularly bad.-^

Editorial comment in Public Administration

,

journal of

the Royal Institute for Public Administration,
was highly
critical of the Fulton Report, arguing that it was
a technical, management, efficiency approach to reform
which over-

looked political constraints and the purposes of public

administration.^

Similarly, The Times

'

conclusion was that

the Report "is heavy in technical appraisal of immediate

practical problems, and light in political reflection."^
The Economist was also critical of the Report, specific

'Lord Helsby, "The Fulton Report," The Liste ner
July 18, 1968, pp. 859-60.
2

80,

F, A. Bishop, "Fulton: The Cart Before the Horse,"
June 28, 1968, pp. 883-84.
,

Spectator
3

•

Eric Hobsbawm, "The Fulton Report: A Further View,"
The Listener 80, July 18, 1968, pp. 67-68.
^See "Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy."
^

The Time s, June 27, 1968, p. 11.

.

proposals as well as its generally
"rude" treatment of the
civil service.
"The report is wide open to
criticisms as an
assault on the whole-time gifted
amateurs of Whitehall by a

part-time group of gifted amateurs,
gathered in that most
nineteenth-century of British constitutional

mechanisms, an

ad_hoc investigation by a number of
uncommitted gentlemen,
meeting about once a week for three years,
on

a royal commis-

sion or committee
The response of the staff associations
representing
the professional and clerical and executive
classes was

muted in tone, pledging to study the Report's
proposals but
disappointed that the Committee found it necessary to
caricature the civil service.

The First Division Associa-

tion responded that "the service cannot command respect or

have reasonable morale unless everyone recognizes that technical expertise and efficient procedures are not enough."^

Among the civil service unions there was general support for
the creation of a new Civil Service Department, the Civil

Service College, and the proposals for better promotion
opportunities.

Yet there was also deep skepticism about the

proposed abolition of classes among Treasury and First
^"The Good and Faithful Service," The Economist 227,
June 29, 1968, p. 15.
2

.

First Division Association, A Report by a subcommittee, "Professional Standards in the Public Service," Public
Administration 50 (Summer 1972): 181.
.

.

.

.

.
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Division civil servants, the
Institution of Professional
Civil servants, and the Society
of civil Servants.

To

convert the top civil servants and
unions Crowther-Hunt
relates how the Committee held
discussions with "Sir William

Armstrong (later Lord) long before it
was publicly announced
that he was to head the new Civil
Service Department, " ^ with
other top civil servants in the Treasury,
and with some
of

the civil service unions.

In retrospect, Crowther-Hunt

feels that such discussions were
counter-productive, allowing
the officials to prepare their counter-attack.^
In order to overcome the expected civil service
resis-

tance, the Committee also engaged in "high-level
ministerial

lobbying before the Report was published."^

Yet, in the

Cabinet, support for the Fulton recommendations was

unenthusiastic.

The opposition of the Chancellor of the

Exchequer was assured; the creation of

a

new Civil Service

Department would remove significant power from his control.
Other Ministers were cautious.

Wilson had at first received

the backing of only Tony Benn and Peter Shore.

As events

would have it, Wilson began a June 25th Cabinet meeting by
exploding about a weekend leak on a sensitive political
issue by some Ministers.

To assuage the Prime Minister's

'Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt, The Civil
Servants (London: Macdonald General Books, 1980) pp. 57-58
,

2lbid.
Ibid., p. 56.

^

ire,

the Cabinet gave him an easy
time on the Fulton Report.
The next day, June 26, 1968,
the Prime Minister
announced to the House of Commons
the Government's acceptance
of three key recommendations:
the creation of a new Civil

Service Department, the establishment
of a Civil Service
College, and the abolition of classes
within the civil service. Of the latter, Wilson went on
to say that the Government "will enter immediately into
consultations with
the

Staff Associations with a view to carrying
out the thoroughgoing study proposed by the Committee, so that
a practicable
^Y^^^T^ can be prepared for the implementation of the
unified

grading structure in accordance with the timetable
proposed
by the Committee."^
The first full Parliamentary debate on the Fulton rec-

ommendations took place in the House of Lords in July; the

dominant issues were the Report's characterization of the
civil service as amateurish and the abolition of classes.

Lord Snow

(C.

P.

Snow)

took the position that "the contem-

porary stereotype is the very unhappy one that the Civil
Service is composed of amateurs,"^ while Lord Robbins argued
that the characterization was "intellectually muddled,

morally unfair and extremely damaging to the interests of
llbid.
2

Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
series. Vol. 767 (1968) :456, (my emphasis).
^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Lords)
series. Vol. 295 (1968):1104.

,

,

5th

5th

the State. "1

Regarding the abolition of
classes, Lord
Trevelyan, nephew of sir
Charles Trevelyan, warned
that th e
Report had a tendency to
level down too much and
praised th e
French Civil Service for the
creation of an administrative
elite.
AS a reflection of upper
social class
opinion, it is

not surprising that Lord
Fulton appeared to be in a minority
as he emphasized that "we
were right to recommend the
abolition of all artificial divisions. "2

Debate in the House of Commons was
quiet by contrast.
In debate in November of 1968,
Wilson rejected the Committee's proposal that selection of
administrators should favor
those who had studied relevant subjects
at university on the
grounds "that to accept the recommendation
would close to
the Civil Service a very wide field of
possible candidates
who have started or who may in future start on
their chosen

university courses long before they had decided that
they
wanted to become civil servants."^ MP Winstanley vocalized
an interesting and perhaps persuasive argument, at least for

Conservatives, in noting that "people who study subjects of
that kind [social sciences] do tend,

towards the Left in politics.""^
-'Ibid.,

column 1129.

"^Ibid.,

column 1169.

I

think, to lean

Yet for the most part the

•^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
series. Vol. 773 (1968):1553.

^Ibid., column 1622.

,

5th

commons acquiesced in the Pulton
proposals.
Indeed, Edward
Heath, loader of the opposition,
was in agreement with the
main recommendations."^
Thus it appears that Wilson's
political objective had
been achieved. A report appeared
with considerable fanfa re
and momentarily received considerable
attention. Wilson was
able to accept the Report's major
recommendations immediately
and begin implementation of those
recommendations that the

primary participants found acceptable.

On November

1,

196 8,

the new Civil Service Department was
officially established
and in June 1970 the Civil Service College
was formally
opened.

The proposal for the abolition of classes,
the most

controversial of them all, was ceremoniously accepted and

conveniently delegated to the civil service officials and
unions to be implemented privately.

The politicians' concern

to appear to respond to popular demands for reform had
been

accomplished.

As the pressures of more immediate constituent

and policy concerns took over, the detailed implementation
of the reforms was left to the civil servants.
It is now in vogue, as part of the post-Fulton

critique, to argue that the civil service sabotaged the

Fulton reforms, that the unions and Treasury officials

worked to prevent the change Fulton prescribed.

In a 1980

version of this critique. Lord Crowther-Hunt and Peter

Ibid., columns 1572-80.

Kellner

claim that Administrative
Class civil servants not
only had the power to block
the key Fulton proposals
but, at
the same time, had the audacity
to assert they actually
carried them out. a new Civil
Service Department was created
by Harold Wilson, but, these
authors argue, it was staffed
by the same Treasury amateurs
who always had been responsible for the civil service. Likewise,
the abolition of

classes was accepted in principle, but
the civil service
mandarins cleverly maintained a de facto
class structure that
preserved their power. Increased selection
of late-entrants,

in-and-outers, and specialists at higher
levels was merely
proclaimed a fact by the mandarins without any
substantive
change.
Thus it was, in the story told by Kellner and

Crowther-Hunt, that the old Administrative Class, largely
in
the figure of Sir William Armstrong, then Head of the
Civil

Service Department, simply carried out those proposals that
it wanted and ignored the others.

The triumph of the

amateurs in the battle over Fulton epitomizes for Kellner
and Crowther-Hunt the unchecked power of the civil service

vis-a-vis Parliament and Ministers.
Another version of the bureaucracy's role in reform is
perhaps possible.

To discuss, develop, and implement the

details of the Fulton Report

a

Joint Committee of the

National Whitley Council was established immediately after
the Prime Minister accepted the Report.

The Joint Committee

•'Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants.

—

.
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was composed of higher civil
servants (Official Side) and
union Officials (Staff Side),
including Sir Willia. Armstror^,
Who, as Joint Permanent Secretary
responsible for management
prior to and during the Fulton
deliberations, and Permanent
Secretary of the new Civil Service
Department and
Head of

the Home Civil Service after
Fulton, was involved in each
stage of the reform debate. He had
presented evidence on
behalf of the Treasury to Fulton, had
been privy to discussions with Committee members during work
on the Report, had

cautioned Wilson about too hasty

a

decision on the abolition

of classes and counseled that further
study was necessary.

Post-Fulton, Armstrong served as chairman of the
National
Whitley Council Joint Committee. Armstrong was
supportive
of the Civil Service College and new Civil Service
Depart-

ment but he had reservations about the Fulton proposal for
unified grading structure, believing that such

would create staffing problems.

a

a structure

At the same time Armstrong

believed that change in the civil service was desirable
more flexible career management, less anonymity, better

pension arrangements.
Reporting the progress of its discussions and decisions

m

a series of four pamphlets,

2

the Joint Committee took the

"'Interview with Lord Armstrong, London, April 30, 1980
2

Joint Committee of the National Whitley Council:
Developments on Fulton (February 1969) Fulton: A Framework
for the Future (March 1970)
Fulton--The Reshaping of the
Civil Service: Developments During 1970 (March 1971) and
The Shape of the Post-Fulton Civil Service (March 1972)
;

;

;
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view that

"an

institutions benefit f.o. ti.e
to ti.e fro. a
radical review: and the
Fulton Cor^ittee have provided
a
major opportunity for this
in the Civil Service.
These
opportunities do not arise often.
The Official and Staff
Sides of the National Whitley
Council are in agreement on
the
high importance of making the
fullest possible use
of it."^

Thus both sides of the civil
service appeared ready to use
the Fulton Report as an
opportunity to make administrative
changes. And further, "both sides
agree that it is wrong to
limit our examination of possible
changes to those which the
Fulton committee specifically proposed, "2
thereby extricating
themselves from being bound by the exact
Fulton
proposals.

According to the Joint Committee, "clearly,
this is going to
be a long job.""^
The main problem for the Joint Committee was to
devise
a practicable means for abolishing the civil
service classes

and implementing a unified grading structure.

For Wilson

this reform meant "that for everyone in the civil service,

whether from

a

college of technology, or from a university,

whether he or she comes in from industry or from
sion

— all

in future,

a profes-

the school-leaver, the graduate, the

accountant, the engineer, the scientist, the lawyer

— for

all

of them there will be an open road to the top which, up to
•^

Developments on Fulton

^Ibid.

,

p.

1.
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now, has been,

in the main,

through the Administrative

Class.

Although enthusiastic about the goal
of abolishii
".ng
classes, Wilson apparently did not
have a clear picture of
how this would be done. The Joint
Committee
'

was itself

1.
.ess

enthusiastic and asserted that "the
introduction of a new
structure is far too great an undertaking
to be completed in
a single heave.
it will therefore be necessary to
approach
the task in stages. "2 Thus on January
1, 1971, the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes were
merged into

an

Administrative Group.

This was followed in September 1971

by the merger of the Scientific Classes into a
single Science

Category and in January 1972 by the merger of the Works
Group of Professional Classes and other professional and
technical classes into a Professional and Technology
Category.

The changes went far to remove the horizontal

barriers to promotion within the service.
On January

1,

1972, a step was taken to remove the

vertical barriers to mobility as the Joint Committee introduced a unified grading structure for the 600-700 positions
of Under-Secretary and above which allowed posts to be

filled by the most suitable person, whether specialist or

generalist.

But the change fell short of the Fulton recom-

mendation for a unified system from top to bottom and.
Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
series. Vol. 767 (1968) :456.
-'-Great

,

^National Whitley Council, Developments on Fulton
p.

24.

5th

,

xnterestingly enough, was
just what the Treasury had
recommended to the Pulton
Co^^ittee. Whether this partial
reform
represents a triumph of the
bureaucracy's power to thwart
real reform or the best
reform possible given the administrative and political constraints
depends to some extent on
one's view of the nature of
bureaucratic power and
reform.

But it is clear that within
the Joint Committee there was
very little support for a
completely unified grading system.
The First Division Association
and the Society of Civil
Servants opposed the move on grounds
that it would disadvantage their members, and the
Official Side, led by Armstrong,
believed the unification of grades would
be detrimental to
the efficient use of staff.
The unification of grades at
the higher levels only was the result
of negotiation among
civil servants who were responsible for
running the machine
on a day-to-day basis. Incremental reform was
predictable

given that the burden of actually making the
administrative
changes was given to those very officials under attack
and,
further, given that change was the result of bargaining

within the bureaucracy itself.

That this particular reform,

and by implication many others, was only an approximation
of
the recommended reform appears, then, to need explaining
by

more than a "sabotage theory."

In reality,

the incremental

nature of reform was due to the complex intera-ction of union
and official self-interest, lack of clear principles and
goals to guide reform, competing perspectives, and lack of
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parliamentary-poXitical interest,

m

short, it may be

argued that the Pulton proposals
were never implemented in
full because there never
developed a clear political
consensus that these were the correct
proposals for shaping
a responsible civil service.

Other reforms were implemented by
the civil service in
the years immediately after Fulton. ^

Systems were introduced

for job appraisal reviews between
the line manager and his

subordinates, thus developing accountable
management as
recommended by Fulton. Arrangements were made
for greater
staff movement within occupational groups and
between
the

civil service and industry.

New recruitment techniques were

instituted and agreement was reached on new arrangements
for
early retirement. The final Joint Committee report concludes that "the impetus and stimulation derived from the

Fulton Report have permanently changed the nature of the
Service." 2
ti

Perhaps, more accurately, it should be said that

the momentum provided by external pressure and the Fulton

Report was used by those groups and individuals in the civil
service most affected by reform and desirous of change to

pursue those reforms that served their interests.
service cannot be said to have played

a

The civil

role opposed to

change; but it appears that the service's role was to

National Whitley Council, Shape of the Post
Fulton Civil Service pp. 2-3.
-^See

,

^Ibid., p.

3.

-

.
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accommodate or even create change
in order to conserve
what
a consensus within the
civil service believed to be
the
strengths of British administration.^

To some extent, then,

the picture of responsible
administration held by the civil
service was different from that
picture held by the Fulton
reformers. But the picture that
emerged was less a single
snapshot than a collage of interests
and goals.

Latter-Day Prophets and Responsible
Administration

Because of the incremental nature of the
implemented
reforms and the nature of the debate about
responsible
administration, it is not surprising that a new
wave of
criticism of the civil service soon began to swell.

By 1972,

four years after Fulton reported, it was becoming
clear to

many observers that the reform promised by Fulton had
been
aborted.

The tone and nature of the criticisms beginning in

1973 and continuing through the early 1980s fills one with a

sense of dgja vu.

In late 1973, a new Fabian tract appeared

calling for the next step in administrative reform to
continue in the direction indicated by the Fulton Management

Consultancy Group. 2

Throughout the late 1970s and early

198 0s editorial comment and letters to the editors began to
'-Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p. 188.

...

?

John Garrett and Robert Sheldon, Administrative
Reform: The Next Step Fabian Tract 4 28 (London: Fabian
Society, 1973)
,

—
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be concerned about burf^;?nr-T-^+--i
^•
Dureaucratic^ spending,
overstaf f ing,
inefficiency,
"rpu^
and nnwc^r
power.
^, aiiu
The power system in Whitehall/'
r.

wrote Michael Meacher, "is in no
sense a democracy, but
rather a mandarin-dominated bureaucracy
with only limited
ministerial control,
ArtiVlc^Q calling
o=,n-;r,^ -p^
^
Arricies

for reform appeared

in popular periodicals- New Society

Listener,

,

^

New Statesman

,

3

The

etc —indicting the civil service
for having too
much power or for resisting change. Robert
Taylor, for
.

4

example, claimed that "Whitehall is in need
of root and
branch reform, ten years after the Fulton report.

...

generalist approach still rules supreme. "5

The

individual

members of Parliament returned to stressing themes of
civil
service power or laying blame for policy failures on the

bureaucracy.

Labour MP Tony Benn in a speech to the Royal

Institute for Public Administration posited the thesis "that
the power, role, influence and authority of the senior

levels of the civil service in Britain

— especially

now we

l"Men who block the corridors of power," The Guardian
June 14, 1979, p. 16.

,

^David Lipsey, "Who's in Charge in Whitehall?," New
Society 52, April 24, 1980, pp. 155-57.
94,

^G. Cunningham, "Myths and Mandarins," New Statesman
September 23, 1977, pp. 387-88.

—

'^Lord Crowther-Hunt, "Whitehall
just passing through,"
The Listener 96, December 16, 1976, pp. 772-74; "Whitehall
the balance of power," The Listener 97, January 6, 1977,

pp. 10-11;
97,

"The case for civil service power," The Listener

January 13, 1977, pp. 43-45.

^Robert Taylor, "Generalist Cult," New Society
September 22, 1977, p. 601.

41,

.

265

are members of the EEC-have
grown to such an extent as to
create the embryo of a corporate
state."! Former Labour MP
Brian Sedgemore continues the
theme by asserting that "Two
things only can be said with
certainty about Parliamentary
democracy in Britain today. First,
effective power does not
reside in Parliament. Secondly,
there is little that is
democratic about the exercise of that
power. "^ por Sedgemore
the civil service mandarins are among
the establishment
figures who govern by secrecy and
illegitimate use of power.
By 1976 Parliament as a whole had again
taken enough notice
of the criticisms of the civil service for
the House of

Commons Expenditure Committee to conduct a review
of matters
affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil
Service.

Latter-day prophets like Benn and Sedgemore are given
aid and comfort by the highly visible criticism provided by

Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt
book. The Civil Servants

.

,

in a widely-reviewed

"What is at issue," they argue,

"is the competence of senior civil servants

power:

— and

also their

their power to influence governments and parliaments,

their power to select their own successors, and their power

^Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Civil
Service" (Nottingham: Institute for Workers' Control, 1980),
p

.

1
2

Brian Sedgemore, The Secret Constitution (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1980), p. 11.
"^Great Britain, Eleventh Report from the Expenditure
Committee, The Civil Service, Vols. 1-3, 1977.

to resist Change."

m

their estimation, the Pulton
reforms
had been sabotaged by the
higher civil servants and,
in

particular, Armstrong, with the
result that generalist
administrators have more power than
ever to the detriment of
open and parliamentary controlled
government.

While the external critics are
building pressure for
new reform, internal critics,
ingredients which

have proved

necessary in the past, are contributing
to the pressures for
change.
The civil service unions and
higher officials

continue to press for changes which will
benefit their
members and facilitate administrative flexibility
and

continuity.

Thus the debate over the nature of a respon-

sible civil service and the ebb and flow of reform
continues.

What of the future?

Perhaps with the proper political push,

such as a return to Labour Government in the mid-1980s,

Britain will see the creation of

a

new committee charged

with restoring responsible government.

Kellner and Crowther-Hunt

,

The Civil Servants, p. 20.

2

.

CHAPTER

.

VI

BRITAIN AND AMERICATHE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBLE
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Presumably both Jimmy Carter and
Harold Wilson would
declare that the reforms they
championed had gone far to
secure responsible public administration.

For as President

Carter stated when he signed into law
the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978,
this legislation provides a fundamental and,
long overdue reform of the Federal bureaucracyI think
i
I
puts incentive and reward back into the
Federal system.
It allows Federal employees to be encouraged,
transferred, or discharged for the right reasons
if they cannot or will not perform. This bill will make
the
bureaucracy more responsible. It will build in
incentives
'

And Prime Minister Wilson echoed similar sentiments upon
accepting the recommendations of the Fulton Commission in
1968 when he said,
I am
with
than
that

confident that the Report will stand comparison
the historic Northcote-Trevelyan Report of more
a century ago.
The Fulton Report
finds
insufficient attention has been paid to management
in the Service, and calls for a new system of training,
organization and career management.
This Report is
an essential contribution to the modernization of the
basic institutions of the country.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Jimmy Carter, "Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, " Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 14, No. 41 (October 13, 1978):1761.
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates (Commons), 5th series, Vol. 767 1968 ): 4 54-55
(
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The question to be asked is
whether these reforms indeed
have been on the right track
in the search for administrative responsibility.
if so, how?
if not, why not?
The argument presented here
is that responsible public
administration in contemporary
democracy is characterized

by
its responsiveness to changing
political and social values
and forces, its broad representation
of the groups it serves,
and its balanced commitment to
professional competence and
ethical, moral ideals.
several important respects the
reforms of public administration have
shown themselves to be
on the right track.

m

Social and Intellectual Influences
On Reform

Each of the reform efforts studied here has received
its impetus from mounting social and intellectual
pressures.

Reform has not occurred in isolation from the social and
intellectual forces of the period.

Changes in administra-

tive structure and processes have been made to make adminis-

tration compatible with newly predominant social values.
And although it is true that in the environment of politics,
ideas and systematic analysis are often subordinated to

bargained agreement among interest groups, "it would be rash
to conclude from this that those responsible for initiating

and implementing administrative reform in Britain

C

and the

United States] had been uninfluenced by ideas, or that the
intellectual climate has had no influence upon
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„1
administrators."!

For indeed, Sir Charles Trevelyan
was

strongly influenced by the ideas of
Benjamin Jowett regarding
competitive university examinations for
awards.

And 19th

century American reformers were in
turn influenced by
British ideas. Both the Northcote-Trevelyan

Report and the

Pendleton Act were products of 19th century
liberal thought.
The attack by Northcote and Trevelyan on
patronage
was

rooted in the liberal concept of competition or
meritocracy.
Similarly, American reformers of the same period
based their
campaign against spoils politics on notions of
political

liberty, open competition, and Puritan morality.

After World War II British society was heavily influenced by egalitarian values and infused with intellectual

criticisms of the old standards of competence.

Responsive to

this new climate, the Fulton Committee applied new standards
to the selection,

servants.

training, and organization of senior civil

It abolished the civil service class system,

eliminating the Administrative Class in favor of a more open

Administrative Group.

A majority of the Fulton Committee

believed that in the selection and training of top administrators a heavier emphasis should be given to relevant subjects such as economics and social sciences rather than the

classics studied at "Oxbridge."

The Fulton Committee was

influenced also by the growing belief

in science,

technology.

'-Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p. 195.
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and n,anagement science to
solve the country's problems,
it
emphasized the application of
scientific and business
methods to the civil service.
Recommendations to select
senior civil servants who possessed
mathematical
skills and

to hold these civil servants
accountable through quantitative

performance assessment were quite
compatible with emerging
social values.
In the 19th century in Britain the
rise of a new

middle class to positions of social and
political predominance led to pressures for a more representative

bureaucracy.

Similarly, the emergence of a strong labour
movement and
Labour Party in the postwar years led to demands for
a more

representative higher civil service.

The effort to replace

generalists/amateurs with professionals, managers, and
specialists and Oxbridge educated elites with middle and

working class graduates of the London School of Economics
and red brick universities was evidence of widespread

perceptions of the higher civil service as unrepresentative
of the outlook of the working and middle classes and their

political leadership.
Likewise, in the United States civil service reform

has been in tune with the prevailing social-intellectual

climate.

The postwar years, with the exception of the 1960s

to early 1970s, have been characterized by widespread

demands for reduced governmental spending and activity and
by a pervasive belief that business principles and management

techniques are key remedies for
problems in government. The
ideologically conservative Second Hoover
Commission responded
to these trends by proposing
drastic overall
reductions in

governmental functions and a corps of
career senior civil
servants distinctly separated from the
political executives.
The 1970s saw the re-emergence of deep
distrust in government and the growth of social attitudes that
disparage
public service and worship the marketplace.
Public choice

theories and quantitative productivity measurement
techniques
gained a wide following. in this environment a
Senior Exec-

utive Service was created to change administrative
behavior
by stressing monetary incentives and security disincentives.

Reformers held up the civil service to a yardstick metered
by business performance standards and managerial techniques

and found it wanting.

A concern for the representative character of the
bureaucracy was linked closely to these changes in socialpolitical attitudes.

The work of the Second Hoover Commis-

sion can be seen as less a concern for social class repre-

sentativeness than for the increased representation of

conservative business-market values in the higher civil
service.

It is apparent that a goal of the 1978 Reform Act

was to make the senior civil service more representative of
the managerial outlook of the Carter/Campbell Administration.
It is also clear that concerns for increased representation

of women and minority group members was not a major concern.

.
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reflecting the political sensitivity
of the issue.
large extent these public and
intellectual

To a

attitudes

regarding bureaucracy have been
rooted in events external to
the issue of civil service reform.
The Pressure of Externa l Events

Administrative reform does not take place in
a vacuum.
Decisions about the ways administration should
be changed

are often influenced by events external to
the immediate

civil service reform context.

In both America and Britain

reform has been a product of multiple external forces
or
events.
Four examples provide evidence for the way external
events have stimulated civil service reform:

war,

economic

pressures, scandal, and growth of government

Newspaper accounts informing the public of mismanage-

ment and confusion in the administration of the Crimean War
in 1853 provided a stimulus for the Northcote-Trevelyan

reforms.

Public reaction to these accounts contributed to

the creation of a new Government under Palmerston who

quickly began implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report.
The Second World War was an event of considerable

significance for civil service reform in both the United
States and Britain.

In both countries the war stretched the

-'This discussion draws from Chapman and Greenaway's
analysis of external events as they relate to British
reform, in Ibid., pp. 210-15.

.

capacity of public administration,
revealing its weakne=isses
Particularly in Britain, serious
questions were raised about
the professional and managerial
competence of senior
officials as large numbers of
outsiders had to be called
into government service at top
levels.

Some of these tempo-

rary wartime civil servants also
questioned the personal
qualities of Administrative Class
officials, claiming they
lacked initiative and creativity.
Both of these criticisms
were taken up by the Fulton reformers.
In both

the U.S. and

Britain the war stimulated experiments
to improve efficiency
through better planning techniques,
performance appraisal
systems, and training programs.

Subsequent civil service

reforms were influenced by these wartime efforts.

World War II and the postwar years have been marked
by
economic uncertainty and instability. In Britain, for
example, widespread academic and popular criticism of the

higher civil service was grounded in the inefficiency of the

economic departments of central government, particularly the
Treasury.

And critics blamed the "amateur" character of the

Administrative Class for Britain's economic reverses.
Interestingly, economic pressures also were partially

responsible for the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.

Parliamen-

tary dissatisfaction with rising costs of administration led
to a series of investigations by a Parliamentary committee

beginning in 1848.

The Northcote-Trevelyan Report emerged

as one of these investigative reports noting that economic
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efficiencies could be gained by
civil service reform.
Economic pressures have been
important in influencing
united States civil service
reform.
The Second Hoover

commission was motivated by

a desire to cut government
spen-

ding and to reduce the impact of
public administration on
the economy. The state of the
economy was a stimulus to the
carter reforms in ways that are
difficult to measure.

Clearly the widespread public agitation
for reduced taxes
and government spending was an impetus
for reform.
In

addition, popular perceptions that government
is wasteful
and inefficient had a direct impact on the
tone and sub-

stance of the Carter reforms.

Chapman and Greenaway's

observation regarding British reform appears relevant to
reform in America also:
"the interesting lesson emerges
that efforts to cut down the cost or extent of government

activity have frequently stimulated proposals leading to
administrative

reform.""""

If this observation holds true,

is likely that Britain and the U.S.

it

soon will experience

another round of civil service reform as economic conditions

deteriorate and skepticism of government remains high.^

^Ibid., p. 212.
2

For example, a measure recently has been sponsored by
Republican Senator William Roth and Democratic Representative Richard Boiling to create an eighteen-member Citizens
Commission on More Effective Government. Modeled on the two
Hoover Commissions, this time former President Ford has been
suggested as possible chairman.

An examination of the reforms studied
here suggests
that the exposure of political scandal
also has

incited the

movement toward reform.

Publication of the details of the

frauds and extortions perpetrated in the
Grant Administration created public outrage that was tapped
by reformers.
And clearly, the assassination of President
Garfield had a
direct impact on the passage of the Pendleton
bill.

in

Britain, criminal abuse had been checked early on,
but indig
nation over periodic cases of maladministration gave
the

Northcote-Trevelyan reforms some push.

Although no particu-

lar political or administrative scandal directly influenced
the Fulton reform effort, occasional exposure of official

abuse, such as the Crichel Down affair, indirectly contrib-

uted to the reform climate.

In the postwar U.S., well

publicized accounts of scandals involving career and noncareer officials at all levels of government reinforced
attitudes already negative toward government.

A final example of an external event that has influenced civil service reform is the growth of government.

In

each of the postwar reforms studied, the growth of positive

government has stimulated reform in two ways.

Pressure has

been placed on administrators to find more effective
approaches to meeting increased public demands.

For example

many of the Fulton Committee proposals were already in the
process of being implemented in 1968 and the SES had been
incubating in the U.S. Civil Service Commission for many
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years just waiting for the
appropriate political moment to
be hatched. At the same time,
among large segments of the
population in Britain and the U.S.,
governmental growth has
led to perceptions of a bureaucracy
growing increasingly
powerful. A concern for bureaucratic
power has precipitated
political demands for increased administrative
accountability
and responsiveness.

The Impact of Politics and
P olitical Values

In the postwar years, political leaders,
particularly

chief executives, also have found bureaucratic power

troublesome.

Both British and American reformers attacked a

bureaucracy which they believed had grown too resistant to
change, too closed, and too powerful.

Hoover and Republican

Congressional leaders in the 1950s, the Labour Party in the
1960s, and the Carter Administration in the 1970s perceived

that a powerful civil service threatened achievement of

their political goals.

Thus reform, in their eyes, was an

attempt not only to make the civil service more representative of their various political outlooks, but to change the

relationship between the bureaucracy and the political executives so that the politicians would exert more leadership.
To promote political responsiveness the Fulton Commit-

tee urged an increase in the number of political advisors, a

decrease in the traditional anonymity of career civil
servants, and a more exacting standard of accountability
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through management-by-objective
techniques.

For the same

reasons the Hoover Commission
recommended enlarging the
number of political executives who
were to be sharply
separated from a corps of career officials
with rigidly
defined responsibilities. And the Senior
Executive Servic
Lce
is an attempt to increase the bureaucracy's
responsiveness
to the President by giving him flexibility to
reassign

senior career officials, to place either career or
political
appointees in general SES positions, and to reward senior

career executives for "good" performance.

Civil service

reform in the postwar years, then, has emphasized the value
of political responsiveness to executive leadership.

And yet the nature of the reform process suggests that
reform has been the pursuit of many political interests and
values.

The impetus for reform arises from pressure exerted

by many political actors, including the chief executive, as

well as by social and intellectual forces.

The reformed

civil service is a result of political consensus, however
temporary, among reform participants.

The present examina-

tion of reform in Britain and the United States points up
the central role of interest group, pluralist politics in

bringing about administrative change.

Civil service reform

has emerged from the interaction of seven different political sources:

public opinion, individual reformers, senior

civil servants, interest groups, political parties.

^
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Congress/Parliament, and President/Prime
Minister.
Although broad public dissatisfaction
with government
and economics often is a stimulus
for reform, it seldom is
so well focused as to affix itself
specifically on civil
service reform. Except perhaps when
associated with public
spending, problems of government organization
and
civil

service do not excite much public interest.
"sexy" issues.

They are not

However, public opinion often has been

"educated" by individual reformers and reform-minded
groups
to perceive that reform of the civil service is
the solution

for national ills.

In 1855 in Britain the Administrative

Reform Association helped to focus public agitation with
government ineptness in handling the Crimean War on the more
specific criticisms raised by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report,

Likewise in the U.S., reform leaders such as Jenckes, Eaton,
Schurz, and organizations such as the National Civil Service

Reform League transformed public disgust with government
scandals and the assassination of President Garfield into a

more specific demand for civil service reform.

In the

postwar period, widespread public unrest associated with
economic instability, loss of confidence in government, and
feelings of lost national prestige was appropriated by

reformers to fashion the Carter and Fulton reforms.

Reform leaders, therefore, have been crucial in every
'See Chapman and Greenaway, pp. 201-208 for a more
detailed discussion of the impact of political pressure on
British administrative reform.

reforming effort.

just as the Pendleton Act would not
have

been possible without the intense commitment
of Eaton,
Schurz and others, neither would the Carter

reform legisla-

tion have survived without the leadership of
Carter,

Campbell, and Udall.

The motivations of the individual

reform leaders have been as varied as the individuals.
Sometimes civil service reform is supported because it

yields short-term political advantages, as when President

Eisenhower supported the creation of the Second Hoover Com-

mission to placate Congressional Republicans.

Reform is

advocated by other individuals because it coincides with
their broader political goals and view of the public
interest.

Harold Wilson's support of the Fulton Committee

partially emerged from his belief that its recommendations

would support his conviction that more specialization in the
Administrative Class was in the public's interest.

Likewise,

the enthusiasm of Jimmy Carter and Herbert Hoover for a

senior civil service corps was nurtured by their belief that
such a corps would make government more business-like and

management conscious.

To their minds,

demanded such standards.

the public good

Individual leaders, even with their

varied motivations, have given reform efforts focus and
energy.

Senior civil servants also have been key participants
in civil service reform.

They have applied pressure for

reform, developed the reform proposals and framework, and
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guided its implementation.

Personnel administrators in the

U.S. Civil Service Commission
throughout the late 1960s and
early 1970s not only worked to
develop proposals
for a

senior civil service, but also worked
closely with Presidential appointees on political strategy
and Congressional
members and staff on legislative details.
It is clear that
the response of senior career executives
to the new SES will
weigh heavily on its prospects for the future.
In
Britain,

civil service officials already had developed and,
indeed,
had begun implementation of some of the Fulton
proposals

when the Committee reported.

Consolidation of classes and

an increased access to top posts for specialists are notable

examples.
tions,

After Wilson accepted selected Fulton recommenda-

the senior civil service was responsible for

implementing those recommendations.

In implementing the

Fulton proposal to abolish civil service classes, the civil
service modified and moderated the impact of this proposal.
To many critics this simply illustrated the unrestrained

power of the civil service.

For others, however, its

ability to guide the implementation of policy in this way
suggests the responsible use of power to adjust policy to
fit administrative and political realities.

Interest groups, too, have played an important role in
the reform process

— in

initiating the reform, shaping the

contents of the reform package, stimulating political

support or opposition, and implementing the reform.

In the

.

.
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nineteenth century the Administrative
Reform Association in
Britain and the National Civil Service
Reform League in
America were critical to the creation
of civil service

systems.

Similarly, the Citizens Committee for
the Hoover

Report was organized to generate support
for both Hoover
Commissions
In the Fulton and Carter reform debates,
interest

groups lined up on either side of the issues in
typical
patterns. For example, civic, professional, managerial,

and

business groups generally supported Fulton and Carter reform
proposals as contributions to more effective government.

On

the other hand, veterans' organizations and public employee

unions offered intense opposition to those components of the

reform which conflicted with their members' interests, in
terms of job security, promotion opportunities, employee
rights, and so forth.

This conflict between interests and

ideas was reflected in the political dynamics of the reform

process
On the whole, organized political parties have played
an ambiguous role in the efforts to reform civil services.

Reform planks in the Democratic and Republican platforms
prior to the passage of the Pendleton Act were concessions
to a few vocal activists rather than a result of party con-

sensus.

After all, the attitude of most party members at

that time was expressed by Webster Flanagan at the 1880

Republican convention, "What are we here for except for the

.
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offices? "1

When party fortunes appeared to hinge
on the
support of civil service reform, the parties
were

quick to

respond
In post-war American politics, political
parties as

such have remained generally uninterested in
civil service
reform.
In 1978, legislative support for the Carter
reform

package was bipartisan.

Yet the creation of the Second

Hoover Commission was clearly a partisan effort and when
the

Commission reported to

a

Democratic Congress in 1954, party

affiliation was highly significant in its failure.

In

Britain, political parties have given scarcely more

attention to civil service reform.

within the parties have sustained
made important contributions.

However, smaller groups
a longer term interest and

For example, the Labour

affiliated Fabian Society has remained interested in administrative reform since before World War II, writing tracts
on reform of the civil service in 1947, 1964, and again in
1973.

Thus despite short periods of intense interest,

political parties rarely maintain an interest in civil

service reform.
It is equally difficult to sustain an interest in

civil service issues in Congress or

Parliament as

a body.

It is only when other reform actors, such as the chief

executive and interest groups, apply concentrated pressure
in Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 182.
-'-Quoted
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that Congress momentarily focuses on the reform
problem.
The pressure eminating from Congress to establish
a Second
Hoover Commission is an exception to the normal Congres-

sional apathy.

However, it is true that some individual

lawmakers or committees do maintain a rather more consistent

interest in civil service issues.

The Civil Service Sub-

committee of the United States House Post Office and Civil
Service Committee exemplifies such a committee and Representatives from districts with high federal employee

constituencies are examples of such individuals.

Because of the diffused nature of the demands on

Congress/Parliament and political parties, support and

leadership of the Prime Minister or President is vital in
the politics of civil service reform.

Historically, chief

executives have steered away from involvement in reform
issues which demand much time and effort and yield little

political reward.

Yet when the issue of civil service

reform can be used as a beneficial political tactic and/or
coincides with the chief executive's larger political strategies or policy goals, he may devote limited attention.

Harold Wilson and Jimmy Carter are examples.

Both

Both men

wanted the image of reformer and Carter, in particular,
needed a legislative success.

At the same time, reform was

the route for both men to achieve the more fundamental goals

of a politically responsive and managerially competent bu-

reaucracy.

After Wilson and Carter claimed victory, their
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attention was given to more pressing problems.

Neither

executive devoted time to the implementation of
reforms.
Yet each has left his imprint on the civil
service.
Thus, the politics of civil service reform in
contem-

porary democracy results from the clash of ideas and
interests.

Individuals and groups seeking to protect their

interests are often constrained by other individuals' and
groups' sense of the public good.

Undoubtedly some self-

interested proposals are never offered because they appear
selfish, undemocratic, evil.

While some public-spirited

reforms are fought because they so threaten another's
livelihood, self-respect, or status.

Often disputes involve

some variation of the tension between the need for continuity
and the need for change.

Conflicts usually occur because

notions of administrative responsibility are shared imperfectly.

Where consensus fails, proposals for reform are

laid on the shelf.

Where a favorable consensus is reached,

at least some of the reform proposals are accepted.

Disput-

ants then return home, only to return another day.

Problems and Prospects
To the extent that civil service reforms in the two

democracies under discussion have been stimulated and influenced by the prevailing social, economic, and political
forces, responsive to the values of the predominant political

leadership, and intent on securing representative bureaucracies,

they have been on the right track to securing
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responsible administration.

Yet both the Fulton and Carter

reforms take detours that may seriously impede the
search
for responsible administration. One of the traditional

strengths of British politics has been the ability of the
political leadership to regard the civil servant as a

national resource.

To a greater extent than the United

States, Britain has valued the civil servant "for his or her

capacity to respond effectively to
political leaders and to offer

a

succession of different

a service that is more posi-

tive and independent than mere passive obedience.""*"

There

is some question as to whether the Fulton proposals to

reduce the anonymity of civil servants and to increase the

number of political advisors do not indicate a reduced

appreciation of the civil service as a resource.
other hand, the creation of
a

a SES in the

On the

United States marks

potential contribution to realizing the senior civil ser-

vice as "a 'third force' that is different from the self-

interests of either political partisans or bureaucratic

organization men."

However, SES provisions for reassign-

ment of career officials, interchange of career and political
appointees in career general positions, and limited right of
appeals indicate that a harmonious balance between political

responsiveness and neutral competence is quite delicate.
Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 246.
-"-Hugh
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A second and more important problem relates
balance between competence and ethics.

to the

Another of the

strengths of British civil service has been a
particular

philosophy of administration which combines the
pursuit of
efficiency and effectiveness with a commitment to ethical
ideals.

Rosamund Thomas points up three ethical ideals

which form the basis of this commitment:

1)

administration

is a means to attaining a higher form of society;

istration should render

2)

admin-

a service to the community by

supplying the public with quality goods and services at a

reasonable cost;

3)

administration should provide for the

happiness and well-being of the worker through the supply of

non-economic incentives

Administrators guided by this

philosophy of administration are characterized as much by
their high personal character as by their professional

expertise, by their broad social and political perspectives
in addition to their ability to plan ahead, and by their

capacity for reasoned judgment as well as by their knowledge
of technical skills.

From the British philosophy of admin-

istration one learns "the importance of a balance between
science and ethics." 2

Administrative reform seeking such a balance does not
focus on external controls and economic incentives.

By

^Rosamund M. Thomas, The British Philosophy of Admin
istration (London: Longman Group Limited, 1978), p. 24.
2lbid., p. 242.

-

287

emphasizing such approaches reformers may be introducing
new
organizational rigidities and dysfunctions, such as subservient behavior and risk avoidance.

Perhaps more importantly,

they may "be undermining what seem to be dying embers of the

spirit of public service.

The decline in morale and near-

elimination of the spirit of public service is
serious matter.

a

very

it is perhaps a factor in the unrest in

the industrial and non-industrial civil service in Britain
and the employee dissatisfaction at all levels of government
in the United States.

An emphasis on hierarchical controls as exemplified by
management-by-objective techniques, economic incentives, and
security disincentives damages the balance necessary for

responsible democratic government. 2

"If there is a choice

between the liberal, tolerant mind, and efficiency," Herman
Finer argued in 1937, "then efficiency in the harsh and

aggressive sense is well lost."

Both the Fulton and SES

-^Richard A. Chapman, "Training for Administrators in
British Central and Local Government," revised version of a
paper given in Trent Polytechnic, England, February 1981,
One SES member in the Office of Personnel Management
p. 11.
shared his impression that the attitudes of new SES candidates are different from older senior civil servants. The
new candidates, the interviewee suggested, are more concerned
about individual safety and not as concerned about the
rewards of public service as those who have been in government service longer. Interview, Washington, D.C., 1981.

2see Frank P. Sherwood and William J. Page, Jr., "MBO
and Public Management, " in Contemporary Approaches t o Public
Budgeting, ed. Fred A. Kramer (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 139.

^Herman Finer, The British Civil Service (London: The
Fabian Society, 1937), p. 89.
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reformers were remiss, first, in assuming that
conduct in
conformity with specialized professional education
and

quantitative performance standards would be sufficient
to
maintain democratic administrative values. Second,
they

erred in failing to consider how their reforms would affect
administrators' attitudes and behavior toward their work and
the public at large.
The new wave of reformers will explore alternative

approaches to securing responsible administration.

Perhaps

"the' hope of achieving a responsible bureaucracy lies,

rather, in developing internal controls, that is, the

emergence of an administrative hierarchy conscious of its
role under a democratic system and dedicated to the enhance-

ment of the system.""^

Civil servants who are as committed

to the search for community well-being as to professional

expertise become their own best taskmasters.
If these comments are on track, then it is possible

that the Fulton and Carter reforms of the senior civil

service have failed to contribute to responsible administration in a most fundamental way.

The central moral question

for public administration was asked a century ago by Woodrow

Wilson, how shall the public administrator be motivated to
serve "not his superior alone but the community also, with
the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of

loavid M. Levitan, "The Responsibility of Adminis
tive Officials in a Democratic Society," Political Scie
Quarterly 61, No. 4 (December 1946): 582.

289

his conscience?"^

It appears that recent British and

American reform efforts have created administrative
environments in which civil servants may be more motivated by
techniques to serve superiors and self-interest than by

a

spirit of cooperation and sense of community purpose to
serve the wider public.

In the contemporary democracies of

Britain and the United States acceptance of recommendations
for reform along these latter lines will require the

development of

a

favorable political consensus.

Iwoodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration,"
Political Science Quarterly 2, No. 2 (June 1887) :221.

.
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